fix(security): remediate 2026-05-12 audit findings (Stages 2–5)

Remediation of the 2026-05-12/13 audits (78 findings + cluster gaps),
tracked in deploy-k3s/SECURITY.md, plus fixes from two independent
post-remediation reviews.

Auth & sessions:
- SHA-256 hashed auth-token storage (C1); prior-token cache eviction on
  re-login (MEDIUM-1)
- local Google JWKS verification, iss/aud/exp checks (C2/C3)
- constant-time login + generic errors (L1/LIVE-L11/LIVE-L13)
- per-account login lockout keyed on distinct source IPs (M5/MEDIUM-3)
- verified-email gating, login rate limiting (LIVE-L19, H1-H3)

IAP & webhooks:
- Apple/Google cross-account replay protection (C5/C6/C10/C13, H5/H6)
- migrations 000003-000006 (token hashing, IAP replay, audit_log +
  webhook_event_log table creation, append-only audit log)

Authorization & races:
- file-ownership owner-OR-member fix (C7), atomic share-code join
  (C9/H9), device-token reassignment (C8/LOW-3)

Secrets & deploy:
- secrets file-mounted at /etc/honeydue/secrets, not env (F8); Redis
  password out of the ConfigMap (HIGH-1); B2 keys reconciled
- digest-pinned images, admin ingress hardening, CSP/HSTS, /metrics
  lockdown; kubeconfig 0600, etcd secrets-encryption, fail2ban +
  unattended-upgrades at provision; secret-rotation runbook

Build, vet, and the full test suite (incl. -race) pass; the goose
migration chain is verified against PostgreSQL 16.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

deploy-k3s/config.yaml.example

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ load_balancer_ip: ""
 domains:
   api: api.myhoneydue.com
   admin: admin.myhoneydue.com
+  app: app.myhoneydue.com                   # web client host — added to CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS
   base: myhoneydue.com
 
 # --- Container Registry (GHCR) ---

deploy-k3s/manifests/admin/deployment.yaml

@@ -23,8 +23,11 @@ spec:
         app.kubernetes.io/part-of: honeydue
     spec:
       serviceAccountName: admin
+      # Explicit pod-level opt-out (audit F11) — defense-in-depth on top of
+      # the ServiceAccount-level setting in rbac.yaml.
+      automountServiceAccountToken: false
       imagePullSecrets:
-        - name: ghcr-credentials
+        - name: gitea-credentials
       securityContext:
         runAsNonRoot: true
         runAsUser: 1001
@@ -35,6 +38,7 @@ spec:
       containers:
         - name: admin
           image: IMAGE_PLACEHOLDER  # Replaced by 03-deploy.sh
+          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent  # audit CODE-L4 — explicit; images are SHA/digest-pinned
           ports:
             - containerPort: 3000
               protocol: TCP

deploy-k3s/manifests/api/deployment.yaml

@@ -23,8 +23,11 @@ spec:
         app.kubernetes.io/part-of: honeydue
     spec:
       serviceAccountName: api
+      # Explicit pod-level opt-out (audit F11) — defense-in-depth on top of
+      # the ServiceAccount-level setting in rbac.yaml.
+      automountServiceAccountToken: false
       imagePullSecrets:
-        - name: ghcr-credentials
+        - name: gitea-credentials
       securityContext:
         runAsNonRoot: true
         runAsUser: 1000
@@ -35,6 +38,7 @@ spec:
       containers:
         - name: api
           image: IMAGE_PLACEHOLDER  # Replaced by 03-deploy.sh
+          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent  # audit CODE-L4 — explicit; images are SHA/digest-pinned
           ports:
             - containerPort: 8000
               protocol: TCP
@@ -46,65 +50,16 @@ spec:
           envFrom:
             - configMapRef:
                 name: honeydue-config
-          env:
-            - name: POSTGRES_PASSWORD
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
-                  key: POSTGRES_PASSWORD
-            - name: SECRET_KEY
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
-                  key: SECRET_KEY
-            - name: EMAIL_HOST_PASSWORD
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
-                  key: EMAIL_HOST_PASSWORD
-            - name: FCM_SERVER_KEY
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
-                  key: FCM_SERVER_KEY
-            - name: REDIS_PASSWORD
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
-                  key: REDIS_PASSWORD
-                  optional: true
-            # B2 (Backblaze) credentials. With both set, StorageConfig.IsS3()
-            # returns true and uploads stream to B2 via minio-go. With either
-            # missing, code falls back to local filesystem — and since
-            # readOnlyRootFilesystem is true on this container, that fallback
-            # silently fails. So both must be wired or uploads break.
-            - name: B2_KEY_ID
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
-                  key: B2_KEY_ID
-            - name: B2_APP_KEY
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
-                  key: B2_APP_KEY
-            # Observability — push traces (and any future OTLP metrics) to
-            # obs.88oakapps.com. Token gates ingest at nginx; URL is the
-            # same one vmagent uses for metric remote-write. Both come from
-            # honeydue-secrets so they aren't world-readable in ConfigMap.
-            - name: OBS_TRACES_URL
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
-                  key: OBS_TRACES_URL
-                  optional: true
-            - name: OBS_INGEST_TOKEN
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
-                  key: OBS_INGEST_TOKEN
-                  optional: true
+          # Audit CODE-F8: secrets are NOT injected as environment variables.
+          # Env vars are readable for the life of the pod via /proc/<pid>/environ
+          # and leak into crash dumps / child processes. honeydue-secrets is
+          # mounted read-only at /etc/honeydue/secrets (mode 0400) and the Go
+          # config layer (config.loadFileSecrets) reads each key from its file.
+          # Non-secret config still arrives via the configMapRef above.
           volumeMounts:
+            - name: app-secrets
+              mountPath: /etc/honeydue/secrets
+              readOnly: true
             - name: apns-key
               mountPath: /secrets/apns
               readOnly: true
@@ -121,11 +76,12 @@ spec:
             httpGet:
               path: /api/health/
               port: 8000
-            # MigrateWithLock in cmd/api/main.go runs pg_advisory_lock on
-            # every startup. On a cold boot with 3 replicas, the first does
-            # AutoMigrate (~90s) and the others wait on the lock, so real
-            # startup runs 90–240s. 48 × 5s = 240s grace absorbs it without
-            # healthcheck killing a still-starting replica.
+            # Schema migrations run separately in the honeydue-migrate Job
+            # *before* this Deployment rolls — the api itself does not migrate
+            # (it only verifies goose_db_version at boot). Cold start still
+            # pays the DB pool warm-up + Redis connect + APNs/FCM client init
+            # before /api/health/ goes green. 48 × 5s = 240s grace keeps the
+            # probe from killing a still-starting replica.
             failureThreshold: 48
             periodSeconds: 5
           readinessProbe:
@@ -143,6 +99,12 @@ spec:
             periodSeconds: 30
             timeoutSeconds: 10
       volumes:
+        # Audit CODE-F8: the whole honeydue-secrets Secret, projected as files.
+        # defaultMode 0400 → readable only by the container's runAsUser (1000).
+        - name: app-secrets
+          secret:
+            secretName: honeydue-secrets
+            defaultMode: 0400
         - name: apns-key
           secret:
             secretName: honeydue-apns-key

deploy-k3s/manifests/ingress/ingress-simple.yaml

@@ -53,7 +53,12 @@ metadata:
   labels:
     app.kubernetes.io/part-of: honeydue
   annotations:
-    traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.middlewares: honeydue-security-headers@kubernetescrd,honeydue-rate-limit@kubernetescrd
+    # cloudflare-only + admin-auth wired in (audit F2/F3/CODE-L6). Order
+    # matters: reject non-Cloudflare IPs, then basic auth, then headers,
+    # then rate limit. The admin-basic-auth secret is created by
+    # 02-setup-secrets.sh from config.yaml admin.basic_auth_* — that runs
+    # before 03-deploy.sh, so the middleware always has its secret.
+    traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.middlewares: honeydue-cloudflare-only@kubernetescrd,honeydue-admin-auth@kubernetescrd,honeydue-security-headers@kubernetescrd,honeydue-rate-limit@kubernetescrd
 spec:
   ingressClassName: traefik
   tls:
@@ -98,3 +103,98 @@ spec:
                 name: web
                 port:
                   number: 3000
+---
+# Auth-endpoint Ingress (audit F10 / LIVE-L12). A dedicated Ingress for the
+# auth paths so Traefik gives their longer path-prefix routers a higher
+# priority than honeydue-api's "/" router — these paths then get
+# auth-rate-limit (5/min) instead of the general rate-limit (100/min).
+# Anything not matched here falls through to honeydue-api unchanged.
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: Ingress
+metadata:
+  name: honeydue-api-auth
+  namespace: honeydue
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: honeydue
+  annotations:
+    traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.middlewares: honeydue-auth-rate-limit@kubernetescrd,honeydue-security-headers@kubernetescrd
+spec:
+  ingressClassName: traefik
+  tls:
+    - hosts:
+        - api.myhoneydue.com
+      secretName: cloudflare-origin-cert
+  rules:
+    - host: api.myhoneydue.com
+      http:
+        paths:
+          - path: /api/auth/login
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: api
+                port:
+                  number: 8000
+          - path: /api/auth/register
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: api
+                port:
+                  number: 8000
+          - path: /api/auth/forgot-password
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: api
+                port:
+                  number: 8000
+          - path: /api/auth/reset-password
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: api
+                port:
+                  number: 8000
+          - path: /api/residences/join-with-code
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: api
+                port:
+                  number: 8000
+          - path: /api/auth/verify-reset-code
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: api
+                port:
+                  number: 8000
+          - path: /api/auth/apple-sign-in
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: api
+                port:
+                  number: 8000
+          - path: /api/auth/google-sign-in
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: api
+                port:
+                  number: 8000
+          - path: /api/auth/refresh
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: api
+                port:
+                  number: 8000
+          - path: /api/auth/account
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: api
+                port:
+                  number: 8000

deploy-k3s/manifests/ingress/middleware.yaml

@@ -21,12 +21,20 @@ spec:
   headers:
     frameDeny: true
     contentTypeNosniff: true
-    browserXssFilter: true
+    # browserXssFilter removed (audit L7): it emits the deprecated
+    # X-XSS-Protection header, which can itself introduce XSS in legacy
+    # browsers. Modern browsers ignore it.
     referrerPolicy: "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
     customResponseHeaders:
       X-Content-Type-Options: "nosniff"
       X-Frame-Options: "DENY"
-      Strict-Transport-Security: "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
+      # HSTS: 2-year max-age + preload (audit L5/CODE-L3). After this is
+      # live on api/admin/app, submit myhoneydue.com to hstspreload.org.
+      Strict-Transport-Security: "max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload"
+      # Cross-origin isolation (audit F9). COEP (require-corp) is omitted —
+      # it commonly breaks third-party embeds; add only after testing.
+      Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: "same-origin"
+      Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: "same-origin"
       # Content-Security-Policy is intentionally NOT set here — the Go API
       # sets a CSP in internal/router/router.go that permits Google Fonts
       # for the landing page. Two CSP headers would intersect and break it.
@@ -83,3 +91,24 @@ spec:
   basicAuth:
     secret: admin-basic-auth
     realm: "honeyDue Admin"
+
+---
+# Strict rate limit for auth endpoints (audit F10 / LIVE-L12).
+# Applied via the honeydue-api-auth Ingress to login / register /
+# forgot-password / reset-password / join-with-code. depth: 2 makes the
+# limiter key on the real client IP rather than the Cloudflare edge IP
+# (request path: client -> Cloudflare -> Traefik). This is the edge half;
+# the per-account lockout in the Go app is the robust half.
+apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Middleware
+metadata:
+  name: auth-rate-limit
+  namespace: honeydue
+spec:
+  rateLimit:
+    average: 5
+    burst: 10
+    period: 1m
+    sourceCriterion:
+      ipStrategy:
+        depth: 2

deploy-k3s/manifests/kyverno-verify-images.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+# Kyverno image-signature verification policy (audit CODE-L5).
+#
+# ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# THIS MANIFEST IS NOT APPLIED BY 03-deploy.sh. It is intentionally outside
+# the script's apply set. Applying it before the prerequisites are in place
+# would block every honeydue Pod from scheduling. Operator steps:
+#
+#   1. Install Kyverno in the cluster (it is an admission controller):
+#        kubectl create -f https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno/releases/latest/download/install.yaml
+#   2. Generate a cosign key pair and keep the private key safe:
+#        cosign generate-key-pair                 # -> cosign.key (PRIVATE) + cosign.pub
+#      Set COSIGN_KEY=cosign.key in the deploy environment so 03-deploy.sh
+#      signs images after pushing them (the signing step is already wired,
+#      guarded, into 03-deploy.sh).
+#   3. Paste the contents of cosign.pub into the publicKeys block below.
+#   4. Apply this policy:  kubectl apply -f deploy-k3s/manifests/kyverno-verify-images.yaml
+#   5. After confirming honeydue Pods still schedule, flip
+#      validationFailureAction from Audit to Enforce.
+#
+# Until then it is a documented, ready-to-use template — not active config.
+# ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
+kind: ClusterPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: verify-honeydue-images
+  annotations:
+    policies.kyverno.io/title: Verify honeyDue image signatures
+    policies.kyverno.io/description: >-
+      Requires that honeyDue application images pulled into the honeydue
+      namespace carry a valid cosign signature made with the operator's key.
+spec:
+  # Audit first — logs violations without blocking. Switch to Enforce once
+  # signing is confirmed working end to end.
+  validationFailureAction: Audit
+  background: false
+  webhookTimeoutSeconds: 30
+  rules:
+    - name: verify-gitea-image-signatures
+      match:
+        any:
+          - resources:
+              kinds:
+                - Pod
+              namespaces:
+                - honeydue
+      verifyImages:
+        # Only the images we build and sign. Public base images
+        # (redis, vmagent) are pinned by digest instead — see their manifests.
+        - imageReferences:
+            - "gitea.treytartt.com/admin/honeydue-api*"
+            - "gitea.treytartt.com/admin/honeydue-worker*"
+            - "gitea.treytartt.com/admin/honeydue-admin*"
+            - "gitea.treytartt.com/admin/honeydue-web*"
+          attestors:
+            - count: 1
+              entries:
+                - keys:
+                    publicKeys: |-
+                      -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+                      REPLACE_WITH_CONTENTS_OF_cosign.pub
+                      -----END PUBLIC KEY-----

deploy-k3s/manifests/migrate/job.yaml

@@ -27,8 +27,10 @@ spec:
         app.kubernetes.io/part-of: honeydue
     spec:
       restartPolicy: Never
+      # The migrate Job never calls the k8s API (audit F11).
+      automountServiceAccountToken: false
       imagePullSecrets:
-        - name: ghcr-credentials
+        - name: gitea-credentials
       securityContext:
         runAsNonRoot: true
         runAsUser: 1000
@@ -38,6 +40,7 @@ spec:
       containers:
         - name: goose
           image: IMAGE_PLACEHOLDER  # Replaced by 03-deploy.sh — same as api
+          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent  # audit CODE-L4 — explicit
           command: ["/bin/sh", "-c"]
           # DB_HOST in the ConfigMap points at the -pooler endpoint for runtime.
           # goose's session-scoped advisory lock can't survive PgBouncer

deploy-k3s/manifests/observability/vmagent.yaml

@@ -179,7 +179,17 @@ spec:
           type: RuntimeDefault
       containers:
         - name: vmagent
-          image: victoriametrics/vmagent:v1.106.1
+          # Pinned by digest (audit K3S-F14).
+          image: victoriametrics/vmagent:v1.106.1@sha256:90208a667c0baf65f7536b92a84c40b6e35ffe8e88bda7e4447b97b06c6ba6b8
+          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent  # audit CODE-L4 — explicit
+          # Container-level hardening (audit F7) — matches the other 5
+          # workloads. vmagent only writes to the /tmp/vmagent emptyDir
+          # (its remoteWrite buffer), so a read-only root filesystem holds.
+          securityContext:
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+            capabilities:
+              drop: ["ALL"]
           args:
             - "-promscrape.config=/etc/vmagent/scrape.yaml"
             - "-remoteWrite.url=https://obs.88oakapps.com/api/v1/write"

deploy-k3s/manifests/redis/deployment.yaml

@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@ spec:
         app.kubernetes.io/part-of: honeydue
     spec:
       serviceAccountName: redis
+      # Explicit pod-level opt-out (audit F11) — defense-in-depth on top of
+      # the ServiceAccount-level setting in rbac.yaml.
+      automountServiceAccountToken: false
       nodeSelector:
         honeydue/redis: "true"
       securityContext:
@@ -31,7 +34,9 @@ spec:
           type: RuntimeDefault
       containers:
         - name: redis
-          image: redis:7-alpine
+          # Pinned by digest (audit K3S-F14) — redis:7-alpine is 7.4.9-alpine.
+          image: redis:7-alpine@sha256:6ab0b6e7381779332f97b8ca76193e45b0756f38d4c0dcda72dbb3c32061ab99
+          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent  # audit CODE-L4 — explicit
           command:
             - sh
             - -c

deploy-k3s/manifests/web/deployment.yaml

@@ -23,8 +23,11 @@ spec:
         app.kubernetes.io/part-of: honeydue
     spec:
       serviceAccountName: web
+      # Explicit pod-level opt-out (audit F11) — defense-in-depth on top of
+      # the ServiceAccount-level setting in rbac.yaml.
+      automountServiceAccountToken: false
       imagePullSecrets:
-        - name: ghcr-credentials
+        - name: gitea-credentials
       securityContext:
         runAsNonRoot: true
         runAsUser: 1001
@@ -43,6 +46,7 @@ spec:
       containers:
         - name: web
           image: IMAGE_PLACEHOLDER  # Replaced by 03-deploy.sh or manual sed
+          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent  # audit CODE-L4 — explicit; images are SHA/digest-pinned
           ports:
             - containerPort: 3000
               protocol: TCP

deploy-k3s/manifests/worker/deployment.yaml

@@ -27,8 +27,11 @@ spec:
         app.kubernetes.io/part-of: honeydue
     spec:
       serviceAccountName: worker
+      # Explicit pod-level opt-out (audit F11) — defense-in-depth on top of
+      # the ServiceAccount-level setting in rbac.yaml.
+      automountServiceAccountToken: false
       imagePullSecrets:
-        - name: ghcr-credentials
+        - name: gitea-credentials
       securityContext:
         runAsNonRoot: true
         runAsUser: 1000
@@ -39,6 +42,7 @@ spec:
       containers:
         - name: worker
           image: IMAGE_PLACEHOLDER  # Replaced by 03-deploy.sh
+          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent  # audit CODE-L4 — explicit; images are SHA/digest-pinned
           securityContext:
             allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
             readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
@@ -47,64 +51,16 @@ spec:
           envFrom:
             - configMapRef:
                 name: honeydue-config
-          env:
-            - name: POSTGRES_PASSWORD
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
-                  key: POSTGRES_PASSWORD
-            - name: SECRET_KEY
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
-                  key: SECRET_KEY
-            - name: EMAIL_HOST_PASSWORD
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
-                  key: EMAIL_HOST_PASSWORD
-            - name: FCM_SERVER_KEY
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
-                  key: FCM_SERVER_KEY
-            - name: REDIS_PASSWORD
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
-                  key: REDIS_PASSWORD
-                  optional: true
-            # B2 (Backblaze) credentials. The worker needs these to delete
-            # B2 objects when the pending_uploads cleanup cron reaps
-            # expired upload sessions. Without them the worker falls back
-            # to local-disk storage which fails on this pod's read-only
-            # root filesystem and disables the cleanup cron.
-            - name: B2_KEY_ID
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
-                  key: B2_KEY_ID
-            - name: B2_APP_KEY
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
-                  key: B2_APP_KEY
-            # Observability — workers emit traces (e.g., asynq job spans) to
-            # obs.88oakapps.com over OTLP/HTTP. service.name=honeydue-worker
-            # so api and worker show up as separate services in Jaeger.
-            - name: OBS_TRACES_URL
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
-                  key: OBS_TRACES_URL
-                  optional: true
-            - name: OBS_INGEST_TOKEN
-              valueFrom:
-                secretKeyRef:
-                  name: honeydue-secrets
-                  key: OBS_INGEST_TOKEN
-                  optional: true
+          # Audit CODE-F8: secrets are NOT injected as environment variables.
+          # Env vars are readable for the life of the pod via /proc/<pid>/environ
+          # and leak into crash dumps / child processes. honeydue-secrets is
+          # mounted read-only at /etc/honeydue/secrets (mode 0400) and the Go
+          # config layer (config.loadFileSecrets) reads each key from its file.
+          # Non-secret config still arrives via the configMapRef above.
           volumeMounts:
+            - name: app-secrets
+              mountPath: /etc/honeydue/secrets
+              readOnly: true
             - name: apns-key
               mountPath: /secrets/apns
               readOnly: true
@@ -124,6 +80,12 @@ spec:
             periodSeconds: 30
             timeoutSeconds: 5
       volumes:
+        # Audit CODE-F8: the whole honeydue-secrets Secret, projected as files.
+        # defaultMode 0400 → readable only by the container's runAsUser (1000).
+        - name: app-secrets
+          secret:
+            secretName: honeydue-secrets
+            defaultMode: 0400
         - name: apns-key
           secret:
             secretName: honeydue-apns-key

deploy-k3s/scripts/02-setup-secrets.sh

@@ -68,6 +68,25 @@ SECRET_ARGS=(
 if [[ -n "${REDIS_PASSWORD}" ]]; then
   log "  Including REDIS_PASSWORD in secrets"
   SECRET_ARGS+=(--from-literal="REDIS_PASSWORD=${REDIS_PASSWORD}")
+else
+  # Audit K3S-F1 (CRITICAL) / MEDIUM-4: refuse to deploy with an unauthenticated
+  # Redis. A previous version only warned here, which let a deploy from an
+  # unedited config.yaml silently bring Redis up with no password.
+  die "redis.password is empty in config.yaml — refusing to deploy: Redis would run with NO authentication (audit K3S-F1). Set a strong value, e.g.: openssl rand -base64 32"
+fi
+
+# B2 (Backblaze) object-storage credentials. The api/worker manifests
+# reference B2_KEY_ID / B2_APP_KEY as required secret keys, so honeydue-secrets
+# MUST carry them or those pods fail to start. Sourced from config.yaml so the
+# script and the manifests no longer drift (was a latent gap before 2026-05-16).
+B2_KEY_ID_VAL="$(cfg storage.b2_key_id 2>/dev/null || true)"
+B2_APP_KEY_VAL="$(cfg storage.b2_app_key 2>/dev/null || true)"
+if [[ -n "${B2_KEY_ID_VAL}" && -n "${B2_APP_KEY_VAL}" ]]; then
+  log "  Including B2_KEY_ID / B2_APP_KEY in secrets"
+  SECRET_ARGS+=(--from-literal="B2_KEY_ID=${B2_KEY_ID_VAL}")
+  SECRET_ARGS+=(--from-literal="B2_APP_KEY=${B2_APP_KEY_VAL}")
+else
+  warn "storage.b2_key_id / b2_app_key not set in config.yaml — B2 uploads will be disabled."
 fi
 
 # Observability ingest credentials live in deploy/prod.env (gitignored) so
@@ -100,22 +119,24 @@ kubectl create secret generic honeydue-apns-key \
   --from-file="apns_auth_key.p8=${SECRETS_DIR}/apns_auth_key.p8" \
   --dry-run=client -o yaml | kubectl apply -f -
 
-# --- Create GHCR registry credentials ---
+# --- Create container registry credentials ---
+# Secret name is gitea-credentials (audit F6): the registry is self-hosted
+# Gitea, not GHCR. Every deployment manifest references this same name.
 
 REGISTRY_SERVER="$(cfg registry.server)"
 REGISTRY_USER="$(cfg registry.username)"
 REGISTRY_TOKEN="$(cfg registry.token)"
 
 if [[ -n "${REGISTRY_SERVER}" && -n "${REGISTRY_USER}" && -n "${REGISTRY_TOKEN}" ]]; then
-  log "Creating ghcr-credentials..."
-  kubectl create secret docker-registry ghcr-credentials \
+  log "Creating gitea-credentials..."
+  kubectl create secret docker-registry gitea-credentials \
     --namespace="${NAMESPACE}" \
     --docker-server="${REGISTRY_SERVER}" \
     --docker-username="${REGISTRY_USER}" \
     --docker-password="${REGISTRY_TOKEN}" \
     --dry-run=client -o yaml | kubectl apply -f -
 else
-  warn "Registry credentials incomplete in config.yaml — skipping ghcr-credentials."
+  warn "Registry credentials incomplete in config.yaml — skipping gitea-credentials."
 fi
 
 # --- Create Cloudflare origin cert ---
@@ -132,7 +153,8 @@ kubectl create secret tls cloudflare-origin-cert \
 if [[ -n "${ADMIN_AUTH_USER}" && -n "${ADMIN_AUTH_PASSWORD}" ]]; then
   command -v htpasswd >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "Missing: htpasswd (install apache2-utils)"
   log "Creating admin-basic-auth secret..."
-  HTPASSWD="$(htpasswd -nb "${ADMIN_AUTH_USER}" "${ADMIN_AUTH_PASSWORD}")"
+  # -B forces bcrypt (Traefik BasicAuth supports it; avoids weak apr1-MD5).
+  HTPASSWD="$(htpasswd -nbB "${ADMIN_AUTH_USER}" "${ADMIN_AUTH_PASSWORD}")"
   kubectl create secret generic admin-basic-auth \
     --namespace="${NAMESPACE}" \
     --from-literal=users="${HTPASSWD}" \

deploy-k3s/scripts/03-deploy.sh

@@ -128,6 +128,56 @@ else
   warn "Skipping build. Using images for tag: ${DEPLOY_TAG}"
 fi
 
+# --- Resolve immutable image digests (audit F5) ---
+# A short-SHA tag is mutable — anyone who can push to the registry can
+# overwrite it, and imagePullPolicy then pulls the new bits silently. We
+# deploy by @sha256: digest instead, pinning the exact image that was just
+# built and pushed. `docker push` populates RepoDigests; with --skip-build
+# (no local image) resolve_ref falls back to the tag.
+resolve_ref() {
+  local img="$1" digest
+  digest="$(docker inspect --format='{{range .RepoDigests}}{{println .}}{{end}}' "${img}" 2>/dev/null | grep -m1 '@sha256:' || true)"
+  if [[ -n "${digest}" ]]; then
+    printf '%s' "${digest}"
+  else
+    warn "could not resolve a digest for ${img} — deploying by mutable tag"
+    printf '%s' "${img}"
+  fi
+}
+API_REF="$(resolve_ref "${API_IMAGE}")"
+WORKER_REF="$(resolve_ref "${WORKER_IMAGE}")"
+ADMIN_REF="$(resolve_ref "${ADMIN_IMAGE}")"
+WEB_REF="$(resolve_ref "${WEB_IMAGE}")"
+log "Deploying by digest:"
+log "  API:    ${API_REF}"
+log "  Worker: ${WORKER_REF}"
+log "  Admin:  ${ADMIN_REF}"
+
+# --- Image scan + signing (audit CODE-L5) ---
+# Both steps are best-effort: the deploy does NOT fail if the tools are
+# absent, so an operator who has not set up cosign/trivy yet is not blocked.
+# Install trivy + cosign and export COSIGN_KEY to enforce. Cluster-side
+# admission verification (Kyverno/Connaisseur) is a separate operator step.
+if [[ "${SKIP_BUILD}" == "false" ]]; then
+  if command -v trivy >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    log "Scanning images with Trivy (HIGH,CRITICAL)..."
+    for img in "${API_IMAGE}" "${WORKER_IMAGE}" "${ADMIN_IMAGE}"; do
+      trivy image --severity HIGH,CRITICAL --exit-code 0 --quiet "${img}" \
+        || warn "Trivy reported findings for ${img}"
+    done
+  else
+    warn "trivy not installed — skipping image vulnerability scan (audit L5)"
+  fi
+  if command -v cosign >/dev/null 2>&1 && [[ -n "${COSIGN_KEY:-}" ]]; then
+    log "Signing images with cosign..."
+    for ref in "${API_REF}" "${WORKER_REF}" "${ADMIN_REF}"; do
+      cosign sign --yes --key "${COSIGN_KEY}" "${ref}" || warn "cosign sign failed for ${ref}"
+    done
+  else
+    warn "cosign not configured (need cosign + COSIGN_KEY) — skipping image signing (audit L5)"
+  fi
+fi
+
 # --- Generate and apply ConfigMap from config.yaml ---
 
 log "Generating env from config.yaml..."
@@ -166,7 +216,7 @@ kubectl apply -f "${MANIFESTS}/ingress/"
 # pod sees a stale schema.
 log "Running database migrations (goose Job)..."
 kubectl delete job honeydue-migrate -n "${NAMESPACE}" --ignore-not-found --wait=true >/dev/null
-sed "s|image: IMAGE_PLACEHOLDER|image: ${API_IMAGE}|" "${MANIFESTS}/migrate/job.yaml" | kubectl apply -f -
+sed "s|image: IMAGE_PLACEHOLDER|image: ${API_REF}|" "${MANIFESTS}/migrate/job.yaml" | kubectl apply -f -
 if ! kubectl wait --namespace="${NAMESPACE}" --for=condition=complete --timeout=10m job/honeydue-migrate; then
   warn "migration Job failed — see logs:"
   kubectl logs -n "${NAMESPACE}" job/honeydue-migrate --tail=200 || true
@@ -175,17 +225,17 @@ fi
 log "Migrations applied; proceeding with api/worker rollout"
 
 # Apply deployments with image substitution
-sed "s|image: IMAGE_PLACEHOLDER|image: ${API_IMAGE}|" "${MANIFESTS}/api/deployment.yaml" | kubectl apply -f -
+sed "s|image: IMAGE_PLACEHOLDER|image: ${API_REF}|" "${MANIFESTS}/api/deployment.yaml" | kubectl apply -f -
 kubectl apply -f "${MANIFESTS}/api/service.yaml"
 kubectl apply -f "${MANIFESTS}/api/hpa.yaml"
 
-sed "s|image: IMAGE_PLACEHOLDER|image: ${WORKER_IMAGE}|" "${MANIFESTS}/worker/deployment.yaml" | kubectl apply -f -
+sed "s|image: IMAGE_PLACEHOLDER|image: ${WORKER_REF}|" "${MANIFESTS}/worker/deployment.yaml" | kubectl apply -f -
 
-sed "s|image: IMAGE_PLACEHOLDER|image: ${ADMIN_IMAGE}|" "${MANIFESTS}/admin/deployment.yaml" | kubectl apply -f -
+sed "s|image: IMAGE_PLACEHOLDER|image: ${ADMIN_REF}|" "${MANIFESTS}/admin/deployment.yaml" | kubectl apply -f -
 kubectl apply -f "${MANIFESTS}/admin/service.yaml"
 
 if [[ -d "${MANIFESTS}/web" ]]; then
-  sed "s|image: IMAGE_PLACEHOLDER|image: ${WEB_IMAGE}|" "${MANIFESTS}/web/deployment.yaml" | kubectl apply -f -
+  sed "s|image: IMAGE_PLACEHOLDER|image: ${WEB_REF}|" "${MANIFESTS}/web/deployment.yaml" | kubectl apply -f -
   kubectl apply -f "${MANIFESTS}/web/service.yaml"
 fi
 

deploy-k3s/scripts/_config.sh

@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ lines = [
     # API
     'DEBUG=false',
     f\"ALLOWED_HOSTS={d['api']},{d['base']}\",
-    f\"CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=https://{d['base']},https://{d['admin']}\",
+    f\"CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=https://{d['base']},https://{d['admin']},https://{d.get('app', 'app.' + d['base'])}\",
     'TIMEZONE=UTC',
     f\"BASE_URL=https://{d['base']}\",
     'PORT=8000',
@@ -119,9 +119,14 @@ lines = [
     f\"DB_MAX_IDLE_CONNS={db['max_idle_conns']}\",
     f\"DB_MAX_LIFETIME={db['max_lifetime']}\",
     f\"DB_MAX_IDLE_TIME={db.get('max_idle_time', '0s')}\",
-    # Redis (in-namespace DNS short form — password injected if configured;
-    # short form works because /etc/resolv.conf in pods searches honeydue.svc.cluster.local)
-    f\"REDIS_URL=redis://{':%s@' % val(rd.get('password')) if rd.get('password') else ''}redis:6379/0\",
+    # Redis — in-namespace DNS short form (works because pod /etc/resolv.conf
+    # searches honeydue.svc.cluster.local). Audit HIGH-1: the password is
+    # intentionally NOT embedded here. This URL is emitted into the
+    # honeydue-config ConfigMap, which is NOT encrypted at rest and is
+    # readable by anyone with `get configmap`. The Redis password travels
+    # only in honeydue-secrets as REDIS_PASSWORD (file-mounted, F8); the API
+    # applies it in cache_service.go and the worker onto its Asynq opt.
+    'REDIS_URL=redis://redis:6379/0',
     'REDIS_DB=0',
     # Email
     f\"EMAIL_HOST={em['host']}\",
@@ -218,8 +223,18 @@ config = {
         'image': 'ubuntu-24.04',
     },
     'additional_packages': ['open-iscsi'],
-    'post_create_commands': ['sudo systemctl enable --now iscsid'],
-    'k3s_config_file': 'secrets-encryption: true\n',
+    # Audit K3S-CG2: harden the node OS at provision time — fail2ban for SSH
+    # brute-force, unattended-upgrades for automatic security patches.
+    'post_create_commands': [
+        'sudo systemctl enable --now iscsid',
+        'sudo apt-get update -qq',
+        'sudo DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y -qq fail2ban unattended-upgrades',
+        'sudo systemctl enable --now fail2ban',
+        'sudo dpkg-reconfigure -f noninteractive -plow unattended-upgrades',
+    ],
+    # Audit K3S-CG1 / K3S-F4: encrypt Secrets at rest in etcd, and write the
+    # node kubeconfig as mode 0600 (not world-readable).
+    'k3s_config_file': 'secrets-encryption: true\nwrite-kubeconfig-mode: \"0600\"\n',
 }
 
 print(yaml.dump(config, default_flow_style=False, sort_keys=False))