c77ff07ce9
Remediation of the 2026-05-12/13 audits (78 findings + cluster gaps), tracked in deploy-k3s/SECURITY.md, plus fixes from two independent post-remediation reviews. Auth & sessions: - SHA-256 hashed auth-token storage (C1); prior-token cache eviction on re-login (MEDIUM-1) - local Google JWKS verification, iss/aud/exp checks (C2/C3) - constant-time login + generic errors (L1/LIVE-L11/LIVE-L13) - per-account login lockout keyed on distinct source IPs (M5/MEDIUM-3) - verified-email gating, login rate limiting (LIVE-L19, H1-H3) IAP & webhooks: - Apple/Google cross-account replay protection (C5/C6/C10/C13, H5/H6) - migrations 000003-000006 (token hashing, IAP replay, audit_log + webhook_event_log table creation, append-only audit log) Authorization & races: - file-ownership owner-OR-member fix (C7), atomic share-code join (C9/H9), device-token reassignment (C8/LOW-3) Secrets & deploy: - secrets file-mounted at /etc/honeydue/secrets, not env (F8); Redis password out of the ConfigMap (HIGH-1); B2 keys reconciled - digest-pinned images, admin ingress hardening, CSP/HSTS, /metrics lockdown; kubeconfig 0600, etcd secrets-encryption, fail2ban + unattended-upgrades at provision; secret-rotation runbook Build, vet, and the full test suite (incl. -race) pass; the goose migration chain is verified against PostgreSQL 16. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
53 lines
2.3 KiB
PL/PgSQL
53 lines
2.3 KiB
PL/PgSQL
-- +goose Up
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-- Audit M7: make audit_log append-only. A BEFORE trigger rejects UPDATE and
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-- DELETE so the security-event history cannot be altered or erased after the
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-- fact — even by a database account with broad table privileges. The
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-- application only ever INSERTs into this table.
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-- The audit_log table itself was never created by a goose migration — it is
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-- only built by GORM AutoMigrate in the test harness, and production never
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-- runs AutoMigrate. CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS brings it under migration
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-- control without disturbing an existing table: a no-op on a DB that already
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-- has it, and a correct build (matching models.AuditLog) on a from-scratch
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-- redeploy — so the trigger below has a table to attach to and a clean
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-- redeploy comes up with a working, append-only audit log.
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_log (
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id BIGSERIAL PRIMARY KEY,
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user_id BIGINT,
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event_type VARCHAR(50) NOT NULL,
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ip_address VARCHAR(45),
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user_agent TEXT,
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details JSONB,
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created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
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);
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CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_log_user_id ON audit_log (user_id);
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CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_log_created_at ON audit_log (created_at);
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-- +goose StatementBegin
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CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION audit_log_append_only() RETURNS trigger AS $$
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BEGIN
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RAISE EXCEPTION 'audit_log is append-only: % is not permitted', TG_OP;
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END;
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$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
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-- +goose StatementEnd
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-- DROP ... IF EXISTS before CREATE keeps this idempotent (CREATE TRIGGER has
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-- no OR REPLACE on older PostgreSQL).
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DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS audit_log_no_update ON audit_log;
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CREATE TRIGGER audit_log_no_update
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BEFORE UPDATE ON audit_log
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FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION audit_log_append_only();
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DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS audit_log_no_delete ON audit_log;
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CREATE TRIGGER audit_log_no_delete
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BEFORE DELETE ON audit_log
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FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION audit_log_append_only();
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-- +goose Down
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-- Reverses only the append-only guard, which is this migration's purpose.
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-- The audit_log table is intentionally NOT dropped — it may hold security
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-- history that predates this migration.
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DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS audit_log_no_delete ON audit_log;
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DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS audit_log_no_update ON audit_log;
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DROP FUNCTION IF EXISTS audit_log_append_only();
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