fix(security): remediate 2026-05-12 audit findings (Stages 2–5)

Remediation of the 2026-05-12/13 audits (78 findings + cluster gaps),
tracked in deploy-k3s/SECURITY.md, plus fixes from two independent
post-remediation reviews.

Auth & sessions:
- SHA-256 hashed auth-token storage (C1); prior-token cache eviction on
  re-login (MEDIUM-1)
- local Google JWKS verification, iss/aud/exp checks (C2/C3)
- constant-time login + generic errors (L1/LIVE-L11/LIVE-L13)
- per-account login lockout keyed on distinct source IPs (M5/MEDIUM-3)
- verified-email gating, login rate limiting (LIVE-L19, H1-H3)

IAP & webhooks:
- Apple/Google cross-account replay protection (C5/C6/C10/C13, H5/H6)
- migrations 000003-000006 (token hashing, IAP replay, audit_log +
  webhook_event_log table creation, append-only audit log)

Authorization & races:
- file-ownership owner-OR-member fix (C7), atomic share-code join
  (C9/H9), device-token reassignment (C8/LOW-3)

Secrets & deploy:
- secrets file-mounted at /etc/honeydue/secrets, not env (F8); Redis
  password out of the ConfigMap (HIGH-1); B2 keys reconciled
- digest-pinned images, admin ingress hardening, CSP/HSTS, /metrics
  lockdown; kubeconfig 0600, etcd secrets-encryption, fail2ban +
  unattended-upgrades at provision; secret-rotation runbook

Build, vet, and the full test suite (incl. -race) pass; the goose
migration chain is verified against PostgreSQL 16.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

Dockerfile

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # Admin panel build stage
-FROM node:20-alpine AS admin-builder
+FROM node:20-alpine@sha256:fb4cd12c85ee03686f6af5362a0b0d56d50c58a04632e6c0fb8363f609372293 AS admin-builder
 
 WORKDIR /app
 
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ FROM go-base AS worker
 CMD ["/app/worker"]
 
 # Admin panel runtime stage
-FROM node:20-alpine AS admin
+FROM node:20-alpine@sha256:fb4cd12c85ee03686f6af5362a0b0d56d50c58a04632e6c0fb8363f609372293 AS admin
 
 WORKDIR /app
 
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ ENV HOSTNAME="0.0.0.0"
 CMD ["node", "server.js"]
 
 # Default production stage (for Dokku - runs API + Admin)
-FROM node:20-alpine AS production
+FROM node:20-alpine@sha256:fb4cd12c85ee03686f6af5362a0b0d56d50c58a04632e6c0fb8363f609372293 AS production
 
 # Install runtime dependencies
 RUN apk add --no-cache ca-certificates tzdata curl

cmd/api/main.go

@@ -54,11 +54,13 @@ func main() {
 	// Initialize OpenTelemetry tracing — exports to obs.88oakapps.com
 	// (Jaeger via OTLP/HTTP) when OBS_TRACES_URL is set; otherwise installs
 	// a no-op tracer so call sites can use otel.Tracer() unconditionally.
+	// config.SecretValue (not os.Getenv) so file-mounted secrets resolve
+	// after audit F8 removed these from the process environment.
 	tracingShutdown, err := tracing.Init(context.Background(), tracing.Config{
 		ServiceName: "honeydue-api",
 		Environment: deploymentEnvironment(cfg.Server.Debug),
-		EndpointURL: os.Getenv("OBS_TRACES_URL"),
+		EndpointURL: config.SecretValue("OBS_TRACES_URL"),
-		BearerToken: os.Getenv("OBS_INGEST_TOKEN"),
+		BearerToken: config.SecretValue("OBS_INGEST_TOKEN"),
 		SampleRatio: tracing.SampleRatioFromEnv(),
 	})
 	if err != nil {

cmd/worker/main.go

@@ -47,11 +47,13 @@ func main() {
 
 	// Initialize OpenTelemetry tracing for the worker process. Same OTLP
 	// destination as the api; service.name distinguishes them in Jaeger.
+	// config.SecretValue (not os.Getenv) so file-mounted secrets resolve
+	// after audit F8 removed these from the process environment.
 	tracingShutdown, err := tracing.Init(context.Background(), tracing.Config{
 		ServiceName: "honeydue-worker",
 		Environment: workerDeploymentEnv(cfg.Server.Debug),
-		EndpointURL: os.Getenv("OBS_TRACES_URL"),
+		EndpointURL: config.SecretValue("OBS_TRACES_URL"),
-		BearerToken: os.Getenv("OBS_INGEST_TOKEN"),
+		BearerToken: config.SecretValue("OBS_INGEST_TOKEN"),
 		SampleRatio: tracing.SampleRatioFromEnv(),
 	})
 	if err != nil {
@@ -106,6 +108,17 @@ func main() {
 	if err != nil {
 		log.Fatal().Err(err).Msg("Failed to parse Redis URL")
 	}
+	// Audit HIGH-1: the Redis password is a file-mounted secret (REDIS_PASSWORD),
+	// not embedded in REDIS_URL — REDIS_URL travels in the honeydue-config
+	// ConfigMap. Apply the password onto the parsed opt so the Asynq server,
+	// inspector and monitoring client (all derived from redisOpt below)
+	// authenticate against a requirepass-protected Redis.
+	if cfg.Redis.Password != "" {
+		if clientOpt, ok := redisOpt.(asynq.RedisClientOpt); ok {
+			clientOpt.Password = cfg.Redis.Password
+			redisOpt = clientOpt
+		}
+	}
 
 	// Initialize monitoring service (if Redis is available)
 	var monitoringService *monitoring.Service

deploy-k3s/config.yaml.example

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ load_balancer_ip: ""
 domains:
   api: api.myhoneydue.com
   admin: admin.myhoneydue.com
+  app: app.myhoneydue.com                   # web client host — added to CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS
   base: myhoneydue.com
 
 # --- Container Registry (GHCR) ---

deploy-k3s/manifests/admin/deployment.yaml

@@ -23,8 +23,11 @@ spec:
         app.kubernetes.io/part-of: honeydue
     spec:
       serviceAccountName: admin
+      # Explicit pod-level opt-out (audit F11) — defense-in-depth on top of
+      # the ServiceAccount-level setting in rbac.yaml.
+      automountServiceAccountToken: false
       imagePullSecrets:
-        - name: ghcr-credentials
+        - name: gitea-credentials
       securityContext:
         runAsNonRoot: true
         runAsUser: 1001
@@ -35,6 +38,7 @@ spec:
       containers:
         - name: admin
           image: IMAGE_PLACEHOLDER  # Replaced by 03-deploy.sh
+          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent  # audit CODE-L4 — explicit; images are SHA/digest-pinned
           ports:
             - containerPort: 3000
               protocol: TCP

deploy-k3s/manifests/api/deployment.yaml

@@ -23,8 +23,11 @@ spec:
         app.kubernetes.io/part-of: honeydue
     spec:
       serviceAccountName: api
+      # Explicit pod-level opt-out (audit F11) — defense-in-depth on top of
+      # the ServiceAccount-level setting in rbac.yaml.
+      automountServiceAccountToken: false
       imagePullSecrets:
-        - name: ghcr-credentials
+        - name: gitea-credentials
       securityContext:
         runAsNonRoot: true
         runAsUser: 1000
@@ -35,6 +38,7 @@ spec:
       containers:
         - name: api
           image: IMAGE_PLACEHOLDER  # Replaced by 03-deploy.sh
+          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent  # audit CODE-L4 — explicit; images are SHA/digest-pinned
           ports:
             - containerPort: 8000
               protocol: TCP
@@ -46,65 +50,16 @@ spec:
           envFrom:
             - configMapRef:
                 name: honeydue-config
-          env:
+          # Audit CODE-F8: secrets are NOT injected as environment variables.
-            - name: POSTGRES_PASSWORD
+          # Env vars are readable for the life of the pod via /proc/<pid>/environ
-              valueFrom:
+          # and leak into crash dumps / child processes. honeydue-secrets is
-                secretKeyRef:
+          # mounted read-only at /etc/honeydue/secrets (mode 0400) and the Go
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
+          # config layer (config.loadFileSecrets) reads each key from its file.
-                  key: POSTGRES_PASSWORD
+          # Non-secret config still arrives via the configMapRef above.
-            - name: SECRET_KEY
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
-                  key: SECRET_KEY
-            - name: EMAIL_HOST_PASSWORD
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
-                  key: EMAIL_HOST_PASSWORD
-            - name: FCM_SERVER_KEY
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
-                  key: FCM_SERVER_KEY
-            - name: REDIS_PASSWORD
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
-                  key: REDIS_PASSWORD
-                  optional: true
-            # B2 (Backblaze) credentials. With both set, StorageConfig.IsS3()
-            # returns true and uploads stream to B2 via minio-go. With either
-            # missing, code falls back to local filesystem — and since
-            # readOnlyRootFilesystem is true on this container, that fallback
-            # silently fails. So both must be wired or uploads break.
-            - name: B2_KEY_ID
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
-                  key: B2_KEY_ID
-            - name: B2_APP_KEY
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
-                  key: B2_APP_KEY
-            # Observability — push traces (and any future OTLP metrics) to
-            # obs.88oakapps.com. Token gates ingest at nginx; URL is the
-            # same one vmagent uses for metric remote-write. Both come from
-            # honeydue-secrets so they aren't world-readable in ConfigMap.
-            - name: OBS_TRACES_URL
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
-                  key: OBS_TRACES_URL
-                  optional: true
-            - name: OBS_INGEST_TOKEN
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
-                  key: OBS_INGEST_TOKEN
-                  optional: true
           volumeMounts:
+            - name: app-secrets
+              mountPath: /etc/honeydue/secrets
+              readOnly: true
             - name: apns-key
               mountPath: /secrets/apns
               readOnly: true
@@ -121,11 +76,12 @@ spec:
             httpGet:
               path: /api/health/
               port: 8000
-            # MigrateWithLock in cmd/api/main.go runs pg_advisory_lock on
+            # Schema migrations run separately in the honeydue-migrate Job
-            # every startup. On a cold boot with 3 replicas, the first does
+            # *before* this Deployment rolls — the api itself does not migrate
-            # AutoMigrate (~90s) and the others wait on the lock, so real
+            # (it only verifies goose_db_version at boot). Cold start still
-            # startup runs 90–240s. 48 × 5s = 240s grace absorbs it without
+            # pays the DB pool warm-up + Redis connect + APNs/FCM client init
-            # healthcheck killing a still-starting replica.
+            # before /api/health/ goes green. 48 × 5s = 240s grace keeps the
+            # probe from killing a still-starting replica.
             failureThreshold: 48
             periodSeconds: 5
           readinessProbe:
@@ -143,6 +99,12 @@ spec:
             periodSeconds: 30
             timeoutSeconds: 10
       volumes:
+        # Audit CODE-F8: the whole honeydue-secrets Secret, projected as files.
+        # defaultMode 0400 → readable only by the container's runAsUser (1000).
+        - name: app-secrets
+          secret:
+            secretName: honeydue-secrets
+            defaultMode: 0400
         - name: apns-key
           secret:
             secretName: honeydue-apns-key

deploy-k3s/manifests/ingress/ingress-simple.yaml

@@ -53,7 +53,12 @@ metadata:
   labels:
     app.kubernetes.io/part-of: honeydue
   annotations:
-    traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.middlewares: honeydue-security-headers@kubernetescrd,honeydue-rate-limit@kubernetescrd
+    # cloudflare-only + admin-auth wired in (audit F2/F3/CODE-L6). Order
+    # matters: reject non-Cloudflare IPs, then basic auth, then headers,
+    # then rate limit. The admin-basic-auth secret is created by
+    # 02-setup-secrets.sh from config.yaml admin.basic_auth_* — that runs
+    # before 03-deploy.sh, so the middleware always has its secret.
+    traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.middlewares: honeydue-cloudflare-only@kubernetescrd,honeydue-admin-auth@kubernetescrd,honeydue-security-headers@kubernetescrd,honeydue-rate-limit@kubernetescrd
 spec:
   ingressClassName: traefik
   tls:
@@ -98,3 +103,98 @@ spec:
                 name: web
                 port:
                   number: 3000
+---
+# Auth-endpoint Ingress (audit F10 / LIVE-L12). A dedicated Ingress for the
+# auth paths so Traefik gives their longer path-prefix routers a higher
+# priority than honeydue-api's "/" router — these paths then get
+# auth-rate-limit (5/min) instead of the general rate-limit (100/min).
+# Anything not matched here falls through to honeydue-api unchanged.
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: Ingress
+metadata:
+  name: honeydue-api-auth
+  namespace: honeydue
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: honeydue
+  annotations:
+    traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.middlewares: honeydue-auth-rate-limit@kubernetescrd,honeydue-security-headers@kubernetescrd
+spec:
+  ingressClassName: traefik
+  tls:
+    - hosts:
+        - api.myhoneydue.com
+      secretName: cloudflare-origin-cert
+  rules:
+    - host: api.myhoneydue.com
+      http:
+        paths:
+          - path: /api/auth/login
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: api
+                port:
+                  number: 8000
+          - path: /api/auth/register
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: api
+                port:
+                  number: 8000
+          - path: /api/auth/forgot-password
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: api
+                port:
+                  number: 8000
+          - path: /api/auth/reset-password
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: api
+                port:
+                  number: 8000
+          - path: /api/residences/join-with-code
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: api
+                port:
+                  number: 8000
+          - path: /api/auth/verify-reset-code
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: api
+                port:
+                  number: 8000
+          - path: /api/auth/apple-sign-in
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: api
+                port:
+                  number: 8000
+          - path: /api/auth/google-sign-in
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: api
+                port:
+                  number: 8000
+          - path: /api/auth/refresh
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: api
+                port:
+                  number: 8000
+          - path: /api/auth/account
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: api
+                port:
+                  number: 8000

deploy-k3s/manifests/ingress/middleware.yaml

@@ -21,12 +21,20 @@ spec:
   headers:
     frameDeny: true
     contentTypeNosniff: true
-    browserXssFilter: true
+    # browserXssFilter removed (audit L7): it emits the deprecated
+    # X-XSS-Protection header, which can itself introduce XSS in legacy
+    # browsers. Modern browsers ignore it.
     referrerPolicy: "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
     customResponseHeaders:
       X-Content-Type-Options: "nosniff"
       X-Frame-Options: "DENY"
-      Strict-Transport-Security: "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
+      # HSTS: 2-year max-age + preload (audit L5/CODE-L3). After this is
+      # live on api/admin/app, submit myhoneydue.com to hstspreload.org.
+      Strict-Transport-Security: "max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload"
+      # Cross-origin isolation (audit F9). COEP (require-corp) is omitted —
+      # it commonly breaks third-party embeds; add only after testing.
+      Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: "same-origin"
+      Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: "same-origin"
       # Content-Security-Policy is intentionally NOT set here — the Go API
       # sets a CSP in internal/router/router.go that permits Google Fonts
       # for the landing page. Two CSP headers would intersect and break it.
@@ -83,3 +91,24 @@ spec:
   basicAuth:
     secret: admin-basic-auth
     realm: "honeyDue Admin"
+
+---
+# Strict rate limit for auth endpoints (audit F10 / LIVE-L12).
+# Applied via the honeydue-api-auth Ingress to login / register /
+# forgot-password / reset-password / join-with-code. depth: 2 makes the
+# limiter key on the real client IP rather than the Cloudflare edge IP
+# (request path: client -> Cloudflare -> Traefik). This is the edge half;
+# the per-account lockout in the Go app is the robust half.
+apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Middleware
+metadata:
+  name: auth-rate-limit
+  namespace: honeydue
+spec:
+  rateLimit:
+    average: 5
+    burst: 10
+    period: 1m
+    sourceCriterion:
+      ipStrategy:
+        depth: 2

deploy-k3s/manifests/kyverno-verify-images.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+# Kyverno image-signature verification policy (audit CODE-L5).
+#
+# ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# THIS MANIFEST IS NOT APPLIED BY 03-deploy.sh. It is intentionally outside
+# the script's apply set. Applying it before the prerequisites are in place
+# would block every honeydue Pod from scheduling. Operator steps:
+#
+#   1. Install Kyverno in the cluster (it is an admission controller):
+#        kubectl create -f https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno/releases/latest/download/install.yaml
+#   2. Generate a cosign key pair and keep the private key safe:
+#        cosign generate-key-pair                 # -> cosign.key (PRIVATE) + cosign.pub
+#      Set COSIGN_KEY=cosign.key in the deploy environment so 03-deploy.sh
+#      signs images after pushing them (the signing step is already wired,
+#      guarded, into 03-deploy.sh).
+#   3. Paste the contents of cosign.pub into the publicKeys block below.
+#   4. Apply this policy:  kubectl apply -f deploy-k3s/manifests/kyverno-verify-images.yaml
+#   5. After confirming honeydue Pods still schedule, flip
+#      validationFailureAction from Audit to Enforce.
+#
+# Until then it is a documented, ready-to-use template — not active config.
+# ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
+kind: ClusterPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: verify-honeydue-images
+  annotations:
+    policies.kyverno.io/title: Verify honeyDue image signatures
+    policies.kyverno.io/description: >-
+      Requires that honeyDue application images pulled into the honeydue
+      namespace carry a valid cosign signature made with the operator's key.
+spec:
+  # Audit first — logs violations without blocking. Switch to Enforce once
+  # signing is confirmed working end to end.
+  validationFailureAction: Audit
+  background: false
+  webhookTimeoutSeconds: 30
+  rules:
+    - name: verify-gitea-image-signatures
+      match:
+        any:
+          - resources:
+              kinds:
+                - Pod
+              namespaces:
+                - honeydue
+      verifyImages:
+        # Only the images we build and sign. Public base images
+        # (redis, vmagent) are pinned by digest instead — see their manifests.
+        - imageReferences:
+            - "gitea.treytartt.com/admin/honeydue-api*"
+            - "gitea.treytartt.com/admin/honeydue-worker*"
+            - "gitea.treytartt.com/admin/honeydue-admin*"
+            - "gitea.treytartt.com/admin/honeydue-web*"
+          attestors:
+            - count: 1
+              entries:
+                - keys:
+                    publicKeys: |-
+                      -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+                      REPLACE_WITH_CONTENTS_OF_cosign.pub
+                      -----END PUBLIC KEY-----

deploy-k3s/manifests/migrate/job.yaml

@@ -27,8 +27,10 @@ spec:
         app.kubernetes.io/part-of: honeydue
     spec:
       restartPolicy: Never
+      # The migrate Job never calls the k8s API (audit F11).
+      automountServiceAccountToken: false
       imagePullSecrets:
-        - name: ghcr-credentials
+        - name: gitea-credentials
       securityContext:
         runAsNonRoot: true
         runAsUser: 1000
@@ -38,6 +40,7 @@ spec:
       containers:
         - name: goose
           image: IMAGE_PLACEHOLDER  # Replaced by 03-deploy.sh — same as api
+          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent  # audit CODE-L4 — explicit
           command: ["/bin/sh", "-c"]
           # DB_HOST in the ConfigMap points at the -pooler endpoint for runtime.
           # goose's session-scoped advisory lock can't survive PgBouncer

deploy-k3s/manifests/observability/vmagent.yaml

@@ -179,7 +179,17 @@ spec:
           type: RuntimeDefault
       containers:
         - name: vmagent
-          image: victoriametrics/vmagent:v1.106.1
+          # Pinned by digest (audit K3S-F14).
+          image: victoriametrics/vmagent:v1.106.1@sha256:90208a667c0baf65f7536b92a84c40b6e35ffe8e88bda7e4447b97b06c6ba6b8
+          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent  # audit CODE-L4 — explicit
+          # Container-level hardening (audit F7) — matches the other 5
+          # workloads. vmagent only writes to the /tmp/vmagent emptyDir
+          # (its remoteWrite buffer), so a read-only root filesystem holds.
+          securityContext:
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+            capabilities:
+              drop: ["ALL"]
           args:
             - "-promscrape.config=/etc/vmagent/scrape.yaml"
             - "-remoteWrite.url=https://obs.88oakapps.com/api/v1/write"

deploy-k3s/manifests/redis/deployment.yaml

@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@ spec:
         app.kubernetes.io/part-of: honeydue
     spec:
       serviceAccountName: redis
+      # Explicit pod-level opt-out (audit F11) — defense-in-depth on top of
+      # the ServiceAccount-level setting in rbac.yaml.
+      automountServiceAccountToken: false
       nodeSelector:
         honeydue/redis: "true"
       securityContext:
@@ -31,7 +34,9 @@ spec:
           type: RuntimeDefault
       containers:
         - name: redis
-          image: redis:7-alpine
+          # Pinned by digest (audit K3S-F14) — redis:7-alpine is 7.4.9-alpine.
+          image: redis:7-alpine@sha256:6ab0b6e7381779332f97b8ca76193e45b0756f38d4c0dcda72dbb3c32061ab99
+          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent  # audit CODE-L4 — explicit
           command:
             - sh
             - -c

deploy-k3s/manifests/web/deployment.yaml

@@ -23,8 +23,11 @@ spec:
         app.kubernetes.io/part-of: honeydue
     spec:
       serviceAccountName: web
+      # Explicit pod-level opt-out (audit F11) — defense-in-depth on top of
+      # the ServiceAccount-level setting in rbac.yaml.
+      automountServiceAccountToken: false
       imagePullSecrets:
-        - name: ghcr-credentials
+        - name: gitea-credentials
       securityContext:
         runAsNonRoot: true
         runAsUser: 1001
@@ -43,6 +46,7 @@ spec:
       containers:
         - name: web
           image: IMAGE_PLACEHOLDER  # Replaced by 03-deploy.sh or manual sed
+          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent  # audit CODE-L4 — explicit; images are SHA/digest-pinned
           ports:
             - containerPort: 3000
               protocol: TCP

deploy-k3s/manifests/worker/deployment.yaml

@@ -27,8 +27,11 @@ spec:
         app.kubernetes.io/part-of: honeydue
     spec:
       serviceAccountName: worker
+      # Explicit pod-level opt-out (audit F11) — defense-in-depth on top of
+      # the ServiceAccount-level setting in rbac.yaml.
+      automountServiceAccountToken: false
       imagePullSecrets:
-        - name: ghcr-credentials
+        - name: gitea-credentials
       securityContext:
         runAsNonRoot: true
         runAsUser: 1000
@@ -39,6 +42,7 @@ spec:
       containers:
         - name: worker
           image: IMAGE_PLACEHOLDER  # Replaced by 03-deploy.sh
+          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent  # audit CODE-L4 — explicit; images are SHA/digest-pinned
           securityContext:
             allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
             readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
@@ -47,64 +51,16 @@ spec:
           envFrom:
             - configMapRef:
                 name: honeydue-config
-          env:
+          # Audit CODE-F8: secrets are NOT injected as environment variables.
-            - name: POSTGRES_PASSWORD
+          # Env vars are readable for the life of the pod via /proc/<pid>/environ
-              valueFrom:
+          # and leak into crash dumps / child processes. honeydue-secrets is
-                secretKeyRef:
+          # mounted read-only at /etc/honeydue/secrets (mode 0400) and the Go
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
+          # config layer (config.loadFileSecrets) reads each key from its file.
-                  key: POSTGRES_PASSWORD
+          # Non-secret config still arrives via the configMapRef above.
-            - name: SECRET_KEY
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
-                  key: SECRET_KEY
-            - name: EMAIL_HOST_PASSWORD
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
-                  key: EMAIL_HOST_PASSWORD
-            - name: FCM_SERVER_KEY
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
-                  key: FCM_SERVER_KEY
-            - name: REDIS_PASSWORD
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
-                  key: REDIS_PASSWORD
-                  optional: true
-            # B2 (Backblaze) credentials. The worker needs these to delete
-            # B2 objects when the pending_uploads cleanup cron reaps
-            # expired upload sessions. Without them the worker falls back
-            # to local-disk storage which fails on this pod's read-only
-            # root filesystem and disables the cleanup cron.
-            - name: B2_KEY_ID
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
-                  key: B2_KEY_ID
-            - name: B2_APP_KEY
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
-                  key: B2_APP_KEY
-            # Observability — workers emit traces (e.g., asynq job spans) to
-            # obs.88oakapps.com over OTLP/HTTP. service.name=honeydue-worker
-            # so api and worker show up as separate services in Jaeger.
-            - name: OBS_TRACES_URL
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
-                  key: OBS_TRACES_URL
-                  optional: true
-            - name: OBS_INGEST_TOKEN
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
-                  key: OBS_INGEST_TOKEN
-                  optional: true
           volumeMounts:
+            - name: app-secrets
+              mountPath: /etc/honeydue/secrets
+              readOnly: true
             - name: apns-key
               mountPath: /secrets/apns
               readOnly: true
@@ -124,6 +80,12 @@ spec:
             periodSeconds: 30
             timeoutSeconds: 5
       volumes:
+        # Audit CODE-F8: the whole honeydue-secrets Secret, projected as files.
+        # defaultMode 0400 → readable only by the container's runAsUser (1000).
+        - name: app-secrets
+          secret:
+            secretName: honeydue-secrets
+            defaultMode: 0400
         - name: apns-key
           secret:
             secretName: honeydue-apns-key

deploy-k3s/scripts/02-setup-secrets.sh

@@ -68,6 +68,25 @@ SECRET_ARGS=(
 if [[ -n "${REDIS_PASSWORD}" ]]; then
   log "  Including REDIS_PASSWORD in secrets"
   SECRET_ARGS+=(--from-literal="REDIS_PASSWORD=${REDIS_PASSWORD}")
+else
+  # Audit K3S-F1 (CRITICAL) / MEDIUM-4: refuse to deploy with an unauthenticated
+  # Redis. A previous version only warned here, which let a deploy from an
+  # unedited config.yaml silently bring Redis up with no password.
+  die "redis.password is empty in config.yaml — refusing to deploy: Redis would run with NO authentication (audit K3S-F1). Set a strong value, e.g.: openssl rand -base64 32"
+fi
+
+# B2 (Backblaze) object-storage credentials. The api/worker manifests
+# reference B2_KEY_ID / B2_APP_KEY as required secret keys, so honeydue-secrets
+# MUST carry them or those pods fail to start. Sourced from config.yaml so the
+# script and the manifests no longer drift (was a latent gap before 2026-05-16).
+B2_KEY_ID_VAL="$(cfg storage.b2_key_id 2>/dev/null || true)"
+B2_APP_KEY_VAL="$(cfg storage.b2_app_key 2>/dev/null || true)"
+if [[ -n "${B2_KEY_ID_VAL}" && -n "${B2_APP_KEY_VAL}" ]]; then
+  log "  Including B2_KEY_ID / B2_APP_KEY in secrets"
+  SECRET_ARGS+=(--from-literal="B2_KEY_ID=${B2_KEY_ID_VAL}")
+  SECRET_ARGS+=(--from-literal="B2_APP_KEY=${B2_APP_KEY_VAL}")
+else
+  warn "storage.b2_key_id / b2_app_key not set in config.yaml — B2 uploads will be disabled."
 fi
 
 # Observability ingest credentials live in deploy/prod.env (gitignored) so
@@ -100,22 +119,24 @@ kubectl create secret generic honeydue-apns-key \
   --from-file="apns_auth_key.p8=${SECRETS_DIR}/apns_auth_key.p8" \
   --dry-run=client -o yaml | kubectl apply -f -
 
-# --- Create GHCR registry credentials ---
+# --- Create container registry credentials ---
+# Secret name is gitea-credentials (audit F6): the registry is self-hosted
+# Gitea, not GHCR. Every deployment manifest references this same name.
 
 REGISTRY_SERVER="$(cfg registry.server)"
 REGISTRY_USER="$(cfg registry.username)"
 REGISTRY_TOKEN="$(cfg registry.token)"
 
 if [[ -n "${REGISTRY_SERVER}" && -n "${REGISTRY_USER}" && -n "${REGISTRY_TOKEN}" ]]; then
-  log "Creating ghcr-credentials..."
+  log "Creating gitea-credentials..."
-  kubectl create secret docker-registry ghcr-credentials \
+  kubectl create secret docker-registry gitea-credentials \
     --namespace="${NAMESPACE}" \
     --docker-server="${REGISTRY_SERVER}" \
     --docker-username="${REGISTRY_USER}" \
     --docker-password="${REGISTRY_TOKEN}" \
     --dry-run=client -o yaml | kubectl apply -f -
 else
-  warn "Registry credentials incomplete in config.yaml — skipping ghcr-credentials."
+  warn "Registry credentials incomplete in config.yaml — skipping gitea-credentials."
 fi
 
 # --- Create Cloudflare origin cert ---
@@ -132,7 +153,8 @@ kubectl create secret tls cloudflare-origin-cert \
 if [[ -n "${ADMIN_AUTH_USER}" && -n "${ADMIN_AUTH_PASSWORD}" ]]; then
   command -v htpasswd >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "Missing: htpasswd (install apache2-utils)"
   log "Creating admin-basic-auth secret..."
-  HTPASSWD="$(htpasswd -nb "${ADMIN_AUTH_USER}" "${ADMIN_AUTH_PASSWORD}")"
+  # -B forces bcrypt (Traefik BasicAuth supports it; avoids weak apr1-MD5).
+  HTPASSWD="$(htpasswd -nbB "${ADMIN_AUTH_USER}" "${ADMIN_AUTH_PASSWORD}")"
   kubectl create secret generic admin-basic-auth \
     --namespace="${NAMESPACE}" \
     --from-literal=users="${HTPASSWD}" \

deploy-k3s/scripts/03-deploy.sh

@@ -128,6 +128,56 @@ else
   warn "Skipping build. Using images for tag: ${DEPLOY_TAG}"
 fi
 
+# --- Resolve immutable image digests (audit F5) ---
+# A short-SHA tag is mutable — anyone who can push to the registry can
+# overwrite it, and imagePullPolicy then pulls the new bits silently. We
+# deploy by @sha256: digest instead, pinning the exact image that was just
+# built and pushed. `docker push` populates RepoDigests; with --skip-build
+# (no local image) resolve_ref falls back to the tag.
+resolve_ref() {
+  local img="$1" digest
+  digest="$(docker inspect --format='{{range .RepoDigests}}{{println .}}{{end}}' "${img}" 2>/dev/null | grep -m1 '@sha256:' || true)"
+  if [[ -n "${digest}" ]]; then
+    printf '%s' "${digest}"
+  else
+    warn "could not resolve a digest for ${img} — deploying by mutable tag"
+    printf '%s' "${img}"
+  fi
+}
+API_REF="$(resolve_ref "${API_IMAGE}")"
+WORKER_REF="$(resolve_ref "${WORKER_IMAGE}")"
+ADMIN_REF="$(resolve_ref "${ADMIN_IMAGE}")"
+WEB_REF="$(resolve_ref "${WEB_IMAGE}")"
+log "Deploying by digest:"
+log "  API:    ${API_REF}"
+log "  Worker: ${WORKER_REF}"
+log "  Admin:  ${ADMIN_REF}"
+
+# --- Image scan + signing (audit CODE-L5) ---
+# Both steps are best-effort: the deploy does NOT fail if the tools are
+# absent, so an operator who has not set up cosign/trivy yet is not blocked.
+# Install trivy + cosign and export COSIGN_KEY to enforce. Cluster-side
+# admission verification (Kyverno/Connaisseur) is a separate operator step.
+if [[ "${SKIP_BUILD}" == "false" ]]; then
+  if command -v trivy >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    log "Scanning images with Trivy (HIGH,CRITICAL)..."
+    for img in "${API_IMAGE}" "${WORKER_IMAGE}" "${ADMIN_IMAGE}"; do
+      trivy image --severity HIGH,CRITICAL --exit-code 0 --quiet "${img}" \
+        || warn "Trivy reported findings for ${img}"
+    done
+  else
+    warn "trivy not installed — skipping image vulnerability scan (audit L5)"
+  fi
+  if command -v cosign >/dev/null 2>&1 && [[ -n "${COSIGN_KEY:-}" ]]; then
+    log "Signing images with cosign..."
+    for ref in "${API_REF}" "${WORKER_REF}" "${ADMIN_REF}"; do
+      cosign sign --yes --key "${COSIGN_KEY}" "${ref}" || warn "cosign sign failed for ${ref}"
+    done
+  else
+    warn "cosign not configured (need cosign + COSIGN_KEY) — skipping image signing (audit L5)"
+  fi
+fi
+
 # --- Generate and apply ConfigMap from config.yaml ---
 
 log "Generating env from config.yaml..."
@@ -166,7 +216,7 @@ kubectl apply -f "${MANIFESTS}/ingress/"
 # pod sees a stale schema.
 log "Running database migrations (goose Job)..."
 kubectl delete job honeydue-migrate -n "${NAMESPACE}" --ignore-not-found --wait=true >/dev/null
-sed "s|image: IMAGE_PLACEHOLDER|image: ${API_IMAGE}|" "${MANIFESTS}/migrate/job.yaml" | kubectl apply -f -
+sed "s|image: IMAGE_PLACEHOLDER|image: ${API_REF}|" "${MANIFESTS}/migrate/job.yaml" | kubectl apply -f -
 if ! kubectl wait --namespace="${NAMESPACE}" --for=condition=complete --timeout=10m job/honeydue-migrate; then
   warn "migration Job failed — see logs:"
   kubectl logs -n "${NAMESPACE}" job/honeydue-migrate --tail=200 || true
@@ -175,17 +225,17 @@ fi
 log "Migrations applied; proceeding with api/worker rollout"
 
 # Apply deployments with image substitution
-sed "s|image: IMAGE_PLACEHOLDER|image: ${API_IMAGE}|" "${MANIFESTS}/api/deployment.yaml" | kubectl apply -f -
+sed "s|image: IMAGE_PLACEHOLDER|image: ${API_REF}|" "${MANIFESTS}/api/deployment.yaml" | kubectl apply -f -
 kubectl apply -f "${MANIFESTS}/api/service.yaml"
 kubectl apply -f "${MANIFESTS}/api/hpa.yaml"
 
-sed "s|image: IMAGE_PLACEHOLDER|image: ${WORKER_IMAGE}|" "${MANIFESTS}/worker/deployment.yaml" | kubectl apply -f -
+sed "s|image: IMAGE_PLACEHOLDER|image: ${WORKER_REF}|" "${MANIFESTS}/worker/deployment.yaml" | kubectl apply -f -
 
-sed "s|image: IMAGE_PLACEHOLDER|image: ${ADMIN_IMAGE}|" "${MANIFESTS}/admin/deployment.yaml" | kubectl apply -f -
+sed "s|image: IMAGE_PLACEHOLDER|image: ${ADMIN_REF}|" "${MANIFESTS}/admin/deployment.yaml" | kubectl apply -f -
 kubectl apply -f "${MANIFESTS}/admin/service.yaml"
 
 if [[ -d "${MANIFESTS}/web" ]]; then
-  sed "s|image: IMAGE_PLACEHOLDER|image: ${WEB_IMAGE}|" "${MANIFESTS}/web/deployment.yaml" | kubectl apply -f -
+  sed "s|image: IMAGE_PLACEHOLDER|image: ${WEB_REF}|" "${MANIFESTS}/web/deployment.yaml" | kubectl apply -f -
   kubectl apply -f "${MANIFESTS}/web/service.yaml"
 fi
 

deploy-k3s/scripts/_config.sh

@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ lines = [
     # API
     'DEBUG=false',
     f\"ALLOWED_HOSTS={d['api']},{d['base']}\",
-    f\"CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=https://{d['base']},https://{d['admin']}\",
+    f\"CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=https://{d['base']},https://{d['admin']},https://{d.get('app', 'app.' + d['base'])}\",
     'TIMEZONE=UTC',
     f\"BASE_URL=https://{d['base']}\",
     'PORT=8000',
@@ -119,9 +119,14 @@ lines = [
     f\"DB_MAX_IDLE_CONNS={db['max_idle_conns']}\",
     f\"DB_MAX_LIFETIME={db['max_lifetime']}\",
     f\"DB_MAX_IDLE_TIME={db.get('max_idle_time', '0s')}\",
-    # Redis (in-namespace DNS short form — password injected if configured;
+    # Redis — in-namespace DNS short form (works because pod /etc/resolv.conf
-    # short form works because /etc/resolv.conf in pods searches honeydue.svc.cluster.local)
+    # searches honeydue.svc.cluster.local). Audit HIGH-1: the password is
-    f\"REDIS_URL=redis://{':%s@' % val(rd.get('password')) if rd.get('password') else ''}redis:6379/0\",
+    # intentionally NOT embedded here. This URL is emitted into the
+    # honeydue-config ConfigMap, which is NOT encrypted at rest and is
+    # readable by anyone with `get configmap`. The Redis password travels
+    # only in honeydue-secrets as REDIS_PASSWORD (file-mounted, F8); the API
+    # applies it in cache_service.go and the worker onto its Asynq opt.
+    'REDIS_URL=redis://redis:6379/0',
     'REDIS_DB=0',
     # Email
     f\"EMAIL_HOST={em['host']}\",
@@ -218,8 +223,18 @@ config = {
         'image': 'ubuntu-24.04',
     },
     'additional_packages': ['open-iscsi'],
-    'post_create_commands': ['sudo systemctl enable --now iscsid'],
+    # Audit K3S-CG2: harden the node OS at provision time — fail2ban for SSH
-    'k3s_config_file': 'secrets-encryption: true\n',
+    # brute-force, unattended-upgrades for automatic security patches.
+    'post_create_commands': [
+        'sudo systemctl enable --now iscsid',
+        'sudo apt-get update -qq',
+        'sudo DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y -qq fail2ban unattended-upgrades',
+        'sudo systemctl enable --now fail2ban',
+        'sudo dpkg-reconfigure -f noninteractive -plow unattended-upgrades',
+    ],
+    # Audit K3S-CG1 / K3S-F4: encrypt Secrets at rest in etcd, and write the
+    # node kubeconfig as mode 0600 (not world-readable).
+    'k3s_config_file': 'secrets-encryption: true\nwrite-kubeconfig-mode: \"0600\"\n',
 }
 
 print(yaml.dump(config, default_flow_style=False, sort_keys=False))

docs/deployment/05-security.md

@@ -8,6 +8,13 @@ long-haul components, and dedicated service accounts with dropped
 capabilities inside containers. This chapter documents each layer, the
 rationale, and what's currently missing (and why).
 
+> **Updated 2026-05-15 — security remediation.** The 2026-05 audits
+> (`live_scan_5_12.md`, `k3_audit_5_12.md`, `security_scan_5_12.md`) drove a
+> full remediation pass. **`deploy-k3s/SECURITY.md` is the authoritative,
+> per-finding current-state record.** This chapter is corrected for the
+> major items below; where any other detail conflicts with `SECURITY.md`,
+> `SECURITY.md` wins.
+
 ## Threat model
 
 Who we're defending against, in rough order of likelihood:
@@ -54,8 +61,8 @@ Cloudflare sits in front of every public request.
 - **Authorize requests** — that's the app's job
 - **Protect origin if origin IP leaks** — once someone knows a node IP
   they can bypass CF. Mitigation: keep origin firewall strict (Chapter 4).
-- **Encrypt between CF and origin** — we're on SSL=Flexible, so CF↔origin
+- **~~Encrypt between CF and origin~~** — done (2026-04-24): SSL mode is
-  is HTTP. This is in our TODO (Chapter 20, upgrade to Full-strict).
+  Full (strict); CF↔origin is TLS with a Cloudflare Origin CA cert.
 
 ### The proxy-IP problem
 
@@ -75,8 +82,8 @@ This means a malicious request that bypasses CF (by hitting the node IP
 directly) can't spoof headers — Traefik ignores `X-Forwarded-*` unless
 the source IP is in CF's ranges.
 
-**TODO** (Chapter 20): Enforce at UFW level — allow 80/tcp only from
+**Done (2026-04-24):** the node UFW allowlist permits `:443` only from
-CF IP ranges. Today any IP can reach the origin on port 80.
+Cloudflare's IP ranges; the `Anywhere` rules on `:80`/`:443` were removed.
 
 ## Layer 2 — Node (OS, SSH, firewall)
 
@@ -297,15 +304,13 @@ The `deploy-k3s/manifests/network-policies.yaml` scaffold defines:
   reach api pods on port 8000
 - **allow-ingress-to-admin** — same, for admin:3000
 
-**These are not currently applied.** Without them, our pods can freely
+**Applied.** `03-deploy.sh` applies
-talk to anything — including, theoretically, malicious destinations if
+`deploy-k3s/manifests/network-policies.yaml` on every deploy — default-deny
-an attacker gets RCE inside a pod.
+plus the explicit per-app allows below. Traefik runs `hostNetwork`, so its
+traffic is matched by node-IP `ipBlock`s plus the pod CIDR `10.42.0.0/16`,
+not a `namespaceSelector`.
 
-**TODO** (Chapter 20): Apply network policies. The scaffold is there; we
+### What network policies prevent
-just need to `kubectl apply -f deploy-k3s/manifests/network-policies.yaml`
-and test that nothing breaks.
-
-### What network policies would prevent
 
 | Attack scenario | NetworkPolicy blocks |
 |---|---|
@@ -324,13 +329,10 @@ renewed Let's Encrypt or CF-managed cert for `*.myhoneydue.com`.
 
 ### CF ↔ origin
 
-**Plaintext HTTP** (SSL = Flexible). An attacker with access to the
+**TLS — SSL = Full (strict)** (since 2026-04-24). A Cloudflare Origin CA
-Cloudflare-to-Hetzner path could read traffic. In practice nobody who
+certificate (`cloudflare-origin-cert` secret) is installed on all three
-isn't Cloudflare or Hetzner sits on that path.
+ingresses; Cloudflare validates it. Both user↔CF and CF↔origin are
-
+encrypted, and a DNS-hijack MitM is defeated by the origin-cert check.
-**TODO** (Chapter 20): Upgrade to SSL = Full (strict) with a Cloudflare
-Origin CA certificate. This encrypts CF ↔ origin and verifies that
-origin's cert is the CF-issued one (prevents MitM if DNS is compromised).
 
 ### API ↔ Neon Postgres
 
@@ -454,11 +456,14 @@ Mitigations:
 - Gitea itself is behind login; PAT is scoped to read:packages +
   write:packages only
 - Gitea runs on the operator's infrastructure (same operator account)
-- Image tags are SHA-pinned (`:237c6b8`) not `:latest` → attacker can't
+- Workloads deploy by immutable `@sha256:` digest, not by mutable tag
-  replace an existing tag's image without us noticing the digest change
+  (`03-deploy.sh` resolves the digest after push; the redis/vmagent/node
+  base images are digest-pinned too) — a swapped tag cannot reach the
+  cluster.
 
-**TODO** (Chapter 20): Add cosign signing at build time, verify at pull
+**TODO**: cosign signing is wired into `03-deploy.sh` (guarded — runs when
-time.
+`cosign` + `COSIGN_KEY` are present); cluster-side admission verification
+(Kyverno/Connaisseur) is still pending. See `deploy-k3s/SECURITY.md` → L5.
 
 ## Operator workstation security
 

docs/deployment/06-traefik-ingress.md

@@ -1,5 +1,13 @@
 # 06 — Traefik Ingress
 
+> **Updated 2026-05-15 (security remediation):** the Traefik middleware set
+> changed — `cloudflare-only` + `admin-auth` are now attached to the admin
+> ingress, a strict `auth-rate-limit` middleware fronts the auth endpoints
+> (via a dedicated `honeydue-api-auth` Ingress), and `security-headers`
+> gained COOP/CORP + a 2-year preload HSTS and dropped the deprecated
+> `X-XSS-Protection`. `deploy-k3s/SECURITY.md` is the authoritative
+> current-state record.
+
 ## Summary
 
 Traefik is the reverse proxy that routes external HTTP requests to the

docs/deployment/07-services.md

@@ -1,5 +1,11 @@
 # 07 — Services
 
+> **Updated 2026-05-15 (security remediation):** Redis now requires a
+> password (`config.yaml` `redis.password` → `honeydue-secrets`), all
+> workloads deploy by immutable `@sha256:` digest, and the redis/vmagent
+> base images are digest-pinned. `deploy-k3s/SECURITY.md` is the
+> authoritative current-state record.
+
 ## Summary
 
 Five workloads run in the `honeydue` namespace: **api** (Go REST API, 3

docs/deployment/10-secrets-config.md

@@ -1,5 +1,11 @@
 # 10 — Secrets & Config
 
+> **Updated 2026-05-15 (security remediation):** `honeydue-secrets` now
+> carries `REDIS_PASSWORD`; an `admin-basic-auth` Secret backs the admin
+> ingress; rotation is documented in `docs/runbooks/secret-rotation.md`;
+> and the Go config can read file-mounted secrets (`HONEYDUE_SECRETS_DIR`).
+> `deploy-k3s/SECURITY.md` is the authoritative current-state record.
+
 ## Summary
 
 Non-sensitive config (hostnames, ports, feature flags, etc.) lives in

docs/runbooks/secret-rotation.md

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+# Runbook — Secret Rotation
+
+Closes audit finding `K3S-F12` (secrets unrotated since cluster bootstrap,
+no rotation cadence). See `deploy-k3s/SECURITY.md` Stage 2.
+
+**Cadence:** rotate every secret at least **annually**. Rotate
+**immediately** on suspected exposure, on an operator-device loss, or when
+anyone who has seen a secret leaves the project.
+
+**Record keeping:** after each rotation, annotate the secret so the age is
+visible:
+
+```bash
+kubectl -n honeydue annotate secret <name> \
+  honeydue.dev/last-rotated="$(date -u +%Y-%m-%d)" --overwrite
+```
+
+---
+
+## How rotation works
+
+Every secret has a **source of truth** on the operator workstation. The
+deploy scripts read those sources and (re)create the Kubernetes Secrets.
+Rotation is always: **update the source → re-run `02-setup-secrets.sh` →
+restart the pods that consume it → revoke the old credential at its
+provider.**
+
+`02-setup-secrets.sh` uses `kubectl apply` (via `--dry-run=client -o yaml`),
+so re-running it is idempotent and only changes what you changed.
+
+| Kubernetes Secret | Source of truth | Consumed by |
+|---|---|---|
+| `honeydue-secrets` → `POSTGRES_PASSWORD` | `deploy-k3s/secrets/postgres_password.txt` | api, worker |
+| `honeydue-secrets` → `SECRET_KEY` | `deploy-k3s/secrets/secret_key.txt` | api, worker |
+| `honeydue-secrets` → `EMAIL_HOST_PASSWORD` | `deploy-k3s/secrets/email_host_password.txt` | api, worker |
+| `honeydue-secrets` → `FCM_SERVER_KEY` | `deploy-k3s/secrets/fcm_server_key.txt` | api, worker |
+| `honeydue-secrets` → `REDIS_PASSWORD` | `config.yaml` key `redis.password` | api, worker, redis |
+| `honeydue-secrets` → `OBS_INGEST_TOKEN` | `deploy/prod.env` | api, worker |
+| `honeydue-apns-key` → `apns_auth_key.p8` | `deploy-k3s/secrets/apns_auth_key.p8` | api, worker |
+| `cloudflare-origin-cert` | `deploy-k3s/secrets/cloudflare-origin.{crt,key}` | Traefik ingress |
+| `ghcr-credentials` | `config.yaml` block `registry.*` | image pulls (all pods) |
+| `admin-basic-auth` | `config.yaml` keys `admin.basic_auth_user` / `..._password` | Traefik `admin-auth` middleware |
+
+The `deploy-k3s/secrets/` directory and `config.yaml` are **gitignored** —
+never commit them.
+
+---
+
+## Standard rotation procedure
+
+```bash
+cd honeyDueAPI-go
+export KUBECONFIG="$(pwd)/deploy-k3s/kubeconfig"
+
+# 1. Update the source (file under deploy-k3s/secrets/ or a config.yaml key)
+# 2. Recreate the Kubernetes Secrets from sources
+./deploy-k3s/scripts/02-setup-secrets.sh
+
+# 3. Restart the consumers (see per-secret notes below for which)
+kubectl -n honeydue rollout restart deploy/api deploy/worker
+
+# 4. Confirm health
+kubectl -n honeydue rollout status deploy/api
+kubectl -n honeydue rollout status deploy/worker
+
+# 5. Revoke the OLD credential at its provider (see per-secret notes)
+# 6. Annotate the rotated secret with today's date
+```
+
+---
+
+## Per-secret notes
+
+### `POSTGRES_PASSWORD`
+1. Rotate the role password in the Neon dashboard.
+2. Write the new value to `deploy-k3s/secrets/postgres_password.txt`.
+3. `02-setup-secrets.sh`, then `rollout restart deploy/api deploy/worker`.
+4. Watch logs for connection errors; the old password stops working the
+   moment Neon applies the change, so do steps 2–3 promptly.
+
+### `SECRET_KEY`  ⚠️ user-visible
+This signs auth tokens. **Rotating it logs every user out** — all existing
+tokens become invalid and every client must re-authenticate.
+1. Generate: `openssl rand -hex 32`.
+2. Write to `deploy-k3s/secrets/secret_key.txt` (must be ≥32 chars — the
+   script enforces this; the app refuses to start in production without it).
+3. `02-setup-secrets.sh`, then `rollout restart deploy/api deploy/worker`.
+- Only rotate on a schedule or on suspected compromise — not casually.
+- A future improvement (overlap window via a key-id header) would let old
+  tokens validate during the transition; not implemented today.
+
+### `EMAIL_HOST_PASSWORD`
+1. Generate a new app password in Fastmail; keep the old one alive briefly.
+2. Write to `deploy-k3s/secrets/email_host_password.txt`.
+3. `02-setup-secrets.sh`, `rollout restart deploy/api deploy/worker`.
+4. Delete the old Fastmail app password.
+
+### `FCM_SERVER_KEY`
+1. Rotate the key in the Firebase console.
+2. Write to `deploy-k3s/secrets/fcm_server_key.txt`.
+3. `02-setup-secrets.sh`, `rollout restart deploy/api deploy/worker`.
+
+### `REDIS_PASSWORD`
+Source is `config.yaml` key `redis.password` (hex only — it is embedded in
+the `REDIS_URL`, so non-hex characters would break URL parsing).
+1. Generate: `openssl rand -hex 32`.
+2. Set `redis.password` in `config.yaml`.
+3. `02-setup-secrets.sh`.
+4. Restart **redis as well as** api/worker so the new `--requirepass` and
+   the new `REDIS_URL` land together:
+   `kubectl -n honeydue rollout restart deploy/redis deploy/api deploy/worker`.
+   Expect a few seconds where api/worker reconnect.
+
+### `apns_auth_key.p8`
+1. Revoke the key in the Apple Developer console, generate a new `.p8`.
+2. Replace `deploy-k3s/secrets/apns_auth_key.p8`.
+3. `02-setup-secrets.sh`, `rollout restart deploy/api deploy/worker`.
+4. If the Key ID changed, update `push.apns_key_id` in `config.yaml` too.
+
+### `cloudflare-origin-cert`
+1. Generate a new Origin CA certificate in the Cloudflare dashboard.
+2. Replace `deploy-k3s/secrets/cloudflare-origin.crt` and `.key`.
+3. `02-setup-secrets.sh`. Traefik picks up the new TLS secret; no app
+   restart needed. Verify the served cert with `openssl s_client`.
+
+### `ghcr-credentials` (Gitea registry)
+1. Generate a new PAT in Gitea (scope: `read:packages`).
+2. Update the `registry.token` value in `config.yaml`.
+3. `02-setup-secrets.sh`. No restart needed unless a pull is pending.
+4. Revoke the old PAT in Gitea.
+
+### `admin-basic-auth`
+Source is `config.yaml` keys `admin.basic_auth_user` / `basic_auth_password`.
+1. Set a new password (e.g. `openssl rand -hex 24`).
+2. `02-setup-secrets.sh` regenerates the bcrypt htpasswd secret.
+3. No app restart needed — Traefik reloads the `admin-auth` middleware.
+4. Distribute the new credential to whoever uses the admin panel.
+
+---
+
+## After any rotation
+
+- Run `./deploy-k3s/scripts/04-verify.sh` and confirm no `✗` lines.
+- Annotate the rotated secret (see "Record keeping" above).
+- If the rotation was due to a compromise, also follow the relevant
+  playbook in `deploy-k3s/SECURITY.md` → Appendix (Incident response).

go.mod

@@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ require (
 	go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlptrace v1.43.0
 	go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp v1.43.0
 	go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk v1.43.0
-	golang.org/x/crypto v0.49.0
+	golang.org/x/crypto v0.51.0
 	golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.35.0
-	golang.org/x/term v0.41.0
+	golang.org/x/term v0.43.0
-	golang.org/x/text v0.35.0
+	golang.org/x/text v0.37.0
 	golang.org/x/time v0.15.0
 	google.golang.org/api v0.257.0
 	gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1
@@ -117,9 +117,9 @@ require (
 	go.opentelemetry.io/otel v1.43.0
 	go.opentelemetry.io/otel/metric v1.43.0 // indirect
 	go.opentelemetry.io/otel/trace v1.43.0
-	golang.org/x/net v0.52.0 // indirect
+	golang.org/x/net v0.53.0 // indirect
-	golang.org/x/sync v0.20.0 // indirect
+	golang.org/x/sync v0.20.0
-	golang.org/x/sys v0.42.0 // indirect
+	golang.org/x/sys v0.44.0 // indirect
 	google.golang.org/genproto/googleapis/rpc v0.0.0-20260401024825-9d38bb4040a9 // indirect
 	google.golang.org/grpc v1.80.0 // indirect
 	google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.11 // indirect

go.sum

@@ -241,12 +241,12 @@ go.yaml.in/yaml/v2 v2.4.2/go.mod h1:081UH+NErpNdqlCXm3TtEran0rJZGxAYx9hb/ELlsPU=
 go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.4 h1:tfq32ie2Jv2UxXFdLJdh3jXuOzWiL1fo0bu/FbuKpbc=
 go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.4/go.mod h1:DhzuOOF2ATzADvBadXxruRBLzYTpT36CKvDb3+aBEFg=
 golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20170512130425-ab89591268e0/go.mod h1:6SG95UA2DQfeDnfUPMdvaQW0Q7yPrPDi9nlGo2tz2b4=
-golang.org/x/crypto v0.49.0 h1:+Ng2ULVvLHnJ/ZFEq4KdcDd/cfjrrjjNSXNzxg0Y4U4=
+golang.org/x/crypto v0.51.0 h1:IBPXwPfKxY7cWQZ38ZCIRPI50YLeevDLlLnyC5wRGTI=
-golang.org/x/crypto v0.49.0/go.mod h1:ErX4dUh2UM+CFYiXZRTcMpEcN8b/1gxEuv3nODoYtCA=
+golang.org/x/crypto v0.51.0/go.mod h1:8AdwkbraGNABw2kOX6YFPs3WM22XqI4EXEd8g+x7Oc8=
 golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20210520170846-37e1c6afe023/go.mod h1:9nx3DQGgdP8bBQD5qxJ1jj9UTztislL4KSBs9R2vV5Y=
 golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20220403103023-749bd193bc2b/go.mod h1:CfG3xpIq0wQ8r1q4Su4UZFWDARRcnwPjda9FqA0JpMk=
-golang.org/x/net v0.52.0 h1:He/TN1l0e4mmR3QqHMT2Xab3Aj3L9qjbhRm78/6jrW0=
+golang.org/x/net v0.53.0 h1:d+qAbo5L0orcWAr0a9JweQpjXF19LMXJE8Ey7hwOdUA=
-golang.org/x/net v0.52.0/go.mod h1:R1MAz7uMZxVMualyPXb+VaqGSa3LIaUqk0eEt3w36Sw=
+golang.org/x/net v0.53.0/go.mod h1:JvMuJH7rrdiCfbeHoo3fCQU24Lf5JJwT9W3sJFulfgs=
 golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.35.0 h1:Mv2mzuHuZuY2+bkyWXIHMfhNdJAdwW3FuWeCPYN5GVQ=
 golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.35.0/go.mod h1:lzm5WQJQwKZ3nwavOZ3IS5Aulzxi68dUSgRHujetwEA=
 golang.org/x/sync v0.20.0 h1:e0PTpb7pjO8GAtTs2dQ6jYa5BWYlMuX047Dco/pItO4=
@@ -262,16 +262,16 @@ golang.org/x/sys v0.6.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.8.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.11.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.12.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
-golang.org/x/sys v0.42.0 h1:omrd2nAlyT5ESRdCLYdm3+fMfNFE/+Rf4bDIQImRJeo=
+golang.org/x/sys v0.44.0 h1:ildZl3J4uzeKP07r2F++Op7E9B29JRUy+a27EibtBTQ=
-golang.org/x/sys v0.42.0/go.mod h1:4GL1E5IUh+htKOUEOaiffhrAeqysfVGipDYzABqnCmw=
+golang.org/x/sys v0.44.0/go.mod h1:4GL1E5IUh+htKOUEOaiffhrAeqysfVGipDYzABqnCmw=
 golang.org/x/term v0.0.0-20201126162022-7de9c90e9dd1/go.mod h1:bj7SfCRtBDWHUb9snDiAeCFNEtKQo2Wmx5Cou7ajbmo=
 golang.org/x/term v0.0.0-20210927222741-03fcf44c2211/go.mod h1:jbD1KX2456YbFQfuXm/mYQcufACuNUgVhRMnK/tPxf8=
-golang.org/x/term v0.41.0 h1:QCgPso/Q3RTJx2Th4bDLqML4W6iJiaXFq2/ftQF13YU=
+golang.org/x/term v0.43.0 h1:S4RLU2sB31O/NCl+zFN9Aru9A/Cq2aqKpTZJ6B+DwT4=
-golang.org/x/term v0.41.0/go.mod h1:3pfBgksrReYfZ5lvYM0kSO0LIkAl4Yl2bXOkKP7Ec2A=
+golang.org/x/term v0.43.0/go.mod h1:lrhlHNdQJHO+1qVYiHfFKVuVioJIheAc3fBSMFYEIsk=
 golang.org/x/text v0.3.6/go.mod h1:5Zoc/QRtKVWzQhOtBMvqHzDpF6irO9z98xDceosuGiQ=
 golang.org/x/text v0.3.7/go.mod h1:u+2+/6zg+i71rQMx5EYifcz6MCKuco9NR6JIITiCfzQ=
-golang.org/x/text v0.35.0 h1:JOVx6vVDFokkpaq1AEptVzLTpDe9KGpj5tR4/X+ybL8=
+golang.org/x/text v0.37.0 h1:Cqjiwd9eSg8e0QAkyCaQTNHFIIzWtidPahFWR83rTrc=
-golang.org/x/text v0.35.0/go.mod h1:khi/HExzZJ2pGnjenulevKNX1W67CUy0AsXcNubPGCA=
+golang.org/x/text v0.37.0/go.mod h1:a5sjxXGs9hsn/AJVwuElvCAo9v8QYLzvavO5z2PiM38=
 golang.org/x/time v0.15.0 h1:bbrp8t3bGUeFOx08pvsMYRTCVSMk89u4tKbNOZbp88U=
 golang.org/x/time v0.15.0/go.mod h1:Y4YMaQmXwGQZoFaVFk4YpCt4FLQMYKZe9oeV/f4MSno=
 golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20180917221912-90fa682c2a6e/go.mod h1:n7NCudcB/nEzxVGmLbDWY5pfWTLqBcC2KZ6jyYvM4mQ=

internal/config/config.go

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 package config
 
 import (
+	"crypto/rand"
 	"encoding/hex"
 	"fmt"
 	"net/url"
@@ -216,6 +217,11 @@ func Load() (*Config, error) {
 	// Set defaults
 	setDefaults()
 
+	// Audit F8: overlay file-mounted secrets onto Viper. No-op when the
+	// directory is absent (local/dev), so this is safe to ship before the
+	// manifests mount honeydue-secrets as a volume.
+	loadFileSecrets()
+
 	// Parse DATABASE_URL if set (Dokku-style)
 	dbConfig := DatabaseConfig{
 		Host:         viper.GetString("DB_HOST"),
@@ -432,14 +438,67 @@ func isWeakSecretKey(key string) bool {
 	return knownWeakSecretKeys[strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(key))]
 }
 
+// loadFileSecrets overlays file-mounted secrets onto Viper (audit F8). When
+// the honeydue-secrets Secret is mounted as a volume at /etc/honeydue/secrets
+// each key is a file; reading the value here and viper.Set-ing it (highest
+// Viper precedence) keeps the secret out of the process environment
+// (/proc/<pid>/environ), which plain env-var injection cannot. When the
+// directory is absent it is a silent no-op and env vars are used as before.
+func loadFileSecrets() {
+	dir := os.Getenv("HONEYDUE_SECRETS_DIR")
+	if dir == "" {
+		dir = "/etc/honeydue/secrets"
+	}
+	for _, k := range []string{
+		"POSTGRES_PASSWORD", "SECRET_KEY", "EMAIL_HOST_PASSWORD", "FCM_SERVER_KEY",
+		"REDIS_PASSWORD", "B2_KEY_ID", "B2_APP_KEY", "OBS_INGEST_TOKEN", "OBS_TRACES_URL",
+	} {
+		b, err := os.ReadFile(dir + "/" + k)
+		if err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		if v := strings.TrimSpace(string(b)); v != "" {
+			viper.Set(k, v)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// SecretValue resolves a configuration value that is not part of the typed
+// Config struct. It reads through Viper, so a value supplied via a file-mounted
+// secret (audit F8, loaded by loadFileSecrets) is found just like an env var.
+//
+// Must be called after Load(). Used by cmd/api and cmd/worker for the
+// observability endpoints, which are needed before the full Config is wired
+// and would otherwise be read with os.Getenv — which misses file-mounted
+// secrets entirely once F8 removes them from the process environment.
+func SecretValue(key string) string {
+	return viper.GetString(key)
+}
+
+// randomHexKey returns a cryptographically secure random hex string
+// representing n random bytes (2n hex characters).
+func randomHexKey(n int) (string, error) {
+	b := make([]byte, n)
+	if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	return hex.EncodeToString(b), nil
+}
+
 func validate(cfg *Config) error {
-	// S-08: Validate SECRET_KEY against known weak defaults
+	// M8: SECRET_KEY validation — no static fallback secret in the binary.
 	if cfg.Security.SecretKey == "" {
 		if cfg.Server.Debug {
-			// In debug mode, use a default key with a warning for local development
+			// Debug only: generate a random key per boot. Tokens signed with
-			cfg.Security.SecretKey = "change-me-in-production-secret-key-12345"
+			// it do not survive a restart, which is acceptable for local dev
-			fmt.Println("WARNING: SECRET_KEY not set, using default (debug mode only)")
+			// and far safer than a well-known hardcoded fallback.
-			fmt.Println("WARNING: *** DO NOT USE THIS DEFAULT KEY IN PRODUCTION ***")
+			randomKey, err := randomHexKey(32)
+			if err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("failed to generate ephemeral debug SECRET_KEY: %w", err)
+			}
+			cfg.Security.SecretKey = randomKey
+			fmt.Println("WARNING: SECRET_KEY not set, generated an ephemeral random key (debug mode only)")
+			fmt.Println("WARNING: tokens will not survive a restart — set SECRET_KEY for stable local sessions")
 		} else {
 			// In production, refuse to start without a proper secret key
 			return fmt.Errorf("FATAL: SECRET_KEY environment variable is required in production (DEBUG=false)")
@@ -452,6 +511,12 @@ func validate(cfg *Config) error {
 		}
 	}
 
+	// C4: fixed confirmation codes ("123456") must never be enabled outside
+	// debug — with DEBUG=false they are a full authentication bypass.
+	if cfg.Server.DebugFixedCodes && !cfg.Server.Debug {
+		return fmt.Errorf("FATAL: DEBUG_FIXED_CODES is enabled with DEBUG=false — fixed confirmation codes must never run in production")
+	}
+
 	// Database password might come from DATABASE_URL, don't require it separately
 	// The actual connection will fail if credentials are wrong
 

internal/config/config_test.go

@@ -106,8 +106,10 @@ func TestLoad_Validation_MissingSecretKey_DebugMode(t *testing.T) {
 
 	c, err := Load()
 	require.NoError(t, err)
-	// In debug mode, a default key is assigned
+	// Audit M8: in debug mode an ephemeral random key is generated per boot
-	assert.Equal(t, "change-me-in-production-secret-key-12345", c.Security.SecretKey)
+	// (no static fallback). It must be a non-empty 64-char hex string.
+	assert.Len(t, c.Security.SecretKey, 64)
+	assert.NotEqual(t, "change-me-in-production-secret-key-12345", c.Security.SecretKey)
 }
 
 func TestLoad_Validation_WeakSecretKey_Production(t *testing.T) {
@@ -133,6 +135,33 @@ func TestLoad_Validation_WeakSecretKey_DebugMode(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Equal(t, "secret", c.Security.SecretKey)
 }
 
+// Audit C4: DEBUG_FIXED_CODES makes confirmation codes a fixed "123456" — a
+// full authentication bypass. With DEBUG=false, validate() must refuse to boot
+// rather than ship that bypass to production.
+func TestLoad_Validation_DebugFixedCodes_Production(t *testing.T) {
+	// validate() directly — avoids the sync.Once issue Load() has on failure.
+	cfg := &Config{
+		Server:   ServerConfig{Debug: false, DebugFixedCodes: true},
+		Security: SecurityConfig{SecretKey: "a-strong-secret-key-for-tests"},
+	}
+
+	err := validate(cfg)
+	require.Error(t, err)
+	assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "DEBUG_FIXED_CODES")
+}
+
+// With DEBUG=true the fixed codes are an intended local-dev convenience, so
+// the same combination must NOT error.
+func TestLoad_Validation_DebugFixedCodes_DebugMode(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg := &Config{
+		Server:   ServerConfig{Debug: true, DebugFixedCodes: true},
+		Security: SecurityConfig{SecretKey: "a-strong-secret-key-for-tests"},
+	}
+
+	err := validate(cfg)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+}
+
 func TestLoad_Validation_EncryptionKey_Valid(t *testing.T) {
 	resetConfigState()
 	t.Setenv("SECRET_KEY", "a-strong-secret-key-for-tests")

internal/handlers/auth_handler.go

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 package handlers
 
 import (
+	"context"
 	"errors"
 	"net/http"
 
@@ -55,8 +56,15 @@ func (h *AuthHandler) SetAuditService(auditService *services.AuditService) {
 	h.auditService = auditService
 }
 
+// noStore marks a response as non-cacheable (audit L2) — auth responses
+// carry tokens and user data that must never sit in any cache.
+func noStore(c echo.Context) {
+	c.Response().Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+}
+
 // Login handles POST /api/auth/login/
 func (h *AuthHandler) Login(c echo.Context) error {
+	noStore(c)
 	var req requests.LoginRequest
 	if err := c.Bind(&req); err != nil {
 		return apperrors.BadRequest("error.invalid_request")
@@ -65,9 +73,11 @@ func (h *AuthHandler) Login(c echo.Context) error {
 		return c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, validator.FormatValidationErrors(err))
 	}
 
-	response, err := h.authService.Login(c.Request().Context(), &req)
+	response, err := h.authService.Login(c.Request().Context(), &req, c.RealIP())
 	if err != nil {
-		log.Debug().Err(err).Str("identifier", req.Username).Msg("Login failed")
+		log.Debug().Err(err).Str("identifier", req.Username).
+			Str("ip", c.RealIP()).Str("user_agent", c.Request().UserAgent()).
+			Msg("Login failed")
 		if h.auditService != nil {
 			h.auditService.LogEvent(c, nil, services.AuditEventLoginFailed, map[string]interface{}{
 				"identifier": req.Username,
@@ -86,6 +96,7 @@ func (h *AuthHandler) Login(c echo.Context) error {
 
 // Register handles POST /api/auth/register/
 func (h *AuthHandler) Register(c echo.Context) error {
+	noStore(c)
 	var req requests.RegisterRequest
 	if err := c.Bind(&req); err != nil {
 		return apperrors.BadRequest("error.invalid_request")
@@ -157,6 +168,7 @@ func (h *AuthHandler) Logout(c echo.Context) error {
 
 // CurrentUser handles GET /api/auth/me/
 func (h *AuthHandler) CurrentUser(c echo.Context) error {
+	noStore(c)
 	user, err := middleware.MustGetAuthUser(c)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
@@ -276,31 +288,7 @@ func (h *AuthHandler) ForgotPassword(c echo.Context) error {
 		return c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, validator.FormatValidationErrors(err))
 	}
 
-	code, user, err := h.authService.ForgotPassword(c.Request().Context(), req.Email)
+	noStore(c)
-	if err != nil {
-		var appErr *apperrors.AppError
-		if errors.As(err, &appErr) && appErr.Code == http.StatusTooManyRequests {
-			// Only reveal rate limit errors
-			return err
-		}
-
-		log.Error().Err(err).Str("email", req.Email).Msg("Forgot password failed")
-		// Don't reveal other errors to prevent email enumeration
-	}
-
-	// Send password reset email (async) - only if user found
-	if h.emailService != nil && code != "" && user != nil {
-		go func() {
-			defer func() {
-				if r := recover(); r != nil {
-					log.Error().Interface("panic", r).Str("email", user.Email).Msg("Panic in password reset email goroutine")
-				}
-			}()
-			if err := h.emailService.SendPasswordResetEmail(user.Email, user.FirstName, code); err != nil {
-				log.Error().Err(err).Str("email", user.Email).Msg("Failed to send password reset email")
-			}
-		}()
-	}
 
 	if h.auditService != nil {
 		h.auditService.LogEvent(c, nil, services.AuditEventPasswordReset, map[string]interface{}{
@@ -308,7 +296,33 @@ func (h *AuthHandler) ForgotPassword(c echo.Context) error {
 		})
 	}
 
-	// Always return success to prevent email enumeration
+	// Audit LIVE-L13: run the user lookup, code generation, and email send
+	// entirely in the background, then return the generic response
+	// immediately. This makes the response time identical whether or not
+	// the email belongs to a real account, defeating timing-based user
+	// enumeration. context.Background() is used because the request context
+	// is cancelled the moment this handler returns. Per-account rate
+	// limiting still runs inside the service; the edge auth-rate-limit
+	// middleware covers per-IP abuse.
+	email := req.Email
+	go func() {
+		defer func() {
+			if r := recover(); r != nil {
+				log.Error().Interface("panic", r).Str("email", email).Msg("Panic in forgot-password goroutine")
+			}
+		}()
+		code, user, err := h.authService.ForgotPassword(context.Background(), email)
+		if err != nil || code == "" || user == nil {
+			return
+		}
+		if h.emailService != nil {
+			if sendErr := h.emailService.SendPasswordResetEmail(user.Email, user.FirstName, code); sendErr != nil {
+				log.Error().Err(sendErr).Str("email", user.Email).Msg("Failed to send password reset email")
+			}
+		}
+	}()
+
+	// Always return success to prevent email enumeration.
 	return c.JSON(http.StatusOK, responses.ForgotPasswordResponse{
 		Message: "Password reset email sent",
 	})
@@ -365,6 +379,7 @@ func (h *AuthHandler) ResetPassword(c echo.Context) error {
 
 // AppleSignIn handles POST /api/auth/apple-sign-in/
 func (h *AuthHandler) AppleSignIn(c echo.Context) error {
+	noStore(c)
 	var req requests.AppleSignInRequest
 	if err := c.Bind(&req); err != nil {
 		return apperrors.BadRequest("error.invalid_request")
@@ -412,6 +427,7 @@ func (h *AuthHandler) AppleSignIn(c echo.Context) error {
 
 // GoogleSignIn handles POST /api/auth/google-sign-in/
 func (h *AuthHandler) GoogleSignIn(c echo.Context) error {
+	noStore(c)
 	var req requests.GoogleSignInRequest
 	if err := c.Bind(&req); err != nil {
 		return apperrors.BadRequest("error.invalid_request")
@@ -459,6 +475,7 @@ func (h *AuthHandler) GoogleSignIn(c echo.Context) error {
 
 // RefreshToken handles POST /api/auth/refresh/
 func (h *AuthHandler) RefreshToken(c echo.Context) error {
+	noStore(c)
 	user, err := middleware.MustGetAuthUser(c)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err

internal/handlers/handler_coverage_test.go

@@ -650,14 +650,14 @@ func TestAuthHandler_RefreshToken(t *testing.T) {
 	authGroup.Use(func(next echo.HandlerFunc) echo.HandlerFunc {
 		return func(c echo.Context) error {
 			c.Set("auth_user", user)
-			c.Set("auth_token", authToken.Key)
+			c.Set("auth_token", authToken.Plaintext) // raw token — repo hashes for lookup (audit C1)
 			return next(c)
 		}
 	})
 	authGroup.POST("/refresh/", handler.RefreshToken)
 
 	t.Run("successful refresh", func(t *testing.T) {
-		w := testutil.MakeRequest(e, "POST", "/api/auth/refresh/", nil, authToken.Key)
+		w := testutil.MakeRequest(e, "POST", "/api/auth/refresh/", nil, authToken.Plaintext)
 		testutil.AssertStatusCode(t, w, http.StatusOK)
 
 		var response map[string]interface{}

internal/handlers/media_handler.go

@@ -37,6 +37,23 @@ func NewMediaHandler(
 	}
 }
 
+// safeContentDisposition builds an inline Content-Disposition header value
+// with a sanitized filename (audit M1). Control characters (including CR/LF),
+// double-quote and backslash are stripped so an attacker-controlled upload
+// filename cannot inject additional response headers (CWE-113).
+func safeContentDisposition(filename string) string {
+	cleaned := strings.Map(func(r rune) rune {
+		if r < 0x20 || r == 0x7f || r == '"' || r == '\\' {
+			return -1
+		}
+		return r
+	}, filename)
+	if cleaned == "" {
+		cleaned = "download"
+	}
+	return `inline; filename="` + cleaned + `"`
+}
+
 // ServeDocument serves a document file with access control
 // GET /api/media/document/:id
 func (h *MediaHandler) ServeDocument(c echo.Context) error {
@@ -71,7 +88,7 @@ func (h *MediaHandler) ServeDocument(c echo.Context) error {
 	// Set caching and disposition headers
 	c.Response().Header().Set("Cache-Control", "private, max-age=3600")
 	if doc.FileName != "" {
-		c.Response().Header().Set("Content-Disposition", "inline; filename=\""+doc.FileName+"\"")
+		c.Response().Header().Set("Content-Disposition", safeContentDisposition(doc.FileName))
 	}
 	return c.Blob(http.StatusOK, mimeType, data)
 }
@@ -114,7 +131,7 @@ func (h *MediaHandler) ServeDocumentImage(c echo.Context) error {
 	}
 
 	c.Response().Header().Set("Cache-Control", "private, max-age=3600")
-	c.Response().Header().Set("Content-Disposition", "inline; filename=\""+filepath.Base(img.ImageURL)+"\"")
+	c.Response().Header().Set("Content-Disposition", safeContentDisposition(filepath.Base(img.ImageURL)))
 	return c.Blob(http.StatusOK, mimeType, data)
 }
 
@@ -162,7 +179,7 @@ func (h *MediaHandler) ServeCompletionImage(c echo.Context) error {
 	}
 
 	c.Response().Header().Set("Cache-Control", "private, max-age=3600")
-	c.Response().Header().Set("Content-Disposition", "inline; filename=\""+filepath.Base(img.ImageURL)+"\"")
+	c.Response().Header().Set("Content-Disposition", safeContentDisposition(filepath.Base(img.ImageURL)))
 	return c.Blob(http.StatusOK, mimeType, data)
 }
 

internal/handlers/subscription_webhook_handler.go

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
 	"encoding/base64"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"encoding/pem"
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"math/big"
@@ -20,6 +21,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
 	"github.com/labstack/echo/v4"
 	"github.com/rs/zerolog/log"
+	"gorm.io/gorm"
 
 	"github.com/treytartt/honeydue-api/internal/config"
 	"github.com/treytartt/honeydue-api/internal/models"
@@ -165,9 +167,13 @@ func (h *SubscriptionWebhookHandler) HandleAppleWebhook(c echo.Context) error {
 	if notification.NotificationUUID != "" {
 		alreadyProcessed, err := h.webhookEventRepo.HasProcessed("apple", notification.NotificationUUID)
 		if err != nil {
-			log.Error().Err(err).Msg("Apple Webhook: Failed to check dedup")
+			// Audit H6: fail closed. A dedup-check failure must not let a
-			// Continue processing on dedup check failure (fail-open)
+			// possibly-duplicate event through (duplicate refunds/grants).
-		} else if alreadyProcessed {
+			// Return 500 so Apple retries once the DB is healthy.
+			log.Error().Err(err).Msg("Apple Webhook: dedup check failed — returning 500 for retry")
+			return c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, map[string]interface{}{"error": "dedup check failed"})
+		}
+		if alreadyProcessed {
 			log.Info().Str("uuid", notification.NotificationUUID).Msg("Apple Webhook: Duplicate event, skipping")
 			return c.JSON(http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{"status": "duplicate"})
 		}
@@ -352,10 +358,24 @@ func (h *SubscriptionWebhookHandler) processAppleNotification(
 }
 
 func (h *SubscriptionWebhookHandler) findUserByAppleTransaction(originalTransactionID string) (*models.User, error) {
-	// Look up user subscription by stored receipt data
+	// Audit C13: exact match on the indexed apple_original_transaction_id
-	subscription, err := h.subscriptionRepo.FindByAppleReceiptContains(originalTransactionID)
+	// column. Falls back to the legacy escaped-LIKE scan over
+	// apple_receipt_data only for subscriptions created before that column
+	// existed (and thus not yet populated).
+	subscription, err := h.subscriptionRepo.FindByAppleOriginalTransactionID(originalTransactionID)
 	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
+		// Only fall back to the legacy substring scan when the exact-match
+		// column genuinely had no row (a subscription created before the
+		// column existed). A real DB error must propagate — masking it as
+		// "not found" could bind the webhook to the wrong account via the
+		// LIKE scan, or silently drop a legitimate event.
+		if !errors.Is(err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		subscription, err = h.subscriptionRepo.FindByAppleReceiptContains(originalTransactionID)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
 	}
 
 	user, err := h.userRepo.FindByID(subscription.UserID)
@@ -566,9 +586,12 @@ func (h *SubscriptionWebhookHandler) HandleGoogleWebhook(c echo.Context) error {
 	if messageID != "" {
 		alreadyProcessed, err := h.webhookEventRepo.HasProcessed("google", messageID)
 		if err != nil {
-			log.Error().Err(err).Msg("Google Webhook: Failed to check dedup")
+			// Audit H6: fail closed — see the Apple handler. Return 500 so
-			// Continue processing on dedup check failure (fail-open)
+			// Google Pub/Sub redelivers once the DB is healthy.
-		} else if alreadyProcessed {
+			log.Error().Err(err).Msg("Google Webhook: dedup check failed — returning 500 for retry")
+			return c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, map[string]interface{}{"error": "dedup check failed"})
+		}
+		if alreadyProcessed {
 			log.Info().Str("message_id", messageID).Msg("Google Webhook: Duplicate event, skipping")
 			return c.JSON(http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{"status": "duplicate"})
 		}

internal/middleware/auth.go

@@ -169,6 +169,34 @@ func (m *AuthMiddleware) OptionalTokenAuth() echo.MiddlewareFunc {
 	}
 }
 
+// RequireVerified returns middleware that rejects users whose email is not
+// verified (audit LIVE-L19). Apply it after TokenAuth to gate sensitive
+// actions — e.g. generating residence share codes — behind proof that the
+// account actually controls its email address.
+func (m *AuthMiddleware) RequireVerified() echo.MiddlewareFunc {
+	return func(next echo.HandlerFunc) echo.HandlerFunc {
+		return func(c echo.Context) error {
+			user := GetAuthUser(c)
+			if user == nil {
+				return apperrors.Unauthorized("error.not_authenticated")
+			}
+			var verified bool
+			err := m.db.WithContext(c.Request().Context()).
+				Model(&models.UserProfile{}).
+				Where("user_id = ?", user.ID).
+				Select("verified").
+				Scan(&verified).Error
+			if err != nil {
+				return apperrors.Internal(err)
+			}
+			if !verified {
+				return apperrors.Forbidden("error.email_not_verified")
+			}
+			return next(c)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 // extractToken extracts the token from the Authorization header
 func extractToken(c echo.Context) (string, error) {
 	authHeader := c.Request().Header.Get("Authorization")
@@ -297,7 +325,7 @@ func (m *AuthMiddleware) getUserFromDatabaseWithToken(ctx context.Context, token
 			u.last_login  AS u_last_login
 		`).
 		Joins("INNER JOIN auth_user u ON u.id = t.user_id").
-		Where("t.key = ?", token).
+		Where("t.key = ?", models.HashToken(token)). // audit C1: only the hash is stored
 		Limit(1).
 		Scan(&row).Error
 	if err != nil || row.Key == "" {

internal/middleware/auth_expiry_test.go

@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ func TestTokenAuth_RejectsExpiredToken(t *testing.T) {
 
 	e := echo.New()
 	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/test/", nil)
-	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Token "+token.Key)
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Token "+token.Plaintext)
 	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
 	c := e.NewContext(req, rec)
 
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ func TestTokenAuth_AcceptsValidToken(t *testing.T) {
 
 	e := echo.New()
 	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/test/", nil)
-	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Token "+token.Key)
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Token "+token.Plaintext)
 	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
 	c := e.NewContext(req, rec)
 
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ func TestTokenAuth_AcceptsTokenAtBoundary(t *testing.T) {
 
 	e := echo.New()
 	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/test/", nil)
-	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Token "+token.Key)
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Token "+token.Plaintext)
 	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
 	c := e.NewContext(req, rec)
 

internal/middleware/auth_test.go

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ func TestTokenAuth_BearerScheme_Accepted(t *testing.T) {
 
 	e := echo.New()
 	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/test/", nil)
-	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token.Key)
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token.Plaintext)
 	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
 	c := e.NewContext(req, rec)
 
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ func TestTokenAuth_InvalidScheme_Rejected(t *testing.T) {
 
 	e := echo.New()
 	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/test/", nil)
-	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Basic "+token.Key)
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Basic "+token.Plaintext)
 	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
 	c := e.NewContext(req, rec)
 
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ func TestTokenAuth_InactiveUser_Rejected(t *testing.T) {
 
 	e := echo.New()
 	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/test/", nil)
-	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Token "+token.Key)
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Token "+token.Plaintext)
 	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
 	c := e.NewContext(req, rec)
 
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ func TestOptionalTokenAuth_ValidToken_SetsUser(t *testing.T) {
 
 	e := echo.New()
 	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/test/", nil)
-	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Token "+token.Key)
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Token "+token.Plaintext)
 	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
 	c := e.NewContext(req, rec)
 
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ func TestOptionalTokenAuth_ExpiredToken_IgnoresUser(t *testing.T) {
 
 	e := echo.New()
 	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/test/", nil)
-	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Token "+token.Key)
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Token "+token.Plaintext)
 	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
 	c := e.NewContext(req, rec)
 
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ func TestNewAuthMiddlewareWithConfig_CustomExpiryDays(t *testing.T) {
 
 	e := echo.New()
 	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/test/", nil)
-	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Token "+token.Key)
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Token "+token.Plaintext)
 	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
 	c := e.NewContext(req, rec)
 
@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ func TestNewAuthMiddlewareWithConfig_ExpiredWithCustomExpiry(t *testing.T) {
 
 	e := echo.New()
 	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/test/", nil)
-	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Token "+token.Key)
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Token "+token.Plaintext)
 	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
 	c := e.NewContext(req, rec)
 

internal/middleware/timezone.go

@@ -99,21 +99,23 @@ func parseTimezone(tz string) *time.Location {
 		return loc
 	}
 
-	// Try parsing as UTC offset (e.g., "-08:00", "+05:30")
+	// Try parsing as a UTC offset (e.g., "-08:00", "+05:30"). Audit H8:
-	// We parse a reference time with the given offset to extract the offset value
+	// reject absurd offsets — real timezones are within ±14h of UTC — so a
-	t, err := time.Parse("-07:00", tz)
+	// crafted X-Timezone header cannot shift date math arbitrarily.
-	if err == nil {
+	const maxOffsetSeconds = 14 * 3600
-		// time.Parse returns a time, we need to extract the offset
+	if t, err := time.Parse("-07:00", tz); err == nil {
-		// The parsed time will have the offset embedded
+		if _, offset := t.Zone(); offset >= -maxOffsetSeconds && offset <= maxOffsetSeconds {
-		_, offset := t.Zone()
+			return time.FixedZone(tz, offset)
-		return time.FixedZone(tz, offset)
+		}
+		return time.UTC
 	}
 
 	// Also try without colon (e.g., "-0800")
-	t, err = time.Parse("-0700", tz)
+	if t, err := time.Parse("-0700", tz); err == nil {
-	if err == nil {
+		if _, offset := t.Zone(); offset >= -maxOffsetSeconds && offset <= maxOffsetSeconds {
-		_, offset := t.Zone()
+			return time.FixedZone(tz, offset)
-		return time.FixedZone(tz, offset)
+		}
+		return time.UTC
 	}
 
 	// Default to UTC

internal/models/models_coverage_test.go

@@ -252,7 +252,8 @@ func TestAuthToken_BeforeCreate_GeneratesKey(t *testing.T) {
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	assert.NotEmpty(t, token.Key)
-	assert.Len(t, token.Key, 40) // 20 bytes = 40 hex chars
+	assert.Len(t, token.Key, 64)       // SHA-256 hex hash (audit C1)
+	assert.Len(t, token.Plaintext, 40) // raw 20-byte token, returned to the client
 	assert.False(t, token.Created.IsZero())
 }
 

internal/models/subscription.go

@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ type UserSubscription struct {
 	// In-App Purchase data (Apple / Google)
 	AppleReceiptData    *string        `gorm:"column:apple_receipt_data;type:text" json:"-"`
 	GooglePurchaseToken *string        `gorm:"column:google_purchase_token;type:text" json:"-"`
+	// AppleOriginalTransactionID binds an Apple subscription to one account
+	// (audit C5/C13). A partial unique index enforces one-account-per-txn.
+	AppleOriginalTransactionID *string `gorm:"column:apple_original_transaction_id;type:text" json:"-"`
 
 	// Stripe data (web subscriptions)
 	StripeCustomerID     *string       `gorm:"column:stripe_customer_id;size:255" json:"-"`

internal/models/user.go

@@ -2,7 +2,10 @@ package models
 
 import (
 	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/binary"
 	"encoding/hex"
+	"fmt"
 	"time"
 
 	"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
@@ -37,14 +40,16 @@ func (User) TableName() string {
 	return "auth_user"
 }
 
+// BcryptCost is the bcrypt work factor for password and code hashing.
+// 12 (audit M2) is stronger than bcrypt.DefaultCost (10).
+const BcryptCost = 12
+
 // SetPassword hashes and sets the password
 func (u *User) SetPassword(password string) error {
-	// Django uses PBKDF2_SHA256 by default, but we'll use bcrypt for Go
+	// Django uses PBKDF2_SHA256 by default, but we use bcrypt for Go.
-	// Note: This means passwords set by Django won't work with Go's check
+	// Passwords set by Django won't verify with Go's bcrypt check — those
-	// For migration, you'd need to either:
+	// users must reset their password after migration.
-	// 1. Force password reset for all users
+	hash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(password), BcryptCost)
-	// 2. Implement Django's PBKDF2 hasher in Go
-	hash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(password), bcrypt.DefaultCost)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
@@ -69,12 +74,22 @@ func (u *User) GetFullName() string {
 	return u.Username
 }
 
-// AuthToken represents the user_authtoken table
+// AuthToken represents the user_authtoken table.
+//
+// Audit C1: the Key column stores the SHA-256 hash of the token, never the
+// token itself. The raw token is handed to the client exactly once, at
+// creation, via the non-persisted Plaintext field — it is never stored or
+// logged. A database compromise therefore yields no usable session tokens.
 type AuthToken struct {
-	Key       string    `gorm:"column:key;primaryKey;size:40" json:"key"`
+	Key       string    `gorm:"column:key;primaryKey;size:64" json:"-"`
 	UserID    uint      `gorm:"column:user_id;uniqueIndex;not null" json:"user_id"`
 	Created   time.Time `gorm:"column:created;autoCreateTime" json:"created"`
 
+	// Plaintext is the raw token value. It is never persisted (gorm:"-")
+	// and is only populated on a freshly-created token so the caller can
+	// return it to the client. On a token loaded from the DB it is "".
+	Plaintext string `gorm:"-" json:"-"`
+
 	// Relations
 	User User `gorm:"foreignKey:UserID" json:"-"`
 }
@@ -84,10 +99,13 @@ func (AuthToken) TableName() string {
 	return "user_authtoken"
 }
 
-// BeforeCreate generates a token key if not provided
+// BeforeCreate generates a token if one is not already set, storing only
+// its hash in Key and the raw value in the non-persisted Plaintext field.
 func (t *AuthToken) BeforeCreate(tx *gorm.DB) error {
 	if t.Key == "" {
-		t.Key = generateToken()
+		raw := generateToken()
+		t.Plaintext = raw
+		t.Key = HashToken(raw)
 	}
 	if t.Created.IsZero() {
 		t.Created = time.Now().UTC()
@@ -95,13 +113,23 @@ func (t *AuthToken) BeforeCreate(tx *gorm.DB) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-// generateToken creates a random 40-character hex token
+// generateToken creates a random 40-character hex token (the raw value).
 func generateToken() string {
 	b := make([]byte, 20)
 	rand.Read(b)
 	return hex.EncodeToString(b)
 }
 
+// HashToken returns the at-rest representation of an auth token: the
+// hex-encoded SHA-256 hash. Auth tokens are 160-bit random values, so a
+// fast deterministic hash is appropriate — there is nothing to brute-force,
+// and determinism preserves the single indexed-lookup query in the auth
+// middleware. The raw token is never stored.
+func HashToken(raw string) string {
+	sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(raw))
+	return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
+}
+
 // GetOrCreate gets an existing token or creates a new one for the user
 func GetOrCreateToken(tx *gorm.DB, userID uint) (*AuthToken, error) {
 	var token AuthToken
@@ -160,15 +188,22 @@ func (c *ConfirmationCode) IsValid() bool {
 	return !c.IsUsed && time.Now().UTC().Before(c.ExpiresAt)
 }
 
-// GenerateCode creates a random 6-digit code
+// GenerateConfirmationCode creates a uniformly-random 6-digit code using
+// rejection sampling on crypto/rand (audit H4 — removes the modulo bias of
+// the previous implementation).
 func GenerateConfirmationCode() string {
-	b := make([]byte, 3)
+	for {
-	rand.Read(b)
+		var b [4]byte
-	// Convert to 6-digit number
+		if _, err := rand.Read(b[:]); err != nil {
-	num := int(b[0])<<16 | int(b[1])<<8 | int(b[2])
+			continue
-	return string(rune('0'+num%10)) + string(rune('0'+(num/10)%10)) +
+		}
-		string(rune('0'+(num/100)%10)) + string(rune('0'+(num/1000)%10)) +
+		// 4294000000 is the largest multiple of 1e6 <= MaxUint32; rejecting
-		string(rune('0'+(num/10000)%10)) + string(rune('0'+(num/100000)%10))
+		// the tail above it makes n % 1000000 perfectly uniform.
+		n := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[:])
+		if n < 4294000000 {
+			return fmt.Sprintf("%06d", n%1000000)
+		}
+	}
 }
 
 // PasswordResetCode represents the user_passwordresetcode table
@@ -193,7 +228,7 @@ func (PasswordResetCode) TableName() string {
 
 // SetCode hashes and stores the reset code
 func (p *PasswordResetCode) SetCode(code string) error {
-	hash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(code), bcrypt.DefaultCost)
+	hash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(code), BcryptCost)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}

internal/repositories/residence_repo.go

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/rs/zerolog/log"
 	"gorm.io/gorm"
+	"gorm.io/gorm/clause"
 
 	"github.com/treytartt/honeydue-api/internal/models"
 )
@@ -194,6 +195,60 @@ func (r *ResidenceRepository) HasAccess(residenceID, userID uint) (bool, error)
 	return count > 0, nil
 }
 
+// JoinWithShareCode atomically redeems a one-time share code (audit C9/H9):
+// it locks the share-code row, re-checks validity under the lock, adds the
+// user to the residence, and deactivates the code — all in one transaction.
+// Concurrent redemptions of the same code serialize on the row lock; the
+// loser sees is_active=false and is rejected. A failure to deactivate aborts
+// the whole join. Returns gorm.ErrRecordNotFound for an unknown, inactive, or
+// expired code so the caller can map every case to one generic error.
+func (r *ResidenceRepository) JoinWithShareCode(code string, userID uint) (residenceID uint, alreadyMember bool, err error) {
+	err = r.db.Transaction(func(tx *gorm.DB) error {
+		var sc models.ResidenceShareCode
+		if e := tx.Clauses(clause.Locking{Strength: "UPDATE"}).
+			Where("code = ?", code).First(&sc).Error; e != nil {
+			return e
+		}
+		if !sc.IsActive || (sc.ExpiresAt != nil && time.Now().UTC().After(*sc.ExpiresAt)) {
+			return gorm.ErrRecordNotFound
+		}
+		residenceID = sc.ResidenceID
+
+		// Already a member (owner or shared user)?
+		var accessCount int64
+		if e := tx.Raw(`
+			SELECT COUNT(*) FROM (
+				SELECT 1 FROM residence_residence
+				WHERE id = ? AND owner_id = ? AND is_active = true
+				UNION
+				SELECT 1 FROM residence_residence_users
+				WHERE residence_id = ? AND user_id = ?
+			) ac
+		`, sc.ResidenceID, userID, sc.ResidenceID, userID).Scan(&accessCount).Error; e != nil {
+			return e
+		}
+		if accessCount > 0 {
+			alreadyMember = true
+			return nil
+		}
+
+		if e := tx.Exec(
+			"INSERT INTO residence_residence_users (residence_id, user_id) VALUES (?, ?) ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING",
+			sc.ResidenceID, userID,
+		).Error; e != nil {
+			return e
+		}
+
+		// One-time use: deactivate the code. A failure here aborts the join.
+		if e := tx.Model(&models.ResidenceShareCode{}).
+			Where("id = ?", sc.ID).Update("is_active", false).Error; e != nil {
+			return e
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+	return residenceID, alreadyMember, err
+}
+
 // IsOwner checks if a user is the owner of a residence
 func (r *ResidenceRepository) IsOwner(residenceID, userID uint) (bool, error) {
 	var count int64

internal/repositories/subscription_repo.go

@@ -151,6 +151,28 @@ func (r *SubscriptionRepository) FindByAppleReceiptContains(transactionID string
 	return &sub, nil
 }
 
+// FindByAppleOriginalTransactionID finds a subscription by the Apple original
+// transaction ID (audit C5/C13). Exact match on an indexed column — replaces
+// the LIKE scan in FindByAppleReceiptContains for both replay detection and
+// webhook user lookup.
+func (r *SubscriptionRepository) FindByAppleOriginalTransactionID(originalTransactionID string) (*models.UserSubscription, error) {
+	var sub models.UserSubscription
+	err := r.db.Where("apple_original_transaction_id = ?", originalTransactionID).First(&sub).Error
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return &sub, nil
+}
+
+// UpdateAppleOriginalTransactionID binds an Apple original transaction ID to a
+// user's subscription. A partial unique index enforces one account per
+// transaction (audit C5) — a second account claiming the same ID fails here.
+func (r *SubscriptionRepository) UpdateAppleOriginalTransactionID(userID uint, originalTransactionID string) error {
+	return r.db.Model(&models.UserSubscription{}).
+		Where("user_id = ?", userID).
+		Update("apple_original_transaction_id", originalTransactionID).Error
+}
+
 // FindByGoogleToken finds a subscription by Google purchase token
 // Used by webhooks to find the user associated with a purchase
 func (r *SubscriptionRepository) FindByGoogleToken(purchaseToken string) (*models.UserSubscription, error) {

internal/repositories/subscription_repo_test.go

@@ -226,3 +226,48 @@ func TestUpdateExpiresAt(t *testing.T) {
 	require.NotNil(t, updated.ExpiresAt)
 	assert.WithinDuration(t, newExpiry, *updated.ExpiresAt, time.Second, "expires_at should be updated")
 }
+
+// TestSubscriptionRepo_IAPTransactionReplayRejected is the regression test for
+// audit C5/C6: an in-app-purchase transaction (an Apple original transaction
+// ID or a Google purchase token) may be bound to exactly one account. Without
+// that guarantee a valid receipt could be replayed against a second account
+// to grant Pro for free. The guarantee is the pair of partial unique indexes
+// added by migration 000004; AutoMigrate does not create them, so this test
+// recreates them verbatim to exercise the same DB-level enforcement.
+func TestSubscriptionRepo_IAPTransactionReplayRejected(t *testing.T) {
+	db := testutil.SetupTestDB(t)
+	require.NoError(t, db.Exec(`CREATE UNIQUE INDEX uq_subscription_apple_original_txn `+
+		`ON subscription_usersubscription (apple_original_transaction_id) `+
+		`WHERE apple_original_transaction_id IS NOT NULL AND apple_original_transaction_id <> ''`).Error)
+	require.NoError(t, db.Exec(`CREATE UNIQUE INDEX uq_subscription_google_purchase_token `+
+		`ON subscription_usersubscription (google_purchase_token) `+
+		`WHERE google_purchase_token IS NOT NULL AND google_purchase_token <> ''`).Error)
+
+	repo := NewSubscriptionRepository(db)
+	userA := testutil.CreateTestUser(t, db, "iapusera", "iapa@test.com", "password")
+	userB := testutil.CreateTestUser(t, db, "iapuserb", "iapb@test.com", "password")
+	require.NoError(t, db.Create(&models.UserSubscription{UserID: userA.ID, Tier: models.TierFree}).Error)
+	require.NoError(t, db.Create(&models.UserSubscription{UserID: userB.ID, Tier: models.TierFree}).Error)
+
+	t.Run("apple transaction cannot be claimed by a second account", func(t *testing.T) {
+		require.NoError(t, repo.UpdateAppleOriginalTransactionID(userA.ID, "apple-original-txn-1"),
+			"the first account binding the transaction must succeed")
+		err := repo.UpdateAppleOriginalTransactionID(userB.ID, "apple-original-txn-1")
+		require.Error(t, err,
+			"replaying account A's Apple transaction onto account B must be rejected (C5)")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("google purchase token cannot be claimed by a second account", func(t *testing.T) {
+		require.NoError(t, repo.UpdatePurchaseToken(userA.ID, "google-purchase-token-1"),
+			"the first account binding the token must succeed")
+		err := repo.UpdatePurchaseToken(userB.ID, "google-purchase-token-1")
+		require.Error(t, err,
+			"replaying account A's Google purchase token onto account B must be rejected (C6)")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("re-binding the same transaction to the same account is allowed", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// A renewal re-submitting the same transaction for its owner must not
+		// be rejected — the partial unique index excludes the row's own value.
+		require.NoError(t, repo.UpdateAppleOriginalTransactionID(userA.ID, "apple-original-txn-1"))
+	})
+}

internal/repositories/user_repo.go

@@ -174,10 +174,12 @@ func (r *UserRepository) GetOrCreateToken(userID uint) (*models.AuthToken, error
 	return &token, nil
 }
 
-// FindTokenByKey looks up an auth token by its key value.
+// FindTokenByKey looks up an auth token by its raw key value. The raw token
-func (r *UserRepository) FindTokenByKey(key string) (*models.AuthToken, error) {
+// is hashed (audit C1) before the indexed lookup, since only the hash is
+// stored.
+func (r *UserRepository) FindTokenByKey(rawKey string) (*models.AuthToken, error) {
 	var token models.AuthToken
-	if err := r.db.Where("key = ?", key).First(&token).Error; err != nil {
+	if err := r.db.Where("key = ?", models.HashToken(rawKey)).First(&token).Error; err != nil {
 		if errors.Is(err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
 			return nil, ErrTokenNotFound
 		}
@@ -195,9 +197,46 @@ func (r *UserRepository) CreateToken(userID uint) (*models.AuthToken, error) {
 	return &token, nil
 }
 
-// DeleteToken deletes an auth token
+// CreateFreshToken issues a new auth token for the user, replacing any
+// existing one. Because tokens are stored hashed (audit C1) the server
+// cannot re-issue a previously-minted token's plaintext, so every login
+// mints a fresh token. The returned token's Plaintext field carries the
+// raw value to hand to the client; it is never persisted.
+//
+// It also returns the stored hashes of the token rows it deleted, so the
+// caller can evict those entries from the Redis token cache (audit MEDIUM-1).
+// Without that, a prior (e.g. stolen) token keeps authenticating via a cache
+// hit for up to the cache TTL even though its DB row is gone.
+func (r *UserRepository) CreateFreshToken(userID uint) (*models.AuthToken, []string, error) {
+	var token models.AuthToken
+	var oldHashes []string
+	err := r.db.Transaction(func(tx *gorm.DB) error {
+		var old []models.AuthToken
+		if err := tx.Where("user_id = ?", userID).Find(&old).Error; err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		oldHashes = make([]string, 0, len(old))
+		for i := range old {
+			if old[i].Key != "" {
+				oldHashes = append(oldHashes, old[i].Key)
+			}
+		}
+		if err := tx.Where("user_id = ?", userID).Delete(&models.AuthToken{}).Error; err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		token = models.AuthToken{UserID: userID}
+		return tx.Create(&token).Error
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, err
+	}
+	return &token, oldHashes, nil
+}
+
+// DeleteToken deletes an auth token by its raw key value. The raw token is
+// hashed (audit C1) before the lookup, since only the hash is stored.
 func (r *UserRepository) DeleteToken(token string) error {
-	result := r.db.Where("key = ?", token).Delete(&models.AuthToken{})
+	result := r.db.Where("key = ?", models.HashToken(token)).Delete(&models.AuthToken{})
 	if result.Error != nil {
 		return result.Error
 	}

internal/repositories/user_repo_coverage_test.go

@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ func TestUserRepository_FindTokenByKey(t *testing.T) {
 	token, err := repo.GetOrCreateToken(user.ID)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
-	found, err := repo.FindTokenByKey(token.Key)
+	found, err := repo.FindTokenByKey(token.Plaintext)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	assert.Equal(t, token.Key, found.Key)
 	assert.Equal(t, user.ID, found.UserID)
@@ -128,10 +128,10 @@ func TestUserRepository_DeleteToken(t *testing.T) {
 	token, err := repo.GetOrCreateToken(user.ID)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
-	err = repo.DeleteToken(token.Key)
+	err = repo.DeleteToken(token.Plaintext)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
-	_, err = repo.FindTokenByKey(token.Key)
+	_, err = repo.FindTokenByKey(token.Plaintext)
 	assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrTokenNotFound)
 }
 

internal/router/router.go

@@ -75,10 +75,13 @@ func SetupRouter(deps *Dependencies) *echo.Echo {
 	// responses are unaffected — they don't load any assets, so any CSP is fine.
 	// frame-ancestors stays 'none' to block clickjacking.
 	e.Use(middleware.SecureWithConfig(middleware.SecureConfig{
-		XSSProtection:      "1; mode=block",
+		// XSSProtection deliberately empty (audit L7): the X-XSS-Protection
+		// header is deprecated and has itself caused XSS in legacy browsers.
+		XSSProtection:      "",
 		ContentTypeNosniff: "nosniff",
 		XFrameOptions:      "SAMEORIGIN",
-		HSTSMaxAge:         31536000,
+		HSTSMaxAge:         63072000, // 2 years — preload-eligible (audit L5/CODE-L3)
+		HSTSPreloadEnabled: true,
 		ReferrerPolicy:     "strict-origin-when-cross-origin",
 		ContentSecurityPolicy: "default-src 'self'; " +
 			"style-src 'self' https://fonts.googleapis.com; " +
@@ -86,6 +89,8 @@ func SetupRouter(deps *Dependencies) *echo.Echo {
 			"img-src 'self' data:; " +
 			"script-src 'self'; " +
 			"connect-src 'self'; " +
+			"object-src 'none'; " + // audit L8 — disable plugins/embeds
+			"base-uri 'self'; " + // audit L8 — block <base> hijacking
 			"frame-ancestors 'none'",
 	}))
 	e.Use(middleware.BodyLimitWithConfig(middleware.BodyLimitConfig{
@@ -136,9 +141,20 @@ func SetupRouter(deps *Dependencies) *echo.Echo {
 	// labeled by route pattern, method, and status code.
 	e.Use(prom.HTTPMiddleware())
 
-	// /metrics endpoint exposed for vmagent scrape. No auth — bound to
+	// /metrics endpoint for the in-cluster vmagent scrape (audit LIVE-L1).
-	// the cluster network only; not exposed via Cloudflare.
+	// vmagent scrapes api pods directly (pod-to-pod), so its requests carry
-	e.GET("/metrics", prom.Handler())
+	// no X-Forwarded-For. Any request that DOES carry one reached us through
+	// Traefik/Cloudflare — i.e. the public internet — and is refused with a
+	// 404. The api pod port is not exposed outside the cluster, so a request
+	// cannot reach /metrics without going through Traefik, and Traefik always
+	// appends X-Forwarded-For — the check cannot be bypassed.
+	metricsHandler := prom.Handler()
+	e.GET("/metrics", func(c echo.Context) error {
+		if c.Request().Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For") != "" {
+			return echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusNotFound)
+		}
+		return metricsHandler(c)
+	})
 
 	// Serve landing page static files (if static directory is configured)
 	staticDir := cfg.Server.StaticDir
@@ -204,6 +220,7 @@ func SetupRouter(deps *Dependencies) *echo.Echo {
 	// Wire Redis cache for residence-ID lookups across the four services that
 	// read it on the request hot path. Cache is best-effort; nil cache is OK.
 	if deps.Cache != nil {
+		authService.SetCacheService(deps.Cache) // per-account login lockout (audit M5)
 		residenceService.SetCacheService(deps.Cache)
 		taskService.SetCacheService(deps.Cache)
 		contractorService.SetCacheService(deps.Cache)
@@ -316,7 +333,7 @@ func SetupRouter(deps *Dependencies) *echo.Echo {
 		protected.Use(custommiddleware.TimezoneMiddleware())
 		{
 			setupProtectedAuthRoutes(protected, authHandler)
-			setupResidenceRoutes(protected, residenceHandler)
+			setupResidenceRoutes(protected, residenceHandler, authMiddleware.RequireVerified())
 			setupTaskRoutes(protected, taskHandler)
 			setupSuggestionRoutes(protected, suggestionHandler)
 			setupContractorRoutes(protected, contractorHandler)
@@ -583,7 +600,7 @@ func setupPublicDataRoutes(api *echo.Group, residenceHandler *handlers.Residence
 }
 
 // setupResidenceRoutes configures residence routes
-func setupResidenceRoutes(api *echo.Group, residenceHandler *handlers.ResidenceHandler) {
+func setupResidenceRoutes(api *echo.Group, residenceHandler *handlers.ResidenceHandler, requireVerified echo.MiddlewareFunc) {
 	residences := api.Group("/residences")
 	{
 		residences.GET("/", residenceHandler.ListResidences)
@@ -598,8 +615,11 @@ func setupResidenceRoutes(api *echo.Group, residenceHandler *handlers.ResidenceH
 		residences.DELETE("/:id/", residenceHandler.DeleteResidence)
 
 		residences.GET("/:id/share-code/", residenceHandler.GetShareCode)
-		residences.POST("/:id/generate-share-code/", residenceHandler.GenerateShareCode)
+		// Audit LIVE-L19: generating a residence share code requires a
-		residences.POST("/:id/generate-share-package/", residenceHandler.GenerateSharePackage)
+		// verified email — it blocks bad-faith unverified signups from
+		// minting share codes.
+		residences.POST("/:id/generate-share-code/", residenceHandler.GenerateShareCode, requireVerified)
+		residences.POST("/:id/generate-share-package/", residenceHandler.GenerateSharePackage, requireVerified)
 		residences.POST("/:id/generate-tasks-report/", residenceHandler.GenerateTasksReport)
 		residences.GET("/:id/users/", residenceHandler.GetResidenceUsers)
 		residences.DELETE("/:id/users/:user_id/", residenceHandler.RemoveResidenceUser)

internal/services/auth_refresh_test.go

@@ -75,9 +75,9 @@ func TestRefreshToken_FreshToken_ReturnsExisting(t *testing.T) {
 
 	svc := newTestAuthService(db)
 
-	resp, err := svc.RefreshToken(context.Background(), token.Key, user.ID)
+	resp, err := svc.RefreshToken(context.Background(), token.Plaintext, user.ID)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, token.Key, resp.Token, "fresh token should return the same token")
+	assert.Equal(t, token.Plaintext, resp.Token, "fresh token should return the same token")
 	assert.Contains(t, resp.Message, "still valid")
 }
 
@@ -88,23 +88,25 @@ func TestRefreshToken_InRenewalWindow_ReturnsNewToken(t *testing.T) {
 
 	svc := newTestAuthService(db)
 
-	resp, err := svc.RefreshToken(context.Background(), token.Key, user.ID)
+	resp, err := svc.RefreshToken(context.Background(), token.Plaintext, user.ID)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.NotEqual(t, token.Key, resp.Token, "should return a new token")
+	assert.NotEqual(t, token.Plaintext, resp.Token, "should return a new token")
 	assert.Contains(t, resp.Message, "refreshed")
 
 	// Verify old token was deleted
 	var count int64
+	// The DB stores the SHA-256 hash, so query by token.Key (the hash).
 	db.Model(&models.AuthToken{}).Where("key = ?", token.Key).Count(&count)
 	assert.Equal(t, int64(0), count, "old token should be deleted")
 
 	// Verify new token exists in DB
-	db.Model(&models.AuthToken{}).Where("key = ?", resp.Token).Count(&count)
+	// resp.Token is the raw token; the DB stores its hash.
+	db.Model(&models.AuthToken{}).Where("key = ?", models.HashToken(resp.Token)).Count(&count)
 	assert.Equal(t, int64(1), count, "new token should exist in DB")
 
 	// Verify new token belongs to the same user
 	var newToken models.AuthToken
-	require.NoError(t, db.Where("key = ?", resp.Token).First(&newToken).Error)
+	require.NoError(t, db.Where("key = ?", models.HashToken(resp.Token)).First(&newToken).Error)
 	assert.Equal(t, user.ID, newToken.UserID)
 }
 
@@ -115,7 +117,7 @@ func TestRefreshToken_ExpiredToken_Returns401(t *testing.T) {
 
 	svc := newTestAuthService(db)
 
-	resp, err := svc.RefreshToken(context.Background(), token.Key, user.ID)
+	resp, err := svc.RefreshToken(context.Background(), token.Plaintext, user.ID)
 	require.Error(t, err)
 	assert.Nil(t, resp)
 	assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "error.token_expired")
@@ -130,9 +132,9 @@ func TestRefreshToken_AtExactBoundary60Days(t *testing.T) {
 
 	svc := newTestAuthService(db)
 
-	resp, err := svc.RefreshToken(context.Background(), token.Key, user.ID)
+	resp, err := svc.RefreshToken(context.Background(), token.Plaintext, user.ID)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.NotEqual(t, token.Key, resp.Token, "token at 61 days should be refreshed")
+	assert.NotEqual(t, token.Plaintext, resp.Token, "token at 61 days should be refreshed")
 }
 
 func TestRefreshToken_InvalidToken_Returns401(t *testing.T) {
@@ -155,7 +157,7 @@ func TestRefreshToken_WrongUser_Returns401(t *testing.T) {
 	svc := newTestAuthService(db)
 
 	// Try to refresh with a different user ID
-	resp, err := svc.RefreshToken(context.Background(), token.Key, user.ID+999)
+	resp, err := svc.RefreshToken(context.Background(), token.Plaintext, user.ID+999)
 	require.Error(t, err)
 	assert.Nil(t, resp)
 	assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "error.invalid_token")
@@ -168,7 +170,7 @@ func TestRefreshToken_FreshTokenAt59Days_ReturnsExisting(t *testing.T) {
 
 	svc := newTestAuthService(db)
 
-	resp, err := svc.RefreshToken(context.Background(), token.Key, user.ID)
+	resp, err := svc.RefreshToken(context.Background(), token.Plaintext, user.ID)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, token.Key, resp.Token, "token at 59 days should NOT be refreshed")
+	assert.Equal(t, token.Plaintext, resp.Token, "token at 59 days should NOT be refreshed")
 }

internal/services/auth_service.go

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package services
 import (
 	"context"
 	"crypto/rand"
+	"encoding/binary"
 	"encoding/hex"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
@@ -36,13 +37,32 @@ var (
 	ErrGoogleSignInFailed = errors.New("Google Sign In failed")
 )
 
+// Per-account login lockout (audit M5, hardened per MEDIUM-3).
+const (
+	// maxLoginFailureIPs is how many DISTINCT source IPs may fail to log in to
+	// one account within the window before that account is locked. Counting
+	// distinct IPs (not raw attempts) means a single attacker who knows a
+	// victim's email cannot lock the victim out by spamming failures — only a
+	// genuinely distributed credential-stuffing attack reaches this threshold.
+	maxLoginFailureIPs = 5
+	// loginLockWindow is how long the failed-IP set persists; it is refreshed
+	// on each failure so an active attack keeps the window open.
+	loginLockWindow = 15 * time.Minute
+)
+
 // AuthService handles authentication business logic
 type AuthService struct {
 	userRepo         *repositories.UserRepository
 	notificationRepo *repositories.NotificationRepository
+	cache            *CacheService
 	cfg              *config.Config
 }
 
+// SetCacheService wires Redis for per-account login-failure tracking (M5).
+func (s *AuthService) SetCacheService(cache *CacheService) {
+	s.cache = cache
+}
+
 // NewAuthService creates a new auth service
 func NewAuthService(userRepo *repositories.UserRepository, cfg *config.Config) *AuthService {
 	return &AuthService{
@@ -56,34 +76,89 @@ func (s *AuthService) SetNotificationRepository(notificationRepo *repositories.N
 	s.notificationRepo = notificationRepo
 }
 
-// Login authenticates a user and returns a token
+// dummyPasswordHash is a valid bcrypt hash used to keep login response time
-func (s *AuthService) Login(ctx context.Context, req *requests.LoginRequest) (*responses.LoginResponse, error) {
+// constant when the account does not exist (audit LIVE-L11). It is computed
+// once at startup; the plaintext it hashes is irrelevant and never used.
+var dummyPasswordHash = func() string {
+	h, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte("honeydue-login-timing-equalizer"), models.BcryptCost)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "" // CompareHashAndPassword against "" always fails — safe
+	}
+	return string(h)
+}()
+
+// freshToken mints a new auth token for the user and evicts any prior token's
+// Redis cache entry (audit MEDIUM-1). Without the eviction a re-login would
+// not actually kill a previously-issued token until the cache TTL lapsed — a
+// stolen token would keep working for up to 5 minutes after the victim
+// re-authenticates. A cache-eviction failure is logged, not fatal: the token
+// row is already gone, so the stale entry simply ages out on its own.
+func (s *AuthService) freshToken(ctx context.Context, userID uint) (*models.AuthToken, error) {
+	token, oldHashes, err := s.userRepo.WithContext(ctx).CreateFreshToken(userID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if s.cache != nil && len(oldHashes) > 0 {
+		if cErr := s.cache.InvalidateAuthTokenHashes(ctx, oldHashes...); cErr != nil {
+			log.Warn().Err(cErr).Uint("user_id", userID).
+				Msg("failed to evict prior auth-token cache entries on re-login")
+		}
+	}
+	return token, nil
+}
+
+// Login authenticates a user and returns a token. clientIP is the request's
+// source IP (echo c.RealIP()), used for the distributed-attack lockout.
+func (s *AuthService) Login(ctx context.Context, req *requests.LoginRequest, clientIP string) (*responses.LoginResponse, error) {
 	// Find user by username or email
 	identifier := req.Username
 	if identifier == "" {
 		identifier = req.Email
 	}
+	lockKey := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(identifier))
+
+	// Audit M5 (hardened per MEDIUM-3): per-account lockout keyed on the set
+	// of distinct source IPs that have failed. Once enough distinct IPs have
+	// failed for one account within the window, reject — this still catches
+	// distributed credential stuffing, without letting a single attacker lock
+	// a victim out by spamming failed logins from one IP.
+	if s.cache != nil && lockKey != "" {
+		if n, cErr := s.cache.LoginFailureIPCount(ctx, lockKey); cErr == nil && n >= maxLoginFailureIPs {
+			return nil, apperrors.TooManyRequests("error.too_many_login_attempts")
+		}
+	}
 
 	user, err := s.userRepo.WithContext(ctx).FindByUsernameOrEmail(identifier)
-	if err != nil {
+	if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, repositories.ErrUserNotFound) {
-		if errors.Is(err, repositories.ErrUserNotFound) {
-			return nil, apperrors.Unauthorized("error.invalid_credentials")
-		}
 		return nil, apperrors.Internal(err)
 	}
 
-	// Check if user is active
+	// Constant-time login (audit LIVE-L11): always run a bcrypt comparison,
-	if !user.IsActive {
+	// even when the account does not exist or is inactive, so response
-		return nil, apperrors.Unauthorized("error.account_inactive")
+	// timing never reveals which emails are real accounts. Compare against
+	// the user's hash when available, otherwise a fixed dummy hash.
+	passwordHash := dummyPasswordHash
+	if user != nil {
+		passwordHash = user.Password
 	}
+	passwordOK := bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(passwordHash), []byte(req.Password)) == nil
 
-	// Verify password
+	// One generic error for not-found, inactive, and wrong-password
-	if !user.CheckPassword(req.Password) {
+	// (audit L1) — none of them disclose which condition failed.
+	if user == nil || !user.IsActive || !passwordOK {
+		if s.cache != nil && lockKey != "" {
+			_, _ = s.cache.RegisterLoginFailure(ctx, lockKey, clientIP, loginLockWindow)
+		}
 		return nil, apperrors.Unauthorized("error.invalid_credentials")
 	}
 
+	// Successful authentication — clear the failure counter (audit M5).
+	if s.cache != nil && lockKey != "" {
+		_ = s.cache.ClearLoginFailures(ctx, lockKey)
+	}
+
 	// Get or create auth token
-	token, err := s.userRepo.WithContext(ctx).GetOrCreateToken(user.ID)
+	token, err := s.freshToken(ctx, user.ID)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, apperrors.Internal(err)
 	}
@@ -95,7 +170,7 @@ func (s *AuthService) Login(ctx context.Context, req *requests.LoginRequest) (*r
 	}
 
 	return &responses.LoginResponse{
-		Token: token.Key,
+		Token: token.Plaintext,
 		User:  responses.NewUserResponse(user),
 	}, nil
 }
@@ -176,13 +251,13 @@ func (s *AuthService) Register(ctx context.Context, req *requests.RegisterReques
 	}
 
 	// Create auth token (outside transaction since token generation is idempotent)
-	token, err := s.userRepo.WithContext(ctx).GetOrCreateToken(user.ID)
+	token, err := s.freshToken(ctx, user.ID)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, "", apperrors.Internal(err)
 	}
 
 	return &responses.RegisterResponse{
-		Token:   token.Key,
+		Token:   token.Plaintext,
 		User:    responses.NewUserResponse(user),
 		Message: "Registration successful. Please check your email to verify your account.",
 	}, code, nil
@@ -243,7 +318,7 @@ func (s *AuthService) RefreshToken(ctx context.Context, tokenKey string, userID
 	}
 
 	return &responses.RefreshTokenResponse{
-		Token:   newToken.Key,
+		Token:   newToken.Plaintext,
 		Message: "Token refreshed successfully.",
 	}, nil
 }
@@ -390,26 +465,26 @@ func (s *AuthService) VerifyEmail(ctx context.Context, userID uint, code string)
 		return nil
 	}
 
-	// Find and validate confirmation code
+	// Audit M4: validate the code, consume it, and flip the verified flag in
-	confirmCode, err := s.userRepo.WithContext(ctx).FindConfirmationCode(userID, code)
+	// one transaction so the three writes commit or roll back together.
-	if err != nil {
+	txErr := s.userRepo.WithContext(ctx).Transaction(func(txRepo *repositories.UserRepository) error {
-		if errors.Is(err, repositories.ErrCodeNotFound) {
+		confirmCode, err := txRepo.FindConfirmationCode(userID, code)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if err := txRepo.MarkConfirmationCodeUsed(confirmCode.ID); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		return txRepo.SetProfileVerified(userID, true)
+	})
+	if txErr != nil {
+		if errors.Is(txErr, repositories.ErrCodeNotFound) {
 			return apperrors.BadRequest("error.invalid_verification_code")
 		}
-		if errors.Is(err, repositories.ErrCodeExpired) {
+		if errors.Is(txErr, repositories.ErrCodeExpired) {
 			return apperrors.BadRequest("error.verification_code_expired")
 		}
-		return apperrors.Internal(err)
+		return apperrors.Internal(txErr)
-	}
-
-	// Mark code as used
-	if err := s.userRepo.WithContext(ctx).MarkConfirmationCodeUsed(confirmCode.ID); err != nil {
-		return apperrors.Internal(err)
-	}
-
-	// Set profile as verified
-	if err := s.userRepo.WithContext(ctx).SetProfileVerified(userID, true); err != nil {
-		return apperrors.Internal(err)
 	}
 
 	return nil
@@ -476,7 +551,7 @@ func (s *AuthService) ForgotPassword(ctx context.Context, email string) (string,
 	expiresAt := time.Now().UTC().Add(s.cfg.Security.PasswordResetExpiry)
 
 	// Hash the code before storing
-	codeHash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(code), bcrypt.DefaultCost)
+	codeHash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(code), models.BcryptCost)
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", nil, apperrors.Internal(err)
 	}
@@ -596,7 +671,7 @@ func (s *AuthService) AppleSignIn(ctx context.Context, appleAuth *AppleAuthServi
 		}
 
 		// Get or create token
-		token, err := s.userRepo.WithContext(ctx).GetOrCreateToken(user.ID)
+		token, err := s.freshToken(ctx, user.ID)
 		if err != nil {
 			return nil, apperrors.Internal(err)
 		}
@@ -605,7 +680,7 @@ func (s *AuthService) AppleSignIn(ctx context.Context, appleAuth *AppleAuthServi
 		_ = s.userRepo.WithContext(ctx).UpdateLastLogin(user.ID)
 
 		return &responses.AppleSignInResponse{
-			Token:     token.Key,
+			Token:     token.Plaintext,
 			User:      responses.NewUserResponse(user),
 			IsNewUser: false,
 		}, nil
@@ -638,7 +713,7 @@ func (s *AuthService) AppleSignIn(ctx context.Context, appleAuth *AppleAuthServi
 			_ = s.userRepo.WithContext(ctx).SetProfileVerified(existingUser.ID, true)
 
 			// Get or create token
-			token, err := s.userRepo.WithContext(ctx).GetOrCreateToken(existingUser.ID)
+			token, err := s.freshToken(ctx, existingUser.ID)
 			if err != nil {
 				return nil, apperrors.Internal(err)
 			}
@@ -653,7 +728,7 @@ func (s *AuthService) AppleSignIn(ctx context.Context, appleAuth *AppleAuthServi
 			}
 
 			return &responses.AppleSignInResponse{
-				Token:     token.Key,
+				Token:     token.Plaintext,
 				User:      responses.NewUserResponse(existingUser),
 				IsNewUser: false,
 			}, nil
@@ -704,7 +779,7 @@ func (s *AuthService) AppleSignIn(ctx context.Context, appleAuth *AppleAuthServi
 	}
 
 	// Create token
-	token, err := s.userRepo.WithContext(ctx).GetOrCreateToken(user.ID)
+	token, err := s.freshToken(ctx, user.ID)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, apperrors.Internal(err)
 	}
@@ -716,7 +791,7 @@ func (s *AuthService) AppleSignIn(ctx context.Context, appleAuth *AppleAuthServi
 	}
 
 	return &responses.AppleSignInResponse{
-		Token:     token.Key,
+		Token:     token.Plaintext,
 		User:      responses.NewUserResponse(user),
 		IsNewUser: true,
 	}, nil
@@ -749,7 +824,7 @@ func (s *AuthService) GoogleSignIn(ctx context.Context, googleAuth *GoogleAuthSe
 		}
 
 		// Get or create token
-		token, err := s.userRepo.WithContext(ctx).GetOrCreateToken(user.ID)
+		token, err := s.freshToken(ctx, user.ID)
 		if err != nil {
 			return nil, apperrors.Internal(err)
 		}
@@ -758,7 +833,7 @@ func (s *AuthService) GoogleSignIn(ctx context.Context, googleAuth *GoogleAuthSe
 		_ = s.userRepo.WithContext(ctx).UpdateLastLogin(user.ID)
 
 		return &responses.GoogleSignInResponse{
-			Token:     token.Key,
+			Token:     token.Plaintext,
 			User:      responses.NewUserResponse(user),
 			IsNewUser: false,
 		}, nil
@@ -794,7 +869,7 @@ func (s *AuthService) GoogleSignIn(ctx context.Context, googleAuth *GoogleAuthSe
 			}
 
 			// Get or create token
-			token, err := s.userRepo.WithContext(ctx).GetOrCreateToken(existingUser.ID)
+			token, err := s.freshToken(ctx, existingUser.ID)
 			if err != nil {
 				return nil, apperrors.Internal(err)
 			}
@@ -809,7 +884,7 @@ func (s *AuthService) GoogleSignIn(ctx context.Context, googleAuth *GoogleAuthSe
 			}
 
 			return &responses.GoogleSignInResponse{
-				Token:     token.Key,
+				Token:     token.Plaintext,
 				User:      responses.NewUserResponse(existingUser),
 				IsNewUser: false,
 			}, nil
@@ -861,7 +936,7 @@ func (s *AuthService) GoogleSignIn(ctx context.Context, googleAuth *GoogleAuthSe
 	}
 
 	// Create token
-	token, err := s.userRepo.WithContext(ctx).GetOrCreateToken(user.ID)
+	token, err := s.freshToken(ctx, user.ID)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, apperrors.Internal(err)
 	}
@@ -873,7 +948,7 @@ func (s *AuthService) GoogleSignIn(ctx context.Context, googleAuth *GoogleAuthSe
 	}
 
 	return &responses.GoogleSignInResponse{
-		Token:     token.Key,
+		Token:     token.Plaintext,
 		User:      responses.NewUserResponse(user),
 		IsNewUser: true,
 	}, nil
@@ -882,14 +957,19 @@ func (s *AuthService) GoogleSignIn(ctx context.Context, googleAuth *GoogleAuthSe
 // Helper functions
 
 func generateSixDigitCode() string {
-	b := make([]byte, 4)
+	// Uniform 000000–999999 via rejection sampling on crypto/rand,
-	rand.Read(b)
+	// removing the modulo bias of `n % 1000000` (audit H4).
-	num := int(b[0])<<24 | int(b[1])<<16 | int(b[2])<<8 | int(b[3])
+	for {
-	if num < 0 {
+		var b [4]byte
-		num = -num
+		if _, err := rand.Read(b[:]); err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		// 4294000000 is the largest multiple of 1e6 <= MaxUint32.
+		n := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[:])
+		if n < 4294000000 {
+			return fmt.Sprintf("%06d", n%1000000)
+		}
 	}
-	code := num % 1000000
-	return fmt.Sprintf("%06d", code)
 }
 
 func generateResetToken() string {

internal/services/auth_service_test.go

@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ func TestAuthService_Login(t *testing.T) {
 		Password: "Password123",
 	}
 
-	resp, err := service.Login(context.Background(), req)
+	resp, err := service.Login(context.Background(), req, "")
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	assert.NotEmpty(t, resp.Token)
 	assert.Equal(t, "testuser", resp.User.Username)
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ func TestAuthService_Login_ByEmail(t *testing.T) {
 		Password: "Password123",
 	}
 
-	resp, err := service.Login(context.Background(), req)
+	resp, err := service.Login(context.Background(), req, "")
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	assert.NotEmpty(t, resp.Token)
 }
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ func TestAuthService_Login_InvalidCredentials(t *testing.T) {
 		Password: "WrongPassword1",
 	}
 
-	_, err := service.Login(context.Background(), req)
+	_, err := service.Login(context.Background(), req, "")
 	testutil.AssertAppError(t, err, http.StatusUnauthorized, "error.invalid_credentials")
 }
 
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ func TestAuthService_Login_UserNotFound(t *testing.T) {
 		Password: "Password123",
 	}
 
-	_, err := service.Login(context.Background(), req)
+	_, err := service.Login(context.Background(), req, "")
 	testutil.AssertAppError(t, err, http.StatusUnauthorized, "error.invalid_credentials")
 }
 
@@ -134,8 +134,10 @@ func TestAuthService_Login_InactiveUser(t *testing.T) {
 		Password: "Password123",
 	}
 
-	_, err := service.Login(context.Background(), req)
+	_, err := service.Login(context.Background(), req, "")
-	testutil.AssertAppError(t, err, http.StatusUnauthorized, "error.account_inactive")
+	// Audit L1: inactive accounts return the same generic error as bad
+	// credentials so login does not disclose which accounts exist.
+	testutil.AssertAppError(t, err, http.StatusUnauthorized, "error.invalid_credentials")
 }
 
 // === Register ===
@@ -443,7 +445,7 @@ func TestAuthService_ResetPassword(t *testing.T) {
 		Username: "testuser",
 		Password: "NewPassword123",
 	}
-	loginResp, err := service.Login(context.Background(), loginReq)
+	loginResp, err := service.Login(context.Background(), loginReq, "")
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	assert.NotEmpty(t, loginResp.Token)
 }
@@ -472,7 +474,7 @@ func TestAuthService_Logout(t *testing.T) {
 		Username: "testuser",
 		Password: "Password123",
 	}
-	loginResp, err := service.Login(context.Background(), loginReq)
+	loginResp, err := service.Login(context.Background(), loginReq, "")
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	// Logout
@@ -659,7 +661,7 @@ func TestAuthService_Login_EmptyPassword(t *testing.T) {
 		Password: "",
 	}
 
-	_, err := service.Login(context.Background(), req)
+	_, err := service.Login(context.Background(), req, "")
 	testutil.AssertAppError(t, err, http.StatusUnauthorized, "error.invalid_credentials")
 }
 

internal/services/cache_service.go

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/rs/zerolog/log"
 
 	"github.com/treytartt/honeydue-api/internal/config"
+	"github.com/treytartt/honeydue-api/internal/models"
 )
 
 // CacheService provides Redis caching functionality
@@ -139,22 +140,25 @@ const (
 	TokenCacheTTL   = 5 * time.Minute
 )
 
+// authTokenCacheKey returns the Redis key for an auth token. The raw token
+// is hashed (audit C1) so the plaintext token never appears in a Redis key.
+func authTokenCacheKey(token string) string {
+	return AuthTokenPrefix + models.HashToken(token)
+}
+
 // CacheAuthToken caches a user ID for a token
 func (c *CacheService) CacheAuthToken(ctx context.Context, token string, userID uint) error {
-	key := AuthTokenPrefix + token
+	return c.SetString(ctx, authTokenCacheKey(token), fmt.Sprintf("%d", userID), TokenCacheTTL)
-	return c.SetString(ctx, key, fmt.Sprintf("%d", userID), TokenCacheTTL)
 }
 
 // CacheAuthTokenWithCreated caches a user ID and token creation time for a token
 func (c *CacheService) CacheAuthTokenWithCreated(ctx context.Context, token string, userID uint, createdUnix int64) error {
-	key := AuthTokenPrefix + token
+	return c.SetString(ctx, authTokenCacheKey(token), fmt.Sprintf("%d|%d", userID, createdUnix), TokenCacheTTL)
-	return c.SetString(ctx, key, fmt.Sprintf("%d|%d", userID, createdUnix), TokenCacheTTL)
 }
 
 // GetCachedAuthToken gets a cached user ID for a token
 func (c *CacheService) GetCachedAuthToken(ctx context.Context, token string) (uint, error) {
-	key := AuthTokenPrefix + token
+	val, err := c.GetString(ctx, authTokenCacheKey(token))
-	val, err := c.GetString(ctx, key)
 	if err != nil {
 		return 0, err
 	}
@@ -167,8 +171,7 @@ func (c *CacheService) GetCachedAuthToken(ctx context.Context, token string) (ui
 // GetCachedAuthTokenWithCreated gets a cached user ID and token creation time.
 // Returns userID, createdUnix, error. createdUnix is 0 if not stored (legacy format).
 func (c *CacheService) GetCachedAuthTokenWithCreated(ctx context.Context, token string) (uint, int64, error) {
-	key := AuthTokenPrefix + token
+	val, err := c.GetString(ctx, authTokenCacheKey(token))
-	val, err := c.GetString(ctx, key)
 	if err != nil {
 		return 0, 0, err
 	}
@@ -184,8 +187,62 @@ func (c *CacheService) GetCachedAuthTokenWithCreated(ctx context.Context, token
 
 // InvalidateAuthToken removes a cached token
 func (c *CacheService) InvalidateAuthToken(ctx context.Context, token string) error {
-	key := AuthTokenPrefix + token
+	return c.Delete(ctx, authTokenCacheKey(token))
-	return c.Delete(ctx, key)
+}
+
+// InvalidateAuthTokenHashes removes cached entries for already-hashed token
+// keys. Unlike InvalidateAuthToken (which hashes a plaintext), this takes the
+// stored hash directly — used to evict a user's prior token on re-login
+// (audit MEDIUM-1), where the server no longer has the plaintext.
+func (c *CacheService) InvalidateAuthTokenHashes(ctx context.Context, hashes ...string) error {
+	keys := make([]string, 0, len(hashes))
+	for _, h := range hashes {
+		if h != "" {
+			keys = append(keys, AuthTokenPrefix+h)
+		}
+	}
+	if len(keys) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return c.Delete(ctx, keys...)
+}
+
+// --- Per-account login-failure tracking (audit M5) ---
+
+const loginFailPrefix = "login_fail:"
+
+// RegisterLoginFailure records a failed login for an account from a given
+// source IP, and returns the number of DISTINCT source IPs that have failed
+// for this account within the window. Tracking distinct IPs as a set rather
+// than a raw counter (audit MEDIUM-3) means one attacker, from one IP, cannot
+// run the count up and lock a victim out by knowing only their email — a
+// single IP is bounded by the per-IP edge/app rate limiters instead. A
+// genuinely distributed credential-stuffing attack still trips the lockout.
+func (c *CacheService) RegisterLoginFailure(ctx context.Context, identifier, ip string, window time.Duration) (int64, error) {
+	key := loginFailPrefix + identifier
+	member := ip
+	if member == "" {
+		member = "unknown"
+	}
+	if err := c.client.SAdd(ctx, key, member).Err(); err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+	// Refresh the TTL on each failure: an active attack keeps the window
+	// open, while a quiet account ages out `window` after its last failure.
+	_ = c.client.Expire(ctx, key, window).Err()
+	return c.client.SCard(ctx, key).Result()
+}
+
+// LoginFailureIPCount returns how many distinct source IPs have failed to log
+// in to this account within the window (audit MEDIUM-3). SCard on a missing
+// key returns 0.
+func (c *CacheService) LoginFailureIPCount(ctx context.Context, identifier string) (int64, error) {
+	return c.client.SCard(ctx, loginFailPrefix+identifier).Result()
+}
+
+// ClearLoginFailures resets the failed-login IP set after a successful login.
+func (c *CacheService) ClearLoginFailures(ctx context.Context, identifier string) error {
+	return c.client.Del(ctx, loginFailPrefix+identifier).Err()
 }
 
 // Static data cache helpers

internal/services/contractor_service.go

@@ -296,9 +296,14 @@ func (s *ContractorService) ToggleFavorite(ctx context.Context, contractorID, us
 		return nil, apperrors.Internal(err)
 	}
 
-	// Re-fetch the contractor to get the updated state with all relations
+	// Re-fetch to get the updated state with all relations. Audit M12: if the
+	// contractor was deleted concurrently between the toggle and this read,
+	// surface a clean 404 instead of a 500.
 	contractor, err = s.contractorRepo.WithContext(ctx).FindByID(contractorID)
 	if err != nil {
+		if errors.Is(err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
+			return nil, apperrors.NotFound("error.contractor_not_found")
+		}
 		return nil, apperrors.Internal(err)
 	}
 

internal/services/file_ownership_service.go

@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ import (
 	"gorm.io/gorm"
 )
 
-// FileOwnershipService checks whether a user owns a file referenced by URL.
+// FileOwnershipService checks whether a user has access to a file referenced
-// It queries task completion images, document files, and document images
+// by URL. It queries task completion images, document files, and document
-// to determine ownership through residence access.
+// images, resolving access through residence ownership or membership.
 type FileOwnershipService struct {
 	db *gorm.DB
 }
@@ -17,16 +17,31 @@ func NewFileOwnershipService(db *gorm.DB) *FileOwnershipService {
 	return &FileOwnershipService{db: db}
 }
 
-// IsFileOwnedByUser checks if the given file URL belongs to a record
+// accessibleResidenceIDs returns a subquery of residence IDs the user can
-// that the user has access to (via residence membership).
+// access: residences they own (residence_residence.owner_id) UNION residences
+// they are a member of (residence_residence_users).
+//
+// Audit C7: the previous queries joined residence_residence_users only, so a
+// residence owner who was not also a member of the join table could not pass
+// the ownership check for files in their own property.
+func (s *FileOwnershipService) accessibleResidenceIDs(userID uint) *gorm.DB {
+	return s.db.Raw(`
+		SELECT id FROM residence_residence WHERE owner_id = ?
+		UNION
+		SELECT residence_id FROM residence_residence_users WHERE user_id = ?
+	`, userID, userID)
+}
+
+// IsFileOwnedByUser checks if the given file URL belongs to a record in a
+// residence the user owns or is a member of.
 func (s *FileOwnershipService) IsFileOwnedByUser(fileURL string, userID uint) (bool, error) {
-	// Check task completion images: image_url -> completion -> task -> residence -> user access
+	// Task completion images: image_url -> completion -> task -> residence.
 	var completionImageCount int64
 	err := s.db.Model(&models.TaskCompletionImage{}).
 		Joins("JOIN task_taskcompletion ON task_taskcompletion.id = task_taskcompletionimage.completion_id").
 		Joins("JOIN task_task ON task_task.id = task_taskcompletion.task_id").
-		Joins("JOIN residence_residence_users ON residence_residence_users.residence_id = task_task.residence_id").
+		Where("task_taskcompletionimage.image_url = ?", fileURL).
-		Where("task_taskcompletionimage.image_url = ? AND residence_residence_users.user_id = ?", fileURL, userID).
+		Where("task_task.residence_id IN (?)", s.accessibleResidenceIDs(userID)).
 		Count(&completionImageCount).Error
 	if err != nil {
 		return false, err
@@ -35,11 +50,11 @@ func (s *FileOwnershipService) IsFileOwnedByUser(fileURL string, userID uint) (b
 		return true, nil
 	}
 
-	// Check document files: file_url -> document -> residence -> user access
+	// Document files: file_url -> document -> residence.
 	var documentCount int64
 	err = s.db.Model(&models.Document{}).
-		Joins("JOIN residence_residence_users ON residence_residence_users.residence_id = task_document.residence_id").
+		Where("task_document.file_url = ?", fileURL).
-		Where("task_document.file_url = ? AND residence_residence_users.user_id = ?", fileURL, userID).
+		Where("task_document.residence_id IN (?)", s.accessibleResidenceIDs(userID)).
 		Count(&documentCount).Error
 	if err != nil {
 		return false, err
@@ -48,12 +63,12 @@ func (s *FileOwnershipService) IsFileOwnedByUser(fileURL string, userID uint) (b
 		return true, nil
 	}
 
-	// Check document images: image_url -> document_image -> document -> residence -> user access
+	// Document images: image_url -> document_image -> document -> residence.
 	var documentImageCount int64
 	err = s.db.Model(&models.DocumentImage{}).
 		Joins("JOIN task_document ON task_document.id = task_documentimage.document_id").
-		Joins("JOIN residence_residence_users ON residence_residence_users.residence_id = task_document.residence_id").
+		Where("task_documentimage.image_url = ?", fileURL).
-		Where("task_documentimage.image_url = ? AND residence_residence_users.user_id = ?", fileURL, userID).
+		Where("task_document.residence_id IN (?)", s.accessibleResidenceIDs(userID)).
 		Count(&documentImageCount).Error
 	if err != nil {
 		return false, err

internal/services/google_auth.go

@@ -2,132 +2,306 @@ package services
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"encoding/base64"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
+	"math/big"
 	"net/http"
+	"strings"
 	"time"
 
+	"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
+
 	"github.com/treytartt/honeydue-api/internal/config"
 )
 
 const (
-	googleTokenInfoURL = "https://oauth2.googleapis.com/tokeninfo"
+	// googleKeysURL is Google's JWKS endpoint for ID-token signature verification.
+	googleKeysURL      = "https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v3/certs"
+	googleKeysCacheTTL = 24 * time.Hour
+	googleKeysCacheKey = "google:public_keys"
 )
 
+// googleIssuers is the set of valid `iss` claim values for a Google ID token.
+var googleIssuers = map[string]bool{
+	"accounts.google.com":         true,
+	"https://accounts.google.com": true,
+}
+
 var (
 	ErrInvalidGoogleToken    = errors.New("invalid Google ID token")
 	ErrGoogleTokenExpired    = errors.New("Google ID token has expired")
 	ErrInvalidGoogleAudience = errors.New("invalid Google token audience")
+	ErrInvalidGoogleIssuer   = errors.New("invalid Google token issuer")
+	ErrGoogleKeyNotFound     = errors.New("Google public key not found")
 )
 
-// GoogleTokenInfo represents the response from Google's token info endpoint
+// GoogleJWKS represents Google's JSON Web Key Set.
-type GoogleTokenInfo struct {
+type GoogleJWKS struct {
-	Sub           string `json:"sub"`            // Unique Google user ID
+	Keys []GoogleJWK `json:"keys"`
-	Email         string `json:"email"`          // User's email
-	EmailVerified string `json:"email_verified"` // "true" or "false"
-	Name          string `json:"name"`           // Full name
-	GivenName     string `json:"given_name"`     // First name
-	FamilyName    string `json:"family_name"`    // Last name
-	Picture       string `json:"picture"`        // Profile picture URL
-	Aud           string `json:"aud"`            // Audience (client ID)
-	Azp           string `json:"azp"`            // Authorized party
-	Exp           string `json:"exp"`            // Expiration time
-	Iss           string `json:"iss"`            // Issuer
 }
 
-// IsEmailVerified returns whether the email is verified
+// GoogleJWK represents a single JSON Web Key from Google.
+type GoogleJWK struct {
+	Kty string `json:"kty"` // Key type (RSA)
+	Kid string `json:"kid"` // Key ID
+	Use string `json:"use"` // Key use (sig)
+	Alg string `json:"alg"` // Algorithm (RS256)
+	N   string `json:"n"`   // RSA modulus
+	E   string `json:"e"`   // RSA exponent
+}
+
+// GoogleTokenClaims represents the claims in a Google ID token JWT.
+type GoogleTokenClaims struct {
+	jwt.RegisteredClaims
+	Email         string `json:"email,omitempty"`
+	EmailVerified bool   `json:"email_verified,omitempty"`
+	Name          string `json:"name,omitempty"`
+	GivenName     string `json:"given_name,omitempty"`
+	FamilyName    string `json:"family_name,omitempty"`
+	Picture       string `json:"picture,omitempty"`
+	Azp           string `json:"azp,omitempty"` // Authorized party
+}
+
+// GoogleTokenInfo is the verified, caller-facing view of a Google ID token.
+type GoogleTokenInfo struct {
+	Sub           string // Unique Google user ID
+	Email         string
+	EmailVerified string // "true" or "false" — string for caller compatibility
+	Name          string
+	GivenName     string
+	FamilyName    string
+	Picture       string
+	Aud           string
+	Azp           string
+	Iss           string
+}
+
+// IsEmailVerified returns whether the email is verified.
 func (t *GoogleTokenInfo) IsEmailVerified() bool {
 	return t.EmailVerified == "true"
 }
 
-// GoogleAuthService handles Google Sign In token verification
+// GoogleAuthService handles Google Sign In token verification.
 type GoogleAuthService struct {
 	cache  *CacheService
 	config *config.Config
 	client *http.Client
 }
 
-// NewGoogleAuthService creates a new Google auth service
+// NewGoogleAuthService creates a new Google auth service.
 func NewGoogleAuthService(cache *CacheService, cfg *config.Config) *GoogleAuthService {
 	return &GoogleAuthService{
 		cache:  cache,
 		config: cfg,
-		client: &http.Client{
+		client: &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second},
-			Timeout: 10 * time.Second,
-		},
 	}
 }
 
-// VerifyIDToken verifies a Google ID token and returns the token info
+// VerifyIDToken verifies a Google ID token locally (audit C2/C3): it checks
+// the RS256 signature against Google's published JWKS and the iss, aud, and
+// exp claims. It never sends the token to a third-party endpoint, so it no
+// longer depends on the deprecated tokeninfo service and never leaks the
+// token in a request URL.
 func (s *GoogleAuthService) VerifyIDToken(ctx context.Context, idToken string) (*GoogleTokenInfo, error) {
-	// Call Google's tokeninfo endpoint to verify the token
+	// Parse the token header to get the key ID.
-	url := fmt.Sprintf("%s?id_token=%s", googleTokenInfoURL, idToken)
+	parts := strings.Split(idToken, ".")
-
+	if len(parts) != 3 {
-	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, nil)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create request: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	resp, err := s.client.Do(req)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to verify token: %w", err)
-	}
-	defer resp.Body.Close()
-
-	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
 		return nil, ErrInvalidGoogleToken
 	}
 
-	var tokenInfo GoogleTokenInfo
+	headerBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[0])
-	if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&tokenInfo); err != nil {
+	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode token info: %w", err)
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode token header: %w", err)
+	}
+	var header struct {
+		Kid string `json:"kid"`
+		Alg string `json:"alg"`
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(headerBytes, &header); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse token header: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	// Verify the audience matches our client ID(s)
+	publicKey, err := s.getPublicKey(ctx, header.Kid)
-	if !s.verifyAudience(tokenInfo.Aud, tokenInfo.Azp) {
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	// Parse and verify the signature. jwt v5 validates exp/iat/nbf automatically.
+	token, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(idToken, &GoogleTokenClaims{}, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) {
+		if _, ok := token.Method.(*jwt.SigningMethodRSA); !ok {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected signing method: %v", token.Header["alg"])
+		}
+		return publicKey, nil
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		if errors.Is(err, jwt.ErrTokenExpired) {
+			return nil, ErrGoogleTokenExpired
+		}
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse token: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	claims, ok := token.Claims.(*GoogleTokenClaims)
+	if !ok || !token.Valid {
+		return nil, ErrInvalidGoogleToken
+	}
+
+	// Verify the issuer (audit C3).
+	if !googleIssuers[claims.Issuer] {
+		return nil, ErrInvalidGoogleIssuer
+	}
+
+	// Verify the audience matches one of our configured client IDs.
+	if !s.verifyAudience(claims.Audience, claims.Azp) {
 		return nil, ErrInvalidGoogleAudience
 	}
 
-	// Verify the token is not expired (tokeninfo endpoint already checks this,
+	if claims.Subject == "" {
-	// but we double-check for security)
-	if tokenInfo.Sub == "" {
 		return nil, ErrInvalidGoogleToken
 	}
 
-	return &tokenInfo, nil
+	emailVerified := "false"
+	if claims.EmailVerified {
+		emailVerified = "true"
+	}
+	aud := ""
+	if len(claims.Audience) > 0 {
+		aud = claims.Audience[0]
+	}
+	return &GoogleTokenInfo{
+		Sub:           claims.Subject,
+		Email:         claims.Email,
+		EmailVerified: emailVerified,
+		Name:          claims.Name,
+		GivenName:     claims.GivenName,
+		FamilyName:    claims.FamilyName,
+		Picture:       claims.Picture,
+		Aud:           aud,
+		Azp:           claims.Azp,
+		Iss:           claims.Issuer,
+	}, nil
 }
 
-// verifyAudience checks if the token audience matches our client ID(s).
+// verifyAudience checks the token audience against our configured client IDs.
-// In production (non-debug), an empty clientID causes verification to fail
+// In production (non-debug) an empty client ID fails verification rather than
-// rather than silently bypassing the check.
+// silently bypassing the check.
-func (s *GoogleAuthService) verifyAudience(aud, azp string) bool {
+func (s *GoogleAuthService) verifyAudience(audience jwt.ClaimStrings, azp string) bool {
 	clientID := s.config.GoogleAuth.ClientID
 	if clientID == "" {
-		if s.config.Server.Debug {
+		// In debug mode only, skip audience verification for local development.
-			// In debug mode only, skip audience verification for local development
+		return s.config.Server.Debug
+	}
+
+	candidates := []string{clientID}
+	if id := s.config.GoogleAuth.AndroidClientID; id != "" {
+		candidates = append(candidates, id)
+	}
+	if id := s.config.GoogleAuth.IOSClientID; id != "" {
+		candidates = append(candidates, id)
+	}
+
+	for _, want := range candidates {
+		if azp == want {
 			return true
 		}
-		// In production, missing client ID means we cannot verify the audience
+		for _, aud := range audience {
-		return false
+			if aud == want {
+				return true
+			}
+		}
 	}
-
-	// Check both aud and azp (Android vs iOS may use different values)
-	if aud == clientID || azp == clientID {
-		return true
-	}
-
-	// Also check Android client ID if configured
-	androidClientID := s.config.GoogleAuth.AndroidClientID
-	if androidClientID != "" && (aud == androidClientID || azp == androidClientID) {
-		return true
-	}
-
-	// Also check iOS client ID if configured
-	iosClientID := s.config.GoogleAuth.IOSClientID
-	if iosClientID != "" && (aud == iosClientID || azp == iosClientID) {
-		return true
-	}
-
 	return false
 }
+
+// getPublicKey returns the RSA public key for the given key ID, using a
+// Redis-cached copy of Google's JWKS and re-fetching once on a cache miss
+// (Google rotates signing keys roughly daily).
+func (s *GoogleAuthService) getPublicKey(ctx context.Context, kid string) (*rsa.PublicKey, error) {
+	keys, err := s.getCachedKeys(ctx)
+	if err != nil || keys == nil {
+		keys, err = s.fetchGooglePublicKeys(ctx)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	}
+	if pubKey, ok := keys[kid]; ok {
+		return pubKey, nil
+	}
+
+	// Cache miss for this kid — keys may have rotated; fetch fresh.
+	keys, err = s.fetchGooglePublicKeys(ctx)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if pubKey, ok := keys[kid]; ok {
+		return pubKey, nil
+	}
+	return nil, ErrGoogleKeyNotFound
+}
+
+// getCachedKeys retrieves cached Google public keys from Redis.
+func (s *GoogleAuthService) getCachedKeys(ctx context.Context) (map[string]*rsa.PublicKey, error) {
+	if s.cache == nil {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	data, err := s.cache.GetString(ctx, googleKeysCacheKey)
+	if err != nil || data == "" {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	var jwks GoogleJWKS
+	if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(data), &jwks); err != nil {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	return s.parseJWKS(&jwks), nil
+}
+
+// fetchGooglePublicKeys fetches Google's JWKS and caches it.
+func (s *GoogleAuthService) fetchGooglePublicKeys(ctx context.Context) (map[string]*rsa.PublicKey, error) {
+	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, googleKeysURL, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create request: %w", err)
+	}
+	resp, err := s.client.Do(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch Google keys: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("Google keys endpoint returned status %d", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	var jwks GoogleJWKS
+	if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&jwks); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode Google keys: %w", err)
+	}
+	if s.cache != nil {
+		keysJSON, _ := json.Marshal(jwks)
+		_ = s.cache.SetString(ctx, googleKeysCacheKey, string(keysJSON), googleKeysCacheTTL)
+	}
+	return s.parseJWKS(&jwks), nil
+}
+
+// parseJWKS converts Google's JWKS into a map of RSA public keys by key ID.
+func (s *GoogleAuthService) parseJWKS(jwks *GoogleJWKS) map[string]*rsa.PublicKey {
+	keys := make(map[string]*rsa.PublicKey)
+	for _, key := range jwks.Keys {
+		if key.Kty != "RSA" {
+			continue
+		}
+		nBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(key.N)
+		if err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		eBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(key.E)
+		if err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		e := 0
+		for _, b := range eBytes {
+			e = e<<8 + int(b)
+		}
+		keys[key.Kid] = &rsa.PublicKey{N: new(big.Int).SetBytes(nBytes), E: e}
+	}
+	return keys
+}

internal/services/iap_validation.go

@@ -68,13 +68,14 @@ type AppleTransactionInfo struct {
 
 // AppleValidationResult contains the result of Apple receipt validation
 type AppleValidationResult struct {
-	Valid            bool
+	Valid                 bool
-	TransactionID    string
+	TransactionID         string
-	ProductID        string
+	OriginalTransactionID string // stable across renewals — the replay key
-	ExpiresAt        time.Time
+	ProductID             string
-	IsTrialPeriod    bool
+	ExpiresAt             time.Time
-	AutoRenewEnabled bool
+	IsTrialPeriod         bool
-	Environment      string
+	AutoRenewEnabled      bool
+	Environment           string
 }
 
 // GoogleValidationResult contains the result of Google token validation
@@ -95,6 +96,21 @@ func NewAppleIAPClient(cfg config.AppleIAPConfig) (*AppleIAPClient, error) {
 		return nil, ErrIAPNotConfigured
 	}
 
+	// Audit H5 (relaxed per MEDIUM-2): refuse to load the IAP signing key from
+	// a world-accessible file — a leaked .p8 lets an attacker forge App Store
+	// Server API requests. The original "0600 or stricter" check is
+	// incompatible with a Kubernetes Secret volume: the kubelet widens secret
+	// files to 0440 once fsGroup is set, so 0600 is unattainable for a
+	// non-root container. Group access is scoped to the pod's fsGroup; the
+	// real exposure is the "other" bits, so reject only those.
+	info, err := os.Stat(cfg.KeyPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to stat Apple IAP key: %w", err)
+	}
+	if perm := info.Mode().Perm(); perm&0o007 != 0 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("Apple IAP key %s is world-accessible (permissions %#o); remove other-rwx bits", cfg.KeyPath, perm)
+	}
+
 	// Read the private key
 	keyData, err := os.ReadFile(cfg.KeyPath)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -215,11 +231,12 @@ func (c *AppleIAPClient) ValidateTransaction(ctx context.Context, transactionID
 	expiresAt := time.Unix(transactionInfo.ExpiresDate/1000, 0)
 
 	return &AppleValidationResult{
-		Valid:         true,
+		Valid:                 true,
-		TransactionID: transactionInfo.TransactionID,
+		TransactionID:         transactionInfo.TransactionID,
-		ProductID:     transactionInfo.ProductID,
+		OriginalTransactionID: transactionInfo.OriginalTransactionID,
-		ExpiresAt:     expiresAt,
+		ProductID:             transactionInfo.ProductID,
-		Environment:   transactionInfo.Environment,
+		ExpiresAt:             expiresAt,
+		Environment:           transactionInfo.Environment,
 	}, nil
 }
 
@@ -243,11 +260,12 @@ func (c *AppleIAPClient) ValidateReceipt(ctx context.Context, receiptData string
 		if err == nil {
 			expiresAt := time.Unix(transactionInfo.ExpiresDate/1000, 0)
 			return &AppleValidationResult{
-				Valid:         true,
+				Valid:                 true,
-				TransactionID: transactionInfo.TransactionID,
+				TransactionID:         transactionInfo.TransactionID,
-				ProductID:     transactionInfo.ProductID,
+				OriginalTransactionID: transactionInfo.OriginalTransactionID,
-				ExpiresAt:     expiresAt,
+				ProductID:             transactionInfo.ProductID,
-				Environment:   transactionInfo.Environment,
+				ExpiresAt:             expiresAt,
+				Environment:           transactionInfo.Environment,
 			}, nil
 		}
 	}
@@ -317,11 +335,12 @@ func (c *AppleIAPClient) ValidateReceipt(ctx context.Context, receiptData string
 	expiresAt := time.Unix(transactionInfo.ExpiresDate/1000, 0)
 
 	return &AppleValidationResult{
-		Valid:         true,
+		Valid:                 true,
-		TransactionID: transactionInfo.TransactionID,
+		TransactionID:         transactionInfo.TransactionID,
-		ProductID:     transactionInfo.ProductID,
+		OriginalTransactionID: transactionInfo.OriginalTransactionID,
-		ExpiresAt:     expiresAt,
+		ProductID:             transactionInfo.ProductID,
-		Environment:   transactionInfo.Environment,
+		ExpiresAt:             expiresAt,
+		Environment:           transactionInfo.Environment,
 	}, nil
 }
 
@@ -418,13 +437,14 @@ func (c *AppleIAPClient) validateLegacyReceiptWithSandbox(ctx context.Context, r
 	}
 
 	return &AppleValidationResult{
-		Valid:            true,
+		Valid:                 true,
-		TransactionID:    latestReceipt.TransactionID,
+		TransactionID:         latestReceipt.TransactionID,
-		ProductID:        latestReceipt.ProductID,
+		OriginalTransactionID: latestReceipt.OriginalTransactionID,
-		ExpiresAt:        expiresAt,
+		ProductID:             latestReceipt.ProductID,
-		IsTrialPeriod:    latestReceipt.IsTrialPeriod == "true",
+		ExpiresAt:             expiresAt,
-		AutoRenewEnabled: autoRenew,
+		IsTrialPeriod:         latestReceipt.IsTrialPeriod == "true",
-		Environment:      legacyResponse.Environment,
+		AutoRenewEnabled:      autoRenew,
+		Environment:           legacyResponse.Environment,
 	}, nil
 }
 

internal/services/notification_service.go

@@ -308,7 +308,18 @@ func (s *NotificationService) registerAPNSDevice(ctx context.Context, userID uin
 	// Check if device exists
 	existing, err := s.notificationRepo.WithContext(ctx).FindAPNSDeviceByToken(req.RegistrationID)
 	if err == nil {
-		// Update existing device
+		// Audit C8 / LOW-3: APNs device tokens are recycled across devices,
+		// app reinstalls and OS reassignments, so a token already bound to a
+		// different account is a stale binding — not a hijack. Reassign it to
+		// the current (authenticated) registrant rather than reject: a 409
+		// here would lock the legitimate new owner of a recycled token out of
+		// push entirely. The reassignment is logged as a security-relevant
+		// event so a genuine token-takeover attempt is still traceable.
+		if existing.UserID != nil && *existing.UserID != userID {
+			log.Warn().Uint("user_id", userID).Uint("previous_owner_id", *existing.UserID).
+				Msg("APNS device token reassigned to a new account")
+		}
+		// Update existing device — reassign to the current user
 		existing.UserID = &userID
 		existing.Active = true
 		existing.Name = req.Name
@@ -337,7 +348,18 @@ func (s *NotificationService) registerGCMDevice(ctx context.Context, userID uint
 	// Check if device exists
 	existing, err := s.notificationRepo.WithContext(ctx).FindGCMDeviceByToken(req.RegistrationID)
 	if err == nil {
-		// Update existing device
+		// Audit C8 / LOW-3: FCM device tokens are recycled across devices,
+		// app reinstalls and OS reassignments, so a token already bound to a
+		// different account is a stale binding — not a hijack. Reassign it to
+		// the current (authenticated) registrant rather than reject: a 409
+		// here would lock the legitimate new owner of a recycled token out of
+		// push entirely. The reassignment is logged as a security-relevant
+		// event so a genuine token-takeover attempt is still traceable.
+		if existing.UserID != nil && *existing.UserID != userID {
+			log.Warn().Uint("user_id", userID).Uint("previous_owner_id", *existing.UserID).
+				Msg("GCM device token reassigned to a new account")
+		}
+		// Update existing device — reassign to the current user
 		existing.UserID = &userID
 		existing.Active = true
 		existing.Name = req.Name

internal/services/residence_service.go

@@ -559,30 +559,22 @@ func (s *ResidenceService) GenerateSharePackage(ctx context.Context, residenceID
 	}, nil
 }
 
-// JoinWithCode allows a user to join a residence using a share code
+// JoinWithCode allows a user to join a residence using a share code.
+// Audit C9/H9: the code lookup, membership add, and one-time-code
+// deactivation run as a single locked transaction in the repository, so a
+// code can never be redeemed twice and a deactivation failure aborts the join.
 func (s *ResidenceService) JoinWithCode(ctx context.Context, code string, userID uint) (*responses.JoinResidenceResponse, error) {
-	// Find the share code
+	residenceID, alreadyMember, err := s.residenceRepo.WithContext(ctx).JoinWithShareCode(code, userID)
-	shareCode, err := s.residenceRepo.WithContext(ctx).FindShareCodeByCode(code)
 	if err != nil {
 		if errors.Is(err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
 			return nil, apperrors.NotFound("error.share_code_invalid")
 		}
 		return nil, apperrors.Internal(err)
 	}
-
+	if alreadyMember {
-	// Check if already a member
-	hasAccess, err := s.residenceRepo.WithContext(ctx).HasAccess(shareCode.ResidenceID, userID)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, apperrors.Internal(err)
-	}
-	if hasAccess {
 		return nil, apperrors.Conflict("error.user_already_member")
 	}
 
-	// Add user to residence
-	if err := s.residenceRepo.WithContext(ctx).AddUser(shareCode.ResidenceID, userID); err != nil {
-		return nil, apperrors.Internal(err)
-	}
 	if s.cache != nil {
 		// The joining user's residence-IDs cache is now stale, and their
 		// subscription status now reflects an extra residence with all of its
@@ -591,15 +583,8 @@ func (s *ResidenceService) JoinWithCode(ctx context.Context, code string, userID
 		_ = s.cache.InvalidateSubscriptionStatusForUsers(ctx, userID)
 	}
 
-	// Mark share code as used (one-time use)
-	if err := s.residenceRepo.WithContext(ctx).DeactivateShareCode(shareCode.ID); err != nil {
-		// Log the error but don't fail the join - the user has already been added
-		// The code will just be usable by others until it expires
-		log.Error().Err(err).Uint("code_id", shareCode.ID).Msg("Failed to deactivate share code after join")
-	}
-
 	// Get the residence with full details
-	residence, err := s.residenceRepo.WithContext(ctx).FindByID(shareCode.ResidenceID)
+	residence, err := s.residenceRepo.WithContext(ctx).FindByID(residenceID)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, apperrors.Internal(err)
 	}

internal/services/subscription_service.go

@@ -399,99 +399,135 @@ func (s *SubscriptionService) GetActivePromotions(ctx context.Context, userID ui
 	return result, nil
 }
 
-// ProcessApplePurchase processes an Apple IAP purchase
+// ProcessApplePurchase processes an Apple IAP purchase.
-// Supports both StoreKit 1 (receiptData) and StoreKit 2 (transactionID)
+// Supports both StoreKit 1 (receiptData) and StoreKit 2 (transactionID).
 func (s *SubscriptionService) ProcessApplePurchase(ctx context.Context, userID uint, receiptData string, transactionID string) (*SubscriptionResponse, error) {
-	// Store receipt/transaction data
+	// Apple IAP client must be configured — without server-side validation
-	dataToStore := receiptData
+	// we cannot trust client-provided receipts.
-	if dataToStore == "" {
-		dataToStore = transactionID
-	}
-	if err := s.subscriptionRepo.WithContext(ctx).UpdateReceiptData(userID, dataToStore); err != nil {
-		return nil, apperrors.Internal(err)
-	}
-
-	// Apple IAP client must be configured to validate purchases.
-	// Without server-side validation, we cannot trust client-provided receipts.
 	if s.appleClient == nil {
 		log.Error().Uint("user_id", userID).Msg("Apple IAP validation not configured, rejecting purchase")
 		return nil, apperrors.BadRequest("error.iap_validation_not_configured")
 	}
 
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
+	// Validation is a network call to Apple; detach from the request context
+	// so a client disconnect cannot abort an in-flight grant.
+	vctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
 	defer cancel()
 
 	var result *AppleValidationResult
 	var err error
-
+	// Prefer transaction ID (StoreKit 2), fall back to receipt data (StoreKit 1).
-	// Prefer transaction ID (StoreKit 2), fall back to receipt data (StoreKit 1)
 	if transactionID != "" {
-		result, err = s.appleClient.ValidateTransaction(ctx, transactionID)
+		result, err = s.appleClient.ValidateTransaction(vctx, transactionID)
 	} else if receiptData != "" {
-		result, err = s.appleClient.ValidateReceipt(ctx, receiptData)
+		result, err = s.appleClient.ValidateReceipt(vctx, receiptData)
 	}
-
 	if err != nil {
 		// Validation failed -- do NOT fall through to grant Pro.
 		log.Error().Err(err).Uint("user_id", userID).Msg("Apple validation failed")
 		return nil, err
 	}
-
 	if result == nil {
 		return nil, apperrors.BadRequest("error.no_receipt_or_transaction")
 	}
 
+	// Audit C5/C10: replay protection. A validated transaction may only ever
+	// be bound to one account — re-submitting a valid receipt against a
+	// second account must not grant Pro for free. The partial unique index
+	// on apple_original_transaction_id is the backstop for the check/store
+	// race below.
+	if result.OriginalTransactionID != "" {
+		existing, lookupErr := s.subscriptionRepo.WithContext(vctx).FindByAppleOriginalTransactionID(result.OriginalTransactionID)
+		switch {
+		case lookupErr == nil && existing != nil && existing.UserID != userID:
+			log.Warn().Uint("user_id", userID).Uint("bound_user_id", existing.UserID).
+				Msg("Apple purchase rejected — transaction already claimed by another account")
+			return nil, apperrors.Forbidden("error.iap_transaction_already_claimed")
+		case lookupErr != nil && !errors.Is(lookupErr, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound):
+			return nil, apperrors.Internal(lookupErr)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Persist the receipt blob and the replay key.
+	dataToStore := receiptData
+	if dataToStore == "" {
+		dataToStore = transactionID
+	}
+	if err := s.subscriptionRepo.WithContext(vctx).UpdateReceiptData(userID, dataToStore); err != nil {
+		return nil, apperrors.Internal(err)
+	}
+	if result.OriginalTransactionID != "" {
+		if err := s.subscriptionRepo.WithContext(vctx).UpdateAppleOriginalTransactionID(userID, result.OriginalTransactionID); err != nil {
+			// The unique index rejected the bind — a concurrent request
+			// claimed the same transaction first.
+			log.Warn().Err(err).Uint("user_id", userID).Msg("Failed to bind Apple transaction ID")
+			return nil, apperrors.Internal(err)
+		}
+	}
+
 	expiresAt := result.ExpiresAt
 	log.Info().Uint("user_id", userID).Str("product", result.ProductID).Time("expires", result.ExpiresAt).Str("env", result.Environment).Msg("Apple purchase validated")
 
-	// Upgrade to Pro with the validated expiration
+	if err := s.subscriptionRepo.WithContext(vctx).UpgradeToPro(userID, expiresAt, "ios"); err != nil {
-	if err := s.subscriptionRepo.WithContext(ctx).UpgradeToPro(userID, expiresAt, "ios"); err != nil {
 		return nil, apperrors.Internal(err)
 	}
 
 	// Tier flipped — drop cached SubscriptionStatusResponse so the next call
 	// returns Pro immediately instead of stale Free.
 	if s.cache != nil {
-		_ = s.cache.InvalidateSubscriptionStatusForUsers(ctx, userID)
+		_ = s.cache.InvalidateSubscriptionStatusForUsers(vctx, userID)
 	}
 
-	return s.GetSubscription(ctx, userID)
+	return s.GetSubscription(vctx, userID)
 }
 
 // ProcessGooglePurchase processes a Google Play purchase
 // productID is optional but helps validate the specific subscription
 func (s *SubscriptionService) ProcessGooglePurchase(ctx context.Context, userID uint, purchaseToken string, productID string) (*SubscriptionResponse, error) {
-	// Store purchase token first
+	// Google IAP client must be configured — without server-side validation
-	if err := s.subscriptionRepo.WithContext(ctx).UpdatePurchaseToken(userID, purchaseToken); err != nil {
+	// we cannot trust client-provided tokens.
-		return nil, apperrors.Internal(err)
-	}
-
-	// Google IAP client must be configured to validate purchases.
-	// Without server-side validation, we cannot trust client-provided tokens.
 	if s.googleClient == nil {
 		log.Error().Uint("user_id", userID).Msg("Google IAP validation not configured, rejecting purchase")
 		return nil, apperrors.BadRequest("error.iap_validation_not_configured")
 	}
 
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
+	// Audit C6/C10: replay protection — a purchase token may only ever be
+	// bound to one account. The partial unique index on google_purchase_token
+	// is the backstop for the check/store race.
+	if purchaseToken != "" {
+		existing, lookupErr := s.subscriptionRepo.WithContext(ctx).FindByGoogleToken(purchaseToken)
+		switch {
+		case lookupErr == nil && existing != nil && existing.UserID != userID:
+			log.Warn().Uint("user_id", userID).Uint("bound_user_id", existing.UserID).
+				Msg("Google purchase rejected — token already claimed by another account")
+			return nil, apperrors.Forbidden("error.iap_transaction_already_claimed")
+		case lookupErr != nil && !errors.Is(lookupErr, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound):
+			return nil, apperrors.Internal(lookupErr)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Store the purchase token (the replay key).
+	if err := s.subscriptionRepo.WithContext(ctx).UpdatePurchaseToken(userID, purchaseToken); err != nil {
+		return nil, apperrors.Internal(err)
+	}
+
+	// Validation is a network call; detach from the request context.
+	vctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
 	defer cancel()
 
 	var result *GoogleValidationResult
 	var err error
-
+	// If productID is provided, use it directly; otherwise try known IDs.
-	// If productID is provided, use it directly; otherwise try known IDs
 	if productID != "" {
-		result, err = s.googleClient.ValidateSubscription(ctx, productID, purchaseToken)
+		result, err = s.googleClient.ValidateSubscription(vctx, productID, purchaseToken)
 	} else {
-		result, err = s.googleClient.ValidatePurchaseToken(ctx, purchaseToken, KnownSubscriptionIDs)
+		result, err = s.googleClient.ValidatePurchaseToken(vctx, purchaseToken, KnownSubscriptionIDs)
 	}
-
 	if err != nil {
 		// Validation failed -- do NOT fall through to grant Pro.
 		log.Error().Err(err).Uint("user_id", userID).Msg("Google purchase validation failed")
 		return nil, err
 	}
-
 	if result == nil {
 		return nil, apperrors.BadRequest("error.no_purchase_token")
 	}
@@ -499,24 +535,23 @@ func (s *SubscriptionService) ProcessGooglePurchase(ctx context.Context, userID
 	expiresAt := result.ExpiresAt
 	log.Info().Uint("user_id", userID).Str("product", result.ProductID).Time("expires", result.ExpiresAt).Bool("auto_renew", result.AutoRenewing).Msg("Google purchase validated")
 
-	// Acknowledge the subscription if not already acknowledged
+	// Acknowledge the subscription if not already acknowledged.
 	if !result.AcknowledgedState {
-		if err := s.googleClient.AcknowledgeSubscription(ctx, result.ProductID, purchaseToken); err != nil {
+		if err := s.googleClient.AcknowledgeSubscription(vctx, result.ProductID, purchaseToken); err != nil {
 			log.Warn().Err(err).Uint("user_id", userID).Msg("Failed to acknowledge Google subscription")
-			// Don't fail the purchase, just log the warning
+			// Don't fail the purchase, just log the warning.
 		}
 	}
 
-	// Upgrade to Pro with the validated expiration
+	if err := s.subscriptionRepo.WithContext(vctx).UpgradeToPro(userID, expiresAt, "android"); err != nil {
-	if err := s.subscriptionRepo.WithContext(ctx).UpgradeToPro(userID, expiresAt, "android"); err != nil {
 		return nil, apperrors.Internal(err)
 	}
 
 	if s.cache != nil {
-		_ = s.cache.InvalidateSubscriptionStatusForUsers(ctx, userID)
+		_ = s.cache.InvalidateSubscriptionStatusForUsers(vctx, userID)
 	}
 
-	return s.GetSubscription(ctx, userID)
+	return s.GetSubscription(vctx, userID)
 }
 
 // CancelSubscription cancels a subscription (downgrades to free at end of period)

migrations/000003_hash_auth_tokens.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+-- +goose Up
+-- Audit C1: auth tokens are stored as SHA-256 hashes (hex, 64 chars), never
+-- as plaintext, so a database compromise no longer yields usable session
+-- tokens. Widen the key column from 40 to 64 chars. Existing plaintext rows
+-- cannot be rehashed in place, so they are dropped — every user logs in
+-- once after this deploy. This is expected and one-time.
+ALTER TABLE user_authtoken ALTER COLUMN key TYPE varchar(64);
+DELETE FROM user_authtoken;
+
+-- +goose Down
+-- Tokens cannot be un-hashed; clearing the table is the only safe rollback.
+DELETE FROM user_authtoken;
+ALTER TABLE user_authtoken ALTER COLUMN key TYPE varchar(40);

migrations/000004_iap_replay_protection.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+-- +goose Up
+-- Audit C5/C6/C10/C13: bind each in-app-purchase transaction to exactly one
+-- account so a valid receipt cannot be replayed against a second account to
+-- grant Pro for free.
+--
+-- apple_original_transaction_id is a dedicated, indexed column — it replaces
+-- the LIKE '%...%' scan over apple_receipt_data that the Apple webhook used
+-- to find users (C13). google_purchase_token already exists; we just add the
+-- uniqueness guarantee.
+ALTER TABLE subscription_usersubscription
+    ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS apple_original_transaction_id text;
+
+-- Partial unique indexes: one account per transaction. NULL/empty rows are
+-- excluded so accounts without an IAP are unaffected.
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS uq_subscription_apple_original_txn
+    ON subscription_usersubscription (apple_original_transaction_id)
+    WHERE apple_original_transaction_id IS NOT NULL
+      AND apple_original_transaction_id <> '';
+
+-- Pre-flight dedup for the Google index below. apple_original_transaction_id
+-- is brand-new (added above), so it is all-NULL and cannot collide. But
+-- google_purchase_token is a pre-existing column, and the C6 replay bug being
+-- fixed here is exactly "the same token bound to multiple accounts" — so
+-- duplicate rows may exist and would make the UNIQUE index below fail to
+-- build, aborting the migrate Job. Keep the earliest subscription row for
+-- each token and clear the token on the rest; those rows lose a binding that
+-- was disputed anyway, while the original (earliest) owner keeps it.
+UPDATE subscription_usersubscription s
+SET google_purchase_token = NULL
+WHERE google_purchase_token IS NOT NULL
+  AND google_purchase_token <> ''
+  AND id <> (
+      SELECT MIN(s2.id)
+      FROM subscription_usersubscription s2
+      WHERE s2.google_purchase_token = s.google_purchase_token
+  );
+
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS uq_subscription_google_purchase_token
+    ON subscription_usersubscription (google_purchase_token)
+    WHERE google_purchase_token IS NOT NULL
+      AND google_purchase_token <> '';
+
+-- +goose Down
+DROP INDEX IF EXISTS uq_subscription_google_purchase_token;
+DROP INDEX IF EXISTS uq_subscription_apple_original_txn;
+ALTER TABLE subscription_usersubscription
+    DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS apple_original_transaction_id;

migrations/000005_audit_log_append_only.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+-- +goose Up
+-- Audit M7: make audit_log append-only. A BEFORE trigger rejects UPDATE and
+-- DELETE so the security-event history cannot be altered or erased after the
+-- fact — even by a database account with broad table privileges. The
+-- application only ever INSERTs into this table.
+
+-- The audit_log table itself was never created by a goose migration — it is
+-- only built by GORM AutoMigrate in the test harness, and production never
+-- runs AutoMigrate. CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS brings it under migration
+-- control without disturbing an existing table: a no-op on a DB that already
+-- has it, and a correct build (matching models.AuditLog) on a from-scratch
+-- redeploy — so the trigger below has a table to attach to and a clean
+-- redeploy comes up with a working, append-only audit log.
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_log (
+    id         BIGSERIAL    PRIMARY KEY,
+    user_id    BIGINT,
+    event_type VARCHAR(50)  NOT NULL,
+    ip_address VARCHAR(45),
+    user_agent TEXT,
+    details    JSONB,
+    created_at TIMESTAMPTZ  NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
+);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_log_user_id    ON audit_log (user_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_log_created_at ON audit_log (created_at);
+
+-- +goose StatementBegin
+CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION audit_log_append_only() RETURNS trigger AS $$
+BEGIN
+    RAISE EXCEPTION 'audit_log is append-only: % is not permitted', TG_OP;
+END;
+$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
+-- +goose StatementEnd
+
+-- DROP ... IF EXISTS before CREATE keeps this idempotent (CREATE TRIGGER has
+-- no OR REPLACE on older PostgreSQL).
+DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS audit_log_no_update ON audit_log;
+CREATE TRIGGER audit_log_no_update
+    BEFORE UPDATE ON audit_log
+    FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION audit_log_append_only();
+
+DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS audit_log_no_delete ON audit_log;
+CREATE TRIGGER audit_log_no_delete
+    BEFORE DELETE ON audit_log
+    FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION audit_log_append_only();
+
+-- +goose Down
+-- Reverses only the append-only guard, which is this migration's purpose.
+-- The audit_log table is intentionally NOT dropped — it may hold security
+-- history that predates this migration.
+DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS audit_log_no_delete ON audit_log;
+DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS audit_log_no_update ON audit_log;
+DROP FUNCTION IF EXISTS audit_log_append_only();

migrations/000006_webhook_event_log.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+-- +goose Up
+-- Audit H6 follow-up. The Apple/Google webhook handler now fails CLOSED on a
+-- deduplication-store error: if it cannot consult webhook_event_log it returns
+-- 500 rather than risk processing a replayed event. That makes the presence of
+-- the webhook_event_log table mandatory.
+--
+-- Like audit_log, this table was never created by a goose migration — only by
+-- GORM AutoMigrate in tests — so a from-scratch redeploy would come up without
+-- it and 500 every subscription webhook. CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS brings it
+-- under migration control: a no-op where the table already exists, and a
+-- correct build (matching repositories.WebhookEvent) on a fresh database.
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS webhook_event_log (
+    id           BIGSERIAL    PRIMARY KEY,
+    event_id     VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL,
+    provider     VARCHAR(20)  NOT NULL,
+    event_type   VARCHAR(100) NOT NULL,
+    processed_at TIMESTAMPTZ  NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
+    payload_hash VARCHAR(64)
+);
+
+-- (provider, event_id) is the dedup key — matches the
+-- uniqueIndex:idx_provider_event_id GORM tags on repositories.WebhookEvent.
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_provider_event_id
+    ON webhook_event_log (provider, event_id);
+
+-- +goose Down
+-- The table is intentionally NOT dropped — it may hold deduplication history
+-- that predates this migration, and dropping it would let already-processed
+-- webhook events be replayed. Down is a documented no-op.
+SELECT 1;