fix(security): remediate 2026-05-12 audit findings (Stages 2–5)
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Remediation of the 2026-05-12/13 audits (78 findings + cluster gaps),
tracked in deploy-k3s/SECURITY.md, plus fixes from two independent
post-remediation reviews.

Auth & sessions:
- SHA-256 hashed auth-token storage (C1); prior-token cache eviction on
  re-login (MEDIUM-1)
- local Google JWKS verification, iss/aud/exp checks (C2/C3)
- constant-time login + generic errors (L1/LIVE-L11/LIVE-L13)
- per-account login lockout keyed on distinct source IPs (M5/MEDIUM-3)
- verified-email gating, login rate limiting (LIVE-L19, H1-H3)

IAP & webhooks:
- Apple/Google cross-account replay protection (C5/C6/C10/C13, H5/H6)
- migrations 000003-000006 (token hashing, IAP replay, audit_log +
  webhook_event_log table creation, append-only audit log)

Authorization & races:
- file-ownership owner-OR-member fix (C7), atomic share-code join
  (C9/H9), device-token reassignment (C8/LOW-3)

Secrets & deploy:
- secrets file-mounted at /etc/honeydue/secrets, not env (F8); Redis
  password out of the ConfigMap (HIGH-1); B2 keys reconciled
- digest-pinned images, admin ingress hardening, CSP/HSTS, /metrics
  lockdown; kubeconfig 0600, etcd secrets-encryption, fail2ban +
  unattended-upgrades at provision; secret-rotation runbook

Build, vet, and the full test suite (incl. -race) pass; the goose
migration chain is verified against PostgreSQL 16.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Trey t
2026-05-16 22:28:33 -05:00
parent 2004f9c5b2
commit c77ff07ce9
59 changed files with 2819 additions and 1245 deletions
+44 -5
View File
@@ -174,10 +174,12 @@ func (r *UserRepository) GetOrCreateToken(userID uint) (*models.AuthToken, error
return &token, nil
}
// FindTokenByKey looks up an auth token by its key value.
func (r *UserRepository) FindTokenByKey(key string) (*models.AuthToken, error) {
// FindTokenByKey looks up an auth token by its raw key value. The raw token
// is hashed (audit C1) before the indexed lookup, since only the hash is
// stored.
func (r *UserRepository) FindTokenByKey(rawKey string) (*models.AuthToken, error) {
var token models.AuthToken
if err := r.db.Where("key = ?", key).First(&token).Error; err != nil {
if err := r.db.Where("key = ?", models.HashToken(rawKey)).First(&token).Error; err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
return nil, ErrTokenNotFound
}
@@ -195,9 +197,46 @@ func (r *UserRepository) CreateToken(userID uint) (*models.AuthToken, error) {
return &token, nil
}
// DeleteToken deletes an auth token
// CreateFreshToken issues a new auth token for the user, replacing any
// existing one. Because tokens are stored hashed (audit C1) the server
// cannot re-issue a previously-minted token's plaintext, so every login
// mints a fresh token. The returned token's Plaintext field carries the
// raw value to hand to the client; it is never persisted.
//
// It also returns the stored hashes of the token rows it deleted, so the
// caller can evict those entries from the Redis token cache (audit MEDIUM-1).
// Without that, a prior (e.g. stolen) token keeps authenticating via a cache
// hit for up to the cache TTL even though its DB row is gone.
func (r *UserRepository) CreateFreshToken(userID uint) (*models.AuthToken, []string, error) {
var token models.AuthToken
var oldHashes []string
err := r.db.Transaction(func(tx *gorm.DB) error {
var old []models.AuthToken
if err := tx.Where("user_id = ?", userID).Find(&old).Error; err != nil {
return err
}
oldHashes = make([]string, 0, len(old))
for i := range old {
if old[i].Key != "" {
oldHashes = append(oldHashes, old[i].Key)
}
}
if err := tx.Where("user_id = ?", userID).Delete(&models.AuthToken{}).Error; err != nil {
return err
}
token = models.AuthToken{UserID: userID}
return tx.Create(&token).Error
})
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
return &token, oldHashes, nil
}
// DeleteToken deletes an auth token by its raw key value. The raw token is
// hashed (audit C1) before the lookup, since only the hash is stored.
func (r *UserRepository) DeleteToken(token string) error {
result := r.db.Where("key = ?", token).Delete(&models.AuthToken{})
result := r.db.Where("key = ?", models.HashToken(token)).Delete(&models.AuthToken{})
if result.Error != nil {
return result.Error
}