fix(security): remediate 2026-05-12 audit findings (Stages 2–5)
Remediation of the 2026-05-12/13 audits (78 findings + cluster gaps), tracked in deploy-k3s/SECURITY.md, plus fixes from two independent post-remediation reviews. Auth & sessions: - SHA-256 hashed auth-token storage (C1); prior-token cache eviction on re-login (MEDIUM-1) - local Google JWKS verification, iss/aud/exp checks (C2/C3) - constant-time login + generic errors (L1/LIVE-L11/LIVE-L13) - per-account login lockout keyed on distinct source IPs (M5/MEDIUM-3) - verified-email gating, login rate limiting (LIVE-L19, H1-H3) IAP & webhooks: - Apple/Google cross-account replay protection (C5/C6/C10/C13, H5/H6) - migrations 000003-000006 (token hashing, IAP replay, audit_log + webhook_event_log table creation, append-only audit log) Authorization & races: - file-ownership owner-OR-member fix (C7), atomic share-code join (C9/H9), device-token reassignment (C8/LOW-3) Secrets & deploy: - secrets file-mounted at /etc/honeydue/secrets, not env (F8); Redis password out of the ConfigMap (HIGH-1); B2 keys reconciled - digest-pinned images, admin ingress hardening, CSP/HSTS, /metrics lockdown; kubeconfig 0600, etcd secrets-encryption, fail2ban + unattended-upgrades at provision; secret-rotation runbook Build, vet, and the full test suite (incl. -race) pass; the goose migration chain is verified against PostgreSQL 16. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
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-- +goose Up
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-- Audit H6 follow-up. The Apple/Google webhook handler now fails CLOSED on a
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-- deduplication-store error: if it cannot consult webhook_event_log it returns
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-- 500 rather than risk processing a replayed event. That makes the presence of
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-- the webhook_event_log table mandatory.
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--
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-- Like audit_log, this table was never created by a goose migration — only by
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-- GORM AutoMigrate in tests — so a from-scratch redeploy would come up without
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-- it and 500 every subscription webhook. CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS brings it
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-- under migration control: a no-op where the table already exists, and a
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-- correct build (matching repositories.WebhookEvent) on a fresh database.
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS webhook_event_log (
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id BIGSERIAL PRIMARY KEY,
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event_id VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL,
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provider VARCHAR(20) NOT NULL,
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event_type VARCHAR(100) NOT NULL,
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processed_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
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payload_hash VARCHAR(64)
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);
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-- (provider, event_id) is the dedup key — matches the
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-- uniqueIndex:idx_provider_event_id GORM tags on repositories.WebhookEvent.
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CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_provider_event_id
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ON webhook_event_log (provider, event_id);
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-- +goose Down
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-- The table is intentionally NOT dropped — it may hold deduplication history
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-- that predates this migration, and dropping it would let already-processed
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-- webhook events be replayed. Down is a documented no-op.
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SELECT 1;
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