fix(security): remediate 2026-05-12 audit findings (Stages 2–5)
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Remediation of the 2026-05-12/13 audits (78 findings + cluster gaps),
tracked in deploy-k3s/SECURITY.md, plus fixes from two independent
post-remediation reviews.

Auth & sessions:
- SHA-256 hashed auth-token storage (C1); prior-token cache eviction on
  re-login (MEDIUM-1)
- local Google JWKS verification, iss/aud/exp checks (C2/C3)
- constant-time login + generic errors (L1/LIVE-L11/LIVE-L13)
- per-account login lockout keyed on distinct source IPs (M5/MEDIUM-3)
- verified-email gating, login rate limiting (LIVE-L19, H1-H3)

IAP & webhooks:
- Apple/Google cross-account replay protection (C5/C6/C10/C13, H5/H6)
- migrations 000003-000006 (token hashing, IAP replay, audit_log +
  webhook_event_log table creation, append-only audit log)

Authorization & races:
- file-ownership owner-OR-member fix (C7), atomic share-code join
  (C9/H9), device-token reassignment (C8/LOW-3)

Secrets & deploy:
- secrets file-mounted at /etc/honeydue/secrets, not env (F8); Redis
  password out of the ConfigMap (HIGH-1); B2 keys reconciled
- digest-pinned images, admin ingress hardening, CSP/HSTS, /metrics
  lockdown; kubeconfig 0600, etcd secrets-encryption, fail2ban +
  unattended-upgrades at provision; secret-rotation runbook

Build, vet, and the full test suite (incl. -race) pass; the goose
migration chain is verified against PostgreSQL 16.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Trey t
2026-05-16 22:28:33 -05:00
parent 2004f9c5b2
commit c77ff07ce9
59 changed files with 2819 additions and 1245 deletions
+49 -29
View File
@@ -68,13 +68,14 @@ type AppleTransactionInfo struct {
// AppleValidationResult contains the result of Apple receipt validation
type AppleValidationResult struct {
Valid bool
TransactionID string
ProductID string
ExpiresAt time.Time
IsTrialPeriod bool
AutoRenewEnabled bool
Environment string
Valid bool
TransactionID string
OriginalTransactionID string // stable across renewals — the replay key
ProductID string
ExpiresAt time.Time
IsTrialPeriod bool
AutoRenewEnabled bool
Environment string
}
// GoogleValidationResult contains the result of Google token validation
@@ -95,6 +96,21 @@ func NewAppleIAPClient(cfg config.AppleIAPConfig) (*AppleIAPClient, error) {
return nil, ErrIAPNotConfigured
}
// Audit H5 (relaxed per MEDIUM-2): refuse to load the IAP signing key from
// a world-accessible file — a leaked .p8 lets an attacker forge App Store
// Server API requests. The original "0600 or stricter" check is
// incompatible with a Kubernetes Secret volume: the kubelet widens secret
// files to 0440 once fsGroup is set, so 0600 is unattainable for a
// non-root container. Group access is scoped to the pod's fsGroup; the
// real exposure is the "other" bits, so reject only those.
info, err := os.Stat(cfg.KeyPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to stat Apple IAP key: %w", err)
}
if perm := info.Mode().Perm(); perm&0o007 != 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Apple IAP key %s is world-accessible (permissions %#o); remove other-rwx bits", cfg.KeyPath, perm)
}
// Read the private key
keyData, err := os.ReadFile(cfg.KeyPath)
if err != nil {
@@ -215,11 +231,12 @@ func (c *AppleIAPClient) ValidateTransaction(ctx context.Context, transactionID
expiresAt := time.Unix(transactionInfo.ExpiresDate/1000, 0)
return &AppleValidationResult{
Valid: true,
TransactionID: transactionInfo.TransactionID,
ProductID: transactionInfo.ProductID,
ExpiresAt: expiresAt,
Environment: transactionInfo.Environment,
Valid: true,
TransactionID: transactionInfo.TransactionID,
OriginalTransactionID: transactionInfo.OriginalTransactionID,
ProductID: transactionInfo.ProductID,
ExpiresAt: expiresAt,
Environment: transactionInfo.Environment,
}, nil
}
@@ -243,11 +260,12 @@ func (c *AppleIAPClient) ValidateReceipt(ctx context.Context, receiptData string
if err == nil {
expiresAt := time.Unix(transactionInfo.ExpiresDate/1000, 0)
return &AppleValidationResult{
Valid: true,
TransactionID: transactionInfo.TransactionID,
ProductID: transactionInfo.ProductID,
ExpiresAt: expiresAt,
Environment: transactionInfo.Environment,
Valid: true,
TransactionID: transactionInfo.TransactionID,
OriginalTransactionID: transactionInfo.OriginalTransactionID,
ProductID: transactionInfo.ProductID,
ExpiresAt: expiresAt,
Environment: transactionInfo.Environment,
}, nil
}
}
@@ -317,11 +335,12 @@ func (c *AppleIAPClient) ValidateReceipt(ctx context.Context, receiptData string
expiresAt := time.Unix(transactionInfo.ExpiresDate/1000, 0)
return &AppleValidationResult{
Valid: true,
TransactionID: transactionInfo.TransactionID,
ProductID: transactionInfo.ProductID,
ExpiresAt: expiresAt,
Environment: transactionInfo.Environment,
Valid: true,
TransactionID: transactionInfo.TransactionID,
OriginalTransactionID: transactionInfo.OriginalTransactionID,
ProductID: transactionInfo.ProductID,
ExpiresAt: expiresAt,
Environment: transactionInfo.Environment,
}, nil
}
@@ -418,13 +437,14 @@ func (c *AppleIAPClient) validateLegacyReceiptWithSandbox(ctx context.Context, r
}
return &AppleValidationResult{
Valid: true,
TransactionID: latestReceipt.TransactionID,
ProductID: latestReceipt.ProductID,
ExpiresAt: expiresAt,
IsTrialPeriod: latestReceipt.IsTrialPeriod == "true",
AutoRenewEnabled: autoRenew,
Environment: legacyResponse.Environment,
Valid: true,
TransactionID: latestReceipt.TransactionID,
OriginalTransactionID: latestReceipt.OriginalTransactionID,
ProductID: latestReceipt.ProductID,
ExpiresAt: expiresAt,
IsTrialPeriod: latestReceipt.IsTrialPeriod == "true",
AutoRenewEnabled: autoRenew,
Environment: legacyResponse.Environment,
}, nil
}