fix(security): remediate 2026-05-12 audit findings (Stages 2–5)
Remediation of the 2026-05-12/13 audits (78 findings + cluster gaps), tracked in deploy-k3s/SECURITY.md, plus fixes from two independent post-remediation reviews. Auth & sessions: - SHA-256 hashed auth-token storage (C1); prior-token cache eviction on re-login (MEDIUM-1) - local Google JWKS verification, iss/aud/exp checks (C2/C3) - constant-time login + generic errors (L1/LIVE-L11/LIVE-L13) - per-account login lockout keyed on distinct source IPs (M5/MEDIUM-3) - verified-email gating, login rate limiting (LIVE-L19, H1-H3) IAP & webhooks: - Apple/Google cross-account replay protection (C5/C6/C10/C13, H5/H6) - migrations 000003-000006 (token hashing, IAP replay, audit_log + webhook_event_log table creation, append-only audit log) Authorization & races: - file-ownership owner-OR-member fix (C7), atomic share-code join (C9/H9), device-token reassignment (C8/LOW-3) Secrets & deploy: - secrets file-mounted at /etc/honeydue/secrets, not env (F8); Redis password out of the ConfigMap (HIGH-1); B2 keys reconciled - digest-pinned images, admin ingress hardening, CSP/HSTS, /metrics lockdown; kubeconfig 0600, etcd secrets-encryption, fail2ban + unattended-upgrades at provision; secret-rotation runbook Build, vet, and the full test suite (incl. -race) pass; the goose migration chain is verified against PostgreSQL 16. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import (
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"github.com/rs/zerolog/log"
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"github.com/treytartt/honeydue-api/internal/config"
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"github.com/treytartt/honeydue-api/internal/models"
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)
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// CacheService provides Redis caching functionality
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@@ -139,22 +140,25 @@ const (
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TokenCacheTTL = 5 * time.Minute
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)
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// authTokenCacheKey returns the Redis key for an auth token. The raw token
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// is hashed (audit C1) so the plaintext token never appears in a Redis key.
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func authTokenCacheKey(token string) string {
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return AuthTokenPrefix + models.HashToken(token)
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}
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// CacheAuthToken caches a user ID for a token
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func (c *CacheService) CacheAuthToken(ctx context.Context, token string, userID uint) error {
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key := AuthTokenPrefix + token
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return c.SetString(ctx, key, fmt.Sprintf("%d", userID), TokenCacheTTL)
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return c.SetString(ctx, authTokenCacheKey(token), fmt.Sprintf("%d", userID), TokenCacheTTL)
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}
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// CacheAuthTokenWithCreated caches a user ID and token creation time for a token
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func (c *CacheService) CacheAuthTokenWithCreated(ctx context.Context, token string, userID uint, createdUnix int64) error {
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key := AuthTokenPrefix + token
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return c.SetString(ctx, key, fmt.Sprintf("%d|%d", userID, createdUnix), TokenCacheTTL)
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return c.SetString(ctx, authTokenCacheKey(token), fmt.Sprintf("%d|%d", userID, createdUnix), TokenCacheTTL)
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}
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// GetCachedAuthToken gets a cached user ID for a token
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func (c *CacheService) GetCachedAuthToken(ctx context.Context, token string) (uint, error) {
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key := AuthTokenPrefix + token
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val, err := c.GetString(ctx, key)
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val, err := c.GetString(ctx, authTokenCacheKey(token))
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if err != nil {
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return 0, err
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}
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@@ -167,8 +171,7 @@ func (c *CacheService) GetCachedAuthToken(ctx context.Context, token string) (ui
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// GetCachedAuthTokenWithCreated gets a cached user ID and token creation time.
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// Returns userID, createdUnix, error. createdUnix is 0 if not stored (legacy format).
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func (c *CacheService) GetCachedAuthTokenWithCreated(ctx context.Context, token string) (uint, int64, error) {
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key := AuthTokenPrefix + token
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val, err := c.GetString(ctx, key)
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val, err := c.GetString(ctx, authTokenCacheKey(token))
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if err != nil {
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return 0, 0, err
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}
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@@ -184,8 +187,62 @@ func (c *CacheService) GetCachedAuthTokenWithCreated(ctx context.Context, token
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// InvalidateAuthToken removes a cached token
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func (c *CacheService) InvalidateAuthToken(ctx context.Context, token string) error {
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key := AuthTokenPrefix + token
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return c.Delete(ctx, key)
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return c.Delete(ctx, authTokenCacheKey(token))
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}
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// InvalidateAuthTokenHashes removes cached entries for already-hashed token
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// keys. Unlike InvalidateAuthToken (which hashes a plaintext), this takes the
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// stored hash directly — used to evict a user's prior token on re-login
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// (audit MEDIUM-1), where the server no longer has the plaintext.
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func (c *CacheService) InvalidateAuthTokenHashes(ctx context.Context, hashes ...string) error {
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keys := make([]string, 0, len(hashes))
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for _, h := range hashes {
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if h != "" {
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keys = append(keys, AuthTokenPrefix+h)
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}
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}
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if len(keys) == 0 {
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return nil
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}
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return c.Delete(ctx, keys...)
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}
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// --- Per-account login-failure tracking (audit M5) ---
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const loginFailPrefix = "login_fail:"
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// RegisterLoginFailure records a failed login for an account from a given
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// source IP, and returns the number of DISTINCT source IPs that have failed
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// for this account within the window. Tracking distinct IPs as a set rather
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// than a raw counter (audit MEDIUM-3) means one attacker, from one IP, cannot
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// run the count up and lock a victim out by knowing only their email — a
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// single IP is bounded by the per-IP edge/app rate limiters instead. A
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// genuinely distributed credential-stuffing attack still trips the lockout.
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func (c *CacheService) RegisterLoginFailure(ctx context.Context, identifier, ip string, window time.Duration) (int64, error) {
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key := loginFailPrefix + identifier
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member := ip
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if member == "" {
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member = "unknown"
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}
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if err := c.client.SAdd(ctx, key, member).Err(); err != nil {
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return 0, err
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}
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// Refresh the TTL on each failure: an active attack keeps the window
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// open, while a quiet account ages out `window` after its last failure.
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_ = c.client.Expire(ctx, key, window).Err()
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return c.client.SCard(ctx, key).Result()
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}
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// LoginFailureIPCount returns how many distinct source IPs have failed to log
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// in to this account within the window (audit MEDIUM-3). SCard on a missing
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// key returns 0.
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func (c *CacheService) LoginFailureIPCount(ctx context.Context, identifier string) (int64, error) {
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return c.client.SCard(ctx, loginFailPrefix+identifier).Result()
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}
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// ClearLoginFailures resets the failed-login IP set after a successful login.
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func (c *CacheService) ClearLoginFailures(ctx context.Context, identifier string) error {
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return c.client.Del(ctx, loginFailPrefix+identifier).Err()
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}
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// Static data cache helpers
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