fix(security): remediate 2026-05-12 audit findings (Stages 2–5)
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Remediation of the 2026-05-12/13 audits (78 findings + cluster gaps),
tracked in deploy-k3s/SECURITY.md, plus fixes from two independent
post-remediation reviews.

Auth & sessions:
- SHA-256 hashed auth-token storage (C1); prior-token cache eviction on
  re-login (MEDIUM-1)
- local Google JWKS verification, iss/aud/exp checks (C2/C3)
- constant-time login + generic errors (L1/LIVE-L11/LIVE-L13)
- per-account login lockout keyed on distinct source IPs (M5/MEDIUM-3)
- verified-email gating, login rate limiting (LIVE-L19, H1-H3)

IAP & webhooks:
- Apple/Google cross-account replay protection (C5/C6/C10/C13, H5/H6)
- migrations 000003-000006 (token hashing, IAP replay, audit_log +
  webhook_event_log table creation, append-only audit log)

Authorization & races:
- file-ownership owner-OR-member fix (C7), atomic share-code join
  (C9/H9), device-token reassignment (C8/LOW-3)

Secrets & deploy:
- secrets file-mounted at /etc/honeydue/secrets, not env (F8); Redis
  password out of the ConfigMap (HIGH-1); B2 keys reconciled
- digest-pinned images, admin ingress hardening, CSP/HSTS, /metrics
  lockdown; kubeconfig 0600, etcd secrets-encryption, fail2ban +
  unattended-upgrades at provision; secret-rotation runbook

Build, vet, and the full test suite (incl. -race) pass; the goose
migration chain is verified against PostgreSQL 16.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Trey t
2026-05-16 22:28:33 -05:00
parent 2004f9c5b2
commit c77ff07ce9
59 changed files with 2819 additions and 1245 deletions
+29 -1
View File
@@ -169,6 +169,34 @@ func (m *AuthMiddleware) OptionalTokenAuth() echo.MiddlewareFunc {
}
}
// RequireVerified returns middleware that rejects users whose email is not
// verified (audit LIVE-L19). Apply it after TokenAuth to gate sensitive
// actions — e.g. generating residence share codes — behind proof that the
// account actually controls its email address.
func (m *AuthMiddleware) RequireVerified() echo.MiddlewareFunc {
return func(next echo.HandlerFunc) echo.HandlerFunc {
return func(c echo.Context) error {
user := GetAuthUser(c)
if user == nil {
return apperrors.Unauthorized("error.not_authenticated")
}
var verified bool
err := m.db.WithContext(c.Request().Context()).
Model(&models.UserProfile{}).
Where("user_id = ?", user.ID).
Select("verified").
Scan(&verified).Error
if err != nil {
return apperrors.Internal(err)
}
if !verified {
return apperrors.Forbidden("error.email_not_verified")
}
return next(c)
}
}
}
// extractToken extracts the token from the Authorization header
func extractToken(c echo.Context) (string, error) {
authHeader := c.Request().Header.Get("Authorization")
@@ -297,7 +325,7 @@ func (m *AuthMiddleware) getUserFromDatabaseWithToken(ctx context.Context, token
u.last_login AS u_last_login
`).
Joins("INNER JOIN auth_user u ON u.id = t.user_id").
Where("t.key = ?", token).
Where("t.key = ?", models.HashToken(token)). // audit C1: only the hash is stored
Limit(1).
Scan(&row).Error
if err != nil || row.Key == "" {
+3 -3
View File
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ func TestTokenAuth_RejectsExpiredToken(t *testing.T) {
e := echo.New()
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/test/", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Token "+token.Key)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Token "+token.Plaintext)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
c := e.NewContext(req, rec)
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ func TestTokenAuth_AcceptsValidToken(t *testing.T) {
e := echo.New()
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/test/", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Token "+token.Key)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Token "+token.Plaintext)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
c := e.NewContext(req, rec)
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ func TestTokenAuth_AcceptsTokenAtBoundary(t *testing.T) {
e := echo.New()
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/test/", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Token "+token.Key)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Token "+token.Plaintext)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
c := e.NewContext(req, rec)
+7 -7
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ func TestTokenAuth_BearerScheme_Accepted(t *testing.T) {
e := echo.New()
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/test/", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token.Key)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token.Plaintext)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
c := e.NewContext(req, rec)
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ func TestTokenAuth_InvalidScheme_Rejected(t *testing.T) {
e := echo.New()
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/test/", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Basic "+token.Key)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Basic "+token.Plaintext)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
c := e.NewContext(req, rec)
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ func TestTokenAuth_InactiveUser_Rejected(t *testing.T) {
e := echo.New()
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/test/", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Token "+token.Key)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Token "+token.Plaintext)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
c := e.NewContext(req, rec)
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ func TestOptionalTokenAuth_ValidToken_SetsUser(t *testing.T) {
e := echo.New()
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/test/", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Token "+token.Key)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Token "+token.Plaintext)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
c := e.NewContext(req, rec)
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ func TestOptionalTokenAuth_ExpiredToken_IgnoresUser(t *testing.T) {
e := echo.New()
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/test/", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Token "+token.Key)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Token "+token.Plaintext)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
c := e.NewContext(req, rec)
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ func TestNewAuthMiddlewareWithConfig_CustomExpiryDays(t *testing.T) {
e := echo.New()
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/test/", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Token "+token.Key)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Token "+token.Plaintext)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
c := e.NewContext(req, rec)
@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ func TestNewAuthMiddlewareWithConfig_ExpiredWithCustomExpiry(t *testing.T) {
e := echo.New()
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/test/", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Token "+token.Key)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Token "+token.Plaintext)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
c := e.NewContext(req, rec)
+14 -12
View File
@@ -99,21 +99,23 @@ func parseTimezone(tz string) *time.Location {
return loc
}
// Try parsing as UTC offset (e.g., "-08:00", "+05:30")
// We parse a reference time with the given offset to extract the offset value
t, err := time.Parse("-07:00", tz)
if err == nil {
// time.Parse returns a time, we need to extract the offset
// The parsed time will have the offset embedded
_, offset := t.Zone()
return time.FixedZone(tz, offset)
// Try parsing as a UTC offset (e.g., "-08:00", "+05:30"). Audit H8:
// reject absurd offsets — real timezones are within ±14h of UTC — so a
// crafted X-Timezone header cannot shift date math arbitrarily.
const maxOffsetSeconds = 14 * 3600
if t, err := time.Parse("-07:00", tz); err == nil {
if _, offset := t.Zone(); offset >= -maxOffsetSeconds && offset <= maxOffsetSeconds {
return time.FixedZone(tz, offset)
}
return time.UTC
}
// Also try without colon (e.g., "-0800")
t, err = time.Parse("-0700", tz)
if err == nil {
_, offset := t.Zone()
return time.FixedZone(tz, offset)
if t, err := time.Parse("-0700", tz); err == nil {
if _, offset := t.Zone(); offset >= -maxOffsetSeconds && offset <= maxOffsetSeconds {
return time.FixedZone(tz, offset)
}
return time.UTC
}
// Default to UTC