fix(security): remediate 2026-05-12 audit findings (Stages 2–5)
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Remediation of the 2026-05-12/13 audits (78 findings + cluster gaps),
tracked in deploy-k3s/SECURITY.md, plus fixes from two independent
post-remediation reviews.

Auth & sessions:
- SHA-256 hashed auth-token storage (C1); prior-token cache eviction on
  re-login (MEDIUM-1)
- local Google JWKS verification, iss/aud/exp checks (C2/C3)
- constant-time login + generic errors (L1/LIVE-L11/LIVE-L13)
- per-account login lockout keyed on distinct source IPs (M5/MEDIUM-3)
- verified-email gating, login rate limiting (LIVE-L19, H1-H3)

IAP & webhooks:
- Apple/Google cross-account replay protection (C5/C6/C10/C13, H5/H6)
- migrations 000003-000006 (token hashing, IAP replay, audit_log +
  webhook_event_log table creation, append-only audit log)

Authorization & races:
- file-ownership owner-OR-member fix (C7), atomic share-code join
  (C9/H9), device-token reassignment (C8/LOW-3)

Secrets & deploy:
- secrets file-mounted at /etc/honeydue/secrets, not env (F8); Redis
  password out of the ConfigMap (HIGH-1); B2 keys reconciled
- digest-pinned images, admin ingress hardening, CSP/HSTS, /metrics
  lockdown; kubeconfig 0600, etcd secrets-encryption, fail2ban +
  unattended-upgrades at provision; secret-rotation runbook

Build, vet, and the full test suite (incl. -race) pass; the goose
migration chain is verified against PostgreSQL 16.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Trey t
2026-05-16 22:28:33 -05:00
parent 2004f9c5b2
commit c77ff07ce9
59 changed files with 2819 additions and 1245 deletions
+26 -64
View File
@@ -23,8 +23,11 @@ spec:
app.kubernetes.io/part-of: honeydue
spec:
serviceAccountName: api
# Explicit pod-level opt-out (audit F11) — defense-in-depth on top of
# the ServiceAccount-level setting in rbac.yaml.
automountServiceAccountToken: false
imagePullSecrets:
- name: ghcr-credentials
- name: gitea-credentials
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 1000
@@ -35,6 +38,7 @@ spec:
containers:
- name: api
image: IMAGE_PLACEHOLDER # Replaced by 03-deploy.sh
imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent # audit CODE-L4 — explicit; images are SHA/digest-pinned
ports:
- containerPort: 8000
protocol: TCP
@@ -46,65 +50,16 @@ spec:
envFrom:
- configMapRef:
name: honeydue-config
env:
- name: POSTGRES_PASSWORD
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: honeydue-secrets
key: POSTGRES_PASSWORD
- name: SECRET_KEY
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: honeydue-secrets
key: SECRET_KEY
- name: EMAIL_HOST_PASSWORD
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: honeydue-secrets
key: EMAIL_HOST_PASSWORD
- name: FCM_SERVER_KEY
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: honeydue-secrets
key: FCM_SERVER_KEY
- name: REDIS_PASSWORD
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: honeydue-secrets
key: REDIS_PASSWORD
optional: true
# B2 (Backblaze) credentials. With both set, StorageConfig.IsS3()
# returns true and uploads stream to B2 via minio-go. With either
# missing, code falls back to local filesystem — and since
# readOnlyRootFilesystem is true on this container, that fallback
# silently fails. So both must be wired or uploads break.
- name: B2_KEY_ID
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: honeydue-secrets
key: B2_KEY_ID
- name: B2_APP_KEY
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: honeydue-secrets
key: B2_APP_KEY
# Observability — push traces (and any future OTLP metrics) to
# obs.88oakapps.com. Token gates ingest at nginx; URL is the
# same one vmagent uses for metric remote-write. Both come from
# honeydue-secrets so they aren't world-readable in ConfigMap.
- name: OBS_TRACES_URL
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: honeydue-secrets
key: OBS_TRACES_URL
optional: true
- name: OBS_INGEST_TOKEN
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: honeydue-secrets
key: OBS_INGEST_TOKEN
optional: true
# Audit CODE-F8: secrets are NOT injected as environment variables.
# Env vars are readable for the life of the pod via /proc/<pid>/environ
# and leak into crash dumps / child processes. honeydue-secrets is
# mounted read-only at /etc/honeydue/secrets (mode 0400) and the Go
# config layer (config.loadFileSecrets) reads each key from its file.
# Non-secret config still arrives via the configMapRef above.
volumeMounts:
- name: app-secrets
mountPath: /etc/honeydue/secrets
readOnly: true
- name: apns-key
mountPath: /secrets/apns
readOnly: true
@@ -121,11 +76,12 @@ spec:
httpGet:
path: /api/health/
port: 8000
# MigrateWithLock in cmd/api/main.go runs pg_advisory_lock on
# every startup. On a cold boot with 3 replicas, the first does
# AutoMigrate (~90s) and the others wait on the lock, so real
# startup runs 90240s. 48 × 5s = 240s grace absorbs it without
# healthcheck killing a still-starting replica.
# Schema migrations run separately in the honeydue-migrate Job
# *before* this Deployment rolls — the api itself does not migrate
# (it only verifies goose_db_version at boot). Cold start still
# pays the DB pool warm-up + Redis connect + APNs/FCM client init
# before /api/health/ goes green. 48 × 5s = 240s grace keeps the
# probe from killing a still-starting replica.
failureThreshold: 48
periodSeconds: 5
readinessProbe:
@@ -143,6 +99,12 @@ spec:
periodSeconds: 30
timeoutSeconds: 10
volumes:
# Audit CODE-F8: the whole honeydue-secrets Secret, projected as files.
# defaultMode 0400 → readable only by the container's runAsUser (1000).
- name: app-secrets
secret:
secretName: honeydue-secrets
defaultMode: 0400
- name: apns-key
secret:
secretName: honeydue-apns-key