fix(security): remediate 2026-05-12 audit findings (Stages 2–5)

Remediation of the 2026-05-12/13 audits (78 findings + cluster gaps),
tracked in deploy-k3s/SECURITY.md, plus fixes from two independent
post-remediation reviews.

Auth & sessions:
- SHA-256 hashed auth-token storage (C1); prior-token cache eviction on
  re-login (MEDIUM-1)
- local Google JWKS verification, iss/aud/exp checks (C2/C3)
- constant-time login + generic errors (L1/LIVE-L11/LIVE-L13)
- per-account login lockout keyed on distinct source IPs (M5/MEDIUM-3)
- verified-email gating, login rate limiting (LIVE-L19, H1-H3)

IAP & webhooks:
- Apple/Google cross-account replay protection (C5/C6/C10/C13, H5/H6)
- migrations 000003-000006 (token hashing, IAP replay, audit_log +
  webhook_event_log table creation, append-only audit log)

Authorization & races:
- file-ownership owner-OR-member fix (C7), atomic share-code join
  (C9/H9), device-token reassignment (C8/LOW-3)

Secrets & deploy:
- secrets file-mounted at /etc/honeydue/secrets, not env (F8); Redis
  password out of the ConfigMap (HIGH-1); B2 keys reconciled
- digest-pinned images, admin ingress hardening, CSP/HSTS, /metrics
  lockdown; kubeconfig 0600, etcd secrets-encryption, fail2ban +
  unattended-upgrades at provision; secret-rotation runbook

Build, vet, and the full test suite (incl. -race) pass; the goose
migration chain is verified against PostgreSQL 16.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

internal/middleware/auth.go

@@ -169,6 +169,34 @@ func (m *AuthMiddleware) OptionalTokenAuth() echo.MiddlewareFunc {
 	}
 }
 
+// RequireVerified returns middleware that rejects users whose email is not
+// verified (audit LIVE-L19). Apply it after TokenAuth to gate sensitive
+// actions — e.g. generating residence share codes — behind proof that the
+// account actually controls its email address.
+func (m *AuthMiddleware) RequireVerified() echo.MiddlewareFunc {
+	return func(next echo.HandlerFunc) echo.HandlerFunc {
+		return func(c echo.Context) error {
+			user := GetAuthUser(c)
+			if user == nil {
+				return apperrors.Unauthorized("error.not_authenticated")
+			}
+			var verified bool
+			err := m.db.WithContext(c.Request().Context()).
+				Model(&models.UserProfile{}).
+				Where("user_id = ?", user.ID).
+				Select("verified").
+				Scan(&verified).Error
+			if err != nil {
+				return apperrors.Internal(err)
+			}
+			if !verified {
+				return apperrors.Forbidden("error.email_not_verified")
+			}
+			return next(c)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 // extractToken extracts the token from the Authorization header
 func extractToken(c echo.Context) (string, error) {
 	authHeader := c.Request().Header.Get("Authorization")
@@ -297,7 +325,7 @@ func (m *AuthMiddleware) getUserFromDatabaseWithToken(ctx context.Context, token
 			u.last_login  AS u_last_login
 		`).
 		Joins("INNER JOIN auth_user u ON u.id = t.user_id").
-		Where("t.key = ?", token).
+		Where("t.key = ?", models.HashToken(token)). // audit C1: only the hash is stored
 		Limit(1).
 		Scan(&row).Error
 	if err != nil || row.Key == "" {