Files
honeyDueAPI/internal/handlers/media_handler.go
T
Trey t c77ff07ce9
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fix(security): remediate 2026-05-12 audit findings (Stages 2–5)
Remediation of the 2026-05-12/13 audits (78 findings + cluster gaps),
tracked in deploy-k3s/SECURITY.md, plus fixes from two independent
post-remediation reviews.

Auth & sessions:
- SHA-256 hashed auth-token storage (C1); prior-token cache eviction on
  re-login (MEDIUM-1)
- local Google JWKS verification, iss/aud/exp checks (C2/C3)
- constant-time login + generic errors (L1/LIVE-L11/LIVE-L13)
- per-account login lockout keyed on distinct source IPs (M5/MEDIUM-3)
- verified-email gating, login rate limiting (LIVE-L19, H1-H3)

IAP & webhooks:
- Apple/Google cross-account replay protection (C5/C6/C10/C13, H5/H6)
- migrations 000003-000006 (token hashing, IAP replay, audit_log +
  webhook_event_log table creation, append-only audit log)

Authorization & races:
- file-ownership owner-OR-member fix (C7), atomic share-code join
  (C9/H9), device-token reassignment (C8/LOW-3)

Secrets & deploy:
- secrets file-mounted at /etc/honeydue/secrets, not env (F8); Redis
  password out of the ConfigMap (HIGH-1); B2 keys reconciled
- digest-pinned images, admin ingress hardening, CSP/HSTS, /metrics
  lockdown; kubeconfig 0600, etcd secrets-encryption, fail2ban +
  unattended-upgrades at provision; secret-rotation runbook

Build, vet, and the full test suite (incl. -race) pass; the goose
migration chain is verified against PostgreSQL 16.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-16 22:28:33 -05:00

211 lines
6.2 KiB
Go

package handlers
import (
"net/http"
"path/filepath"
"strconv"
"strings"
"github.com/labstack/echo/v4"
"github.com/treytartt/honeydue-api/internal/apperrors"
"github.com/treytartt/honeydue-api/internal/middleware"
"github.com/treytartt/honeydue-api/internal/repositories"
"github.com/treytartt/honeydue-api/internal/services"
)
// MediaHandler handles authenticated media serving
type MediaHandler struct {
documentRepo *repositories.DocumentRepository
taskRepo *repositories.TaskRepository
residenceRepo *repositories.ResidenceRepository
storageSvc *services.StorageService
}
// NewMediaHandler creates a new media handler
func NewMediaHandler(
documentRepo *repositories.DocumentRepository,
taskRepo *repositories.TaskRepository,
residenceRepo *repositories.ResidenceRepository,
storageSvc *services.StorageService,
) *MediaHandler {
return &MediaHandler{
documentRepo: documentRepo,
taskRepo: taskRepo,
residenceRepo: residenceRepo,
storageSvc: storageSvc,
}
}
// safeContentDisposition builds an inline Content-Disposition header value
// with a sanitized filename (audit M1). Control characters (including CR/LF),
// double-quote and backslash are stripped so an attacker-controlled upload
// filename cannot inject additional response headers (CWE-113).
func safeContentDisposition(filename string) string {
cleaned := strings.Map(func(r rune) rune {
if r < 0x20 || r == 0x7f || r == '"' || r == '\\' {
return -1
}
return r
}, filename)
if cleaned == "" {
cleaned = "download"
}
return `inline; filename="` + cleaned + `"`
}
// ServeDocument serves a document file with access control
// GET /api/media/document/:id
func (h *MediaHandler) ServeDocument(c echo.Context) error {
user, err := middleware.MustGetAuthUser(c)
if err != nil {
return err
}
id, err := strconv.ParseUint(c.Param("id"), 10, 32)
if err != nil {
return apperrors.BadRequest("error.invalid_id")
}
// Get document
doc, err := h.documentRepo.FindByID(uint(id))
if err != nil {
return apperrors.NotFound("error.document_not_found")
}
// Check access to residence
hasAccess, err := h.residenceRepo.HasAccess(doc.ResidenceID, user.ID)
if err != nil || !hasAccess {
return apperrors.Forbidden("error.access_denied")
}
// Serve the file (supports encrypted files transparently)
data, mimeType, err := h.storageSvc.ReadFile(doc.FileURL)
if err != nil {
return apperrors.NotFound("error.file_not_found")
}
// Set caching and disposition headers
c.Response().Header().Set("Cache-Control", "private, max-age=3600")
if doc.FileName != "" {
c.Response().Header().Set("Content-Disposition", safeContentDisposition(doc.FileName))
}
return c.Blob(http.StatusOK, mimeType, data)
}
// ServeDocumentImage serves a document image with access control
// GET /api/media/document-image/:id
func (h *MediaHandler) ServeDocumentImage(c echo.Context) error {
user, err := middleware.MustGetAuthUser(c)
if err != nil {
return err
}
id, err := strconv.ParseUint(c.Param("id"), 10, 32)
if err != nil {
return apperrors.BadRequest("error.invalid_id")
}
// Get document image
img, err := h.documentRepo.FindImageByID(uint(id))
if err != nil {
return apperrors.NotFound("error.image_not_found")
}
// Get parent document to check residence access
doc, err := h.documentRepo.FindByID(img.DocumentID)
if err != nil {
return apperrors.NotFound("error.document_not_found")
}
// Check access to residence
hasAccess, err := h.residenceRepo.HasAccess(doc.ResidenceID, user.ID)
if err != nil || !hasAccess {
return apperrors.Forbidden("error.access_denied")
}
// Serve the file (supports encrypted files transparently)
data, mimeType, err := h.storageSvc.ReadFile(img.ImageURL)
if err != nil {
return apperrors.NotFound("error.file_not_found")
}
c.Response().Header().Set("Cache-Control", "private, max-age=3600")
c.Response().Header().Set("Content-Disposition", safeContentDisposition(filepath.Base(img.ImageURL)))
return c.Blob(http.StatusOK, mimeType, data)
}
// ServeCompletionImage serves a task completion image with access control
// GET /api/media/completion-image/:id
func (h *MediaHandler) ServeCompletionImage(c echo.Context) error {
user, err := middleware.MustGetAuthUser(c)
if err != nil {
return err
}
id, err := strconv.ParseUint(c.Param("id"), 10, 32)
if err != nil {
return apperrors.BadRequest("error.invalid_id")
}
// Get completion image
img, err := h.taskRepo.FindCompletionImageByID(uint(id))
if err != nil {
return apperrors.NotFound("error.image_not_found")
}
// Get the completion to get the task
completion, err := h.taskRepo.FindCompletionByID(img.CompletionID)
if err != nil {
return apperrors.NotFound("error.completion_not_found")
}
// Get task to check residence access
task, err := h.taskRepo.FindByID(completion.TaskID)
if err != nil {
return apperrors.NotFound("error.task_not_found")
}
// Check access to residence
hasAccess, err := h.residenceRepo.HasAccess(task.ResidenceID, user.ID)
if err != nil || !hasAccess {
return apperrors.Forbidden("error.access_denied")
}
// Serve the file (supports encrypted files transparently)
data, mimeType, err := h.storageSvc.ReadFile(img.ImageURL)
if err != nil {
return apperrors.NotFound("error.file_not_found")
}
c.Response().Header().Set("Cache-Control", "private, max-age=3600")
c.Response().Header().Set("Content-Disposition", safeContentDisposition(filepath.Base(img.ImageURL)))
return c.Blob(http.StatusOK, mimeType, data)
}
// resolveFilePath converts a stored URL to an actual file path.
// Returns empty string if the URL is empty or the resolved path would escape
// the upload directory (path traversal attempt).
func (h *MediaHandler) resolveFilePath(storedURL string) string {
if storedURL == "" {
return ""
}
uploadDir := h.storageSvc.GetUploadDir()
// Strip legacy /uploads/ prefix to get relative path
relativePath := storedURL
if strings.HasPrefix(storedURL, "/uploads/") {
relativePath = strings.TrimPrefix(storedURL, "/uploads/")
}
// Use SafeResolvePath to validate containment within upload directory
resolved, err := services.SafeResolvePath(uploadDir, relativePath)
if err != nil {
// Path traversal or invalid path — return empty to signal file not found
return ""
}
return resolved
}