fix(security): remediate 2026-05-12 audit findings (Stages 2–5)
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Remediation of the 2026-05-12/13 audits (78 findings + cluster gaps),
tracked in deploy-k3s/SECURITY.md, plus fixes from two independent
post-remediation reviews.

Auth & sessions:
- SHA-256 hashed auth-token storage (C1); prior-token cache eviction on
  re-login (MEDIUM-1)
- local Google JWKS verification, iss/aud/exp checks (C2/C3)
- constant-time login + generic errors (L1/LIVE-L11/LIVE-L13)
- per-account login lockout keyed on distinct source IPs (M5/MEDIUM-3)
- verified-email gating, login rate limiting (LIVE-L19, H1-H3)

IAP & webhooks:
- Apple/Google cross-account replay protection (C5/C6/C10/C13, H5/H6)
- migrations 000003-000006 (token hashing, IAP replay, audit_log +
  webhook_event_log table creation, append-only audit log)

Authorization & races:
- file-ownership owner-OR-member fix (C7), atomic share-code join
  (C9/H9), device-token reassignment (C8/LOW-3)

Secrets & deploy:
- secrets file-mounted at /etc/honeydue/secrets, not env (F8); Redis
  password out of the ConfigMap (HIGH-1); B2 keys reconciled
- digest-pinned images, admin ingress hardening, CSP/HSTS, /metrics
  lockdown; kubeconfig 0600, etcd secrets-encryption, fail2ban +
  unattended-upgrades at provision; secret-rotation runbook

Build, vet, and the full test suite (incl. -race) pass; the goose
migration chain is verified against PostgreSQL 16.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Trey t
2026-05-16 22:28:33 -05:00
parent 2004f9c5b2
commit c77ff07ce9
59 changed files with 2819 additions and 1245 deletions
+20 -3
View File
@@ -37,6 +37,23 @@ func NewMediaHandler(
}
}
// safeContentDisposition builds an inline Content-Disposition header value
// with a sanitized filename (audit M1). Control characters (including CR/LF),
// double-quote and backslash are stripped so an attacker-controlled upload
// filename cannot inject additional response headers (CWE-113).
func safeContentDisposition(filename string) string {
cleaned := strings.Map(func(r rune) rune {
if r < 0x20 || r == 0x7f || r == '"' || r == '\\' {
return -1
}
return r
}, filename)
if cleaned == "" {
cleaned = "download"
}
return `inline; filename="` + cleaned + `"`
}
// ServeDocument serves a document file with access control
// GET /api/media/document/:id
func (h *MediaHandler) ServeDocument(c echo.Context) error {
@@ -71,7 +88,7 @@ func (h *MediaHandler) ServeDocument(c echo.Context) error {
// Set caching and disposition headers
c.Response().Header().Set("Cache-Control", "private, max-age=3600")
if doc.FileName != "" {
c.Response().Header().Set("Content-Disposition", "inline; filename=\""+doc.FileName+"\"")
c.Response().Header().Set("Content-Disposition", safeContentDisposition(doc.FileName))
}
return c.Blob(http.StatusOK, mimeType, data)
}
@@ -114,7 +131,7 @@ func (h *MediaHandler) ServeDocumentImage(c echo.Context) error {
}
c.Response().Header().Set("Cache-Control", "private, max-age=3600")
c.Response().Header().Set("Content-Disposition", "inline; filename=\""+filepath.Base(img.ImageURL)+"\"")
c.Response().Header().Set("Content-Disposition", safeContentDisposition(filepath.Base(img.ImageURL)))
return c.Blob(http.StatusOK, mimeType, data)
}
@@ -162,7 +179,7 @@ func (h *MediaHandler) ServeCompletionImage(c echo.Context) error {
}
c.Response().Header().Set("Cache-Control", "private, max-age=3600")
c.Response().Header().Set("Content-Disposition", "inline; filename=\""+filepath.Base(img.ImageURL)+"\"")
c.Response().Header().Set("Content-Disposition", safeContentDisposition(filepath.Base(img.ImageURL)))
return c.Blob(http.StatusOK, mimeType, data)
}