docs/deployment: record security hardening pass + webapp + APNs

Mark roadmap items done (network policies, Traefik middleware, CF Full
strict, CF IP UFW restriction, webapp deploy, APNs wired up, admin
URL-baking fix, admin probe bug). Update Chapter 4 (firewall rule
inventory now shows CF-only :443, no :80), Chapter 6 (request flow
walks through TLS on :443 and middleware hops), Chapter 13 (CF SSL
mode is Full strict, not Flexible; documents the origin cert
install), Chapter 7 (adds the web service section — proxy pattern,
3 replicas, PostHog build-args), and Appendix C (web manifests, CF
origin cert paths on disk, APNs .p8 path, updated network-policies
applied status).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

docs/deployment/04-firewall.md

@@ -27,23 +27,27 @@ that every legitimate port be enumerated in a rule.
 Run `sudo ufw status verbose` on any node to see the live ruleset. The
 canonical ruleset below, grouped by purpose.
 
-### Public-facing (anywhere)
+### Public-facing
 
-| Port | Protocol | From | Purpose | Comment |
+| Port | Protocol | From | Purpose |
-|---|---|---|---|---|
+|---|---|---|---|
-| 22 | TCP | Anywhere | SSH | |
+| 22 | TCP | Anywhere | SSH (key-only) |
-| 80 | TCP | Anywhere | HTTP (Cloudflare → Traefik) | |
+| 443 | TCP | Cloudflare ranges (15 IPv4 + 7 IPv6) | HTTPS (CF → Traefik, TLS-terminated at Traefik) |
-| 443 | TCP | Anywhere | HTTPS (future, currently unused at origin) | |
 
-**Why 443 is open but unused**: We're on Cloudflare SSL=Flexible, so
+**Port :80 is closed** on all three nodes. CF is in Full (strict) mode
-Cloudflare talks to origin over plain HTTP:80. Port 443 on origin is
+and initiates every request on :443 to the origin. Cloudflare's
-only hit by misconfigured clients (who bypass CF DNS and hit node IPs
+"Always Use HTTPS" turns any plaintext client request into HTTPS at
-directly). Traefik's config accepts it but we don't require it. Keeping
+the edge, so the origin never needs to accept :80.
-it open smooths a future switch to Full (strict) SSL mode.
 
-**Future hardening**: Restrict 80 and 443 to Cloudflare's published IP
+**Port :443 is restricted to Cloudflare** via 22 UFW allow rules per
-ranges (15 IPv4 CIDRs, 7 IPv6 CIDRs). See [Chapter 13](./13-cloudflare.md)
+node (one per CF CIDR). Direct-connect from any non-CF IP is dropped
-for the ranges and the UFW rule format. Today they're open to anyone.
+at the kernel. This closes the "node IP leak = bypass CF WAF/DDoS"
+hole entirely. See [Chapter 13](./13-cloudflare.md#cloudflare-ip-ranges-used-in-traefik-trustedips)
+for the exact ranges and UFW rule format.
+
+**Refresh cadence**: CF updates its IP ranges rarely. A monthly
+`curl https://www.cloudflare.com/ips-v4` diff and UFW re-apply is
+enough. Automation TODO (Chapter 20).
 
 ### SSH (operator access)
 

docs/deployment/06-traefik-ingress.md

@@ -280,16 +280,22 @@ most Ingress controllers and matches how users think about URL routing.
 
 ## How requests flow
 
-1. **Cloudflare DNS** resolves `api.myhoneydue.com` to one of three IPs
+1. **Cloudflare DNS** resolves `api.myhoneydue.com` to a CF edge IP
-   (round-robin). Say it picks `178.105.32.198` (hetzner2).
+   (client never sees the three origin IPs — CF proxies).
-2. **Cloudflare edge** establishes TCP to `178.105.32.198:80` (plain HTTP,
+2. **Cloudflare edge** terminates TLS from the browser, then opens a
-   SSL=Flexible). Original HTTPS terminated at CF.
+   fresh TCP to one of the origin IPs on `:443` (SSL=Full (strict)).
-3. **UFW on hetzner2** accepts the SYN (80/tcp open from anywhere).
+   Say it picks `178.105.32.198` (hetzner2).
-4. **Linux kernel** sees a listener on 0.0.0.0:80 (the Traefik pod).
+3. **UFW on hetzner2** accepts the SYN — the source IP is in one of
-   Hands off the SYN.
+   the 15 CF IPv4 CIDRs allowed on `:443`. (Any non-CF source IP is
-5. **Traefik accepts** the connection. Reads the HTTP request.
+   dropped at the kernel.)
+4. **Linux kernel** sees a listener on `0.0.0.0:443` (the Traefik pod,
+   hostNetwork). Hands off the SYN.
+5. **Traefik accepts** the connection, completes the TLS handshake
+   using the `cloudflare-origin-cert` secret (CF Origin CA — CF
+   verifies this chain on its side). Reads the plaintext HTTP request.
 6. **Traefik matches** the `Host:` header against its router table.
    `Host: api.myhoneydue.com` → `honeydue-api` Ingress → `api` Service.
+   Attached middlewares (`security-headers`, `rate-limit`) run here.
 7. **Traefik dials** `10.43.167.83:8000` (api Service ClusterIP). This
    goes through the cluster DNS (CoreDNS) and kube-proxy (IPVS).
 8. **kube-proxy IPVS** rewrites the destination to a live api pod endpoint

docs/deployment/07-services.md

@@ -2,9 +2,10 @@
 
 ## Summary
 
-Four workloads run in the `honeydue` namespace: **api** (Go REST API, 3
+Five workloads run in the `honeydue` namespace: **api** (Go REST API, 3
-replicas), **admin** (Next.js panel, 1 replica), **worker** (Go background
+replicas), **admin** (Next.js admin panel, 1 replica), **web** (Next.js
-jobs, 1 replica), and **redis** (cache + job queue, 1 replica, PVC-backed).
+customer-facing app, 3 replicas), **worker** (Go background jobs, 1
+replica), and **redis** (cache + job queue, 1 replica, PVC-backed).
 This chapter deep-dives each: container image, resource limits, probes,
 volumes, and why each knob is set the way it is.
 
@@ -14,10 +15,11 @@ volumes, and why each knob is set the way it is.
 |---|---|---|---|---|
 | `api` | `gitea.treytartt.com/admin/honeydue-api:<sha>` | 3 | 8000 | HTTP REST API |
 | `admin` | `gitea.treytartt.com/admin/honeydue-admin:<sha>` | 1 | 3000 | Next.js admin panel |
+| `web` | `gitea.treytartt.com/admin/honeydue-web:<sha>` | 3 | 3000 | Next.js customer-facing web client at `app.myhoneydue.com` |
 | `worker` | `gitea.treytartt.com/admin/honeydue-worker:<sha>` | 1 | — | Background job processor |
 | `redis` | `redis:7-alpine` | 1 | 6379 | Cache + Asynq queue |
 
-All four are Kubernetes `Deployment` workloads (not StatefulSets, not
+All five are Kubernetes `Deployment` workloads (not StatefulSets, not
 DaemonSets). They share:
 - ServiceAccount with `automountServiceAccountToken: false` (Chapter 5)
 - `imagePullSecrets: [gitea-credentials]` (Chapter 11)
@@ -25,6 +27,66 @@ DaemonSets). They share:
 - Individual env vars wired to `honeydue-secrets` keys
 - Read-only root filesystem with `tmp` emptyDir mounted at `/tmp`
 
+## Service — web (Next.js customer app)
+
+### What it does
+
+Lives at `https://app.myhoneydue.com`. Next.js 16 standalone build,
+served by `node server.js` inside the container. Sibling repo:
+`/Users/treyt/Desktop/code/honeyDue/honeyDueAPI-Web/`.
+
+### Architecture: server-side proxy pattern
+
+Unlike the admin panel (which makes CORS requests directly to
+`api.myhoneydue.com`), the web app uses a proxy pattern:
+
+```
+Browser → https://app.myhoneydue.com/api/proxy/tasks/123/
+       → Next.js route handler (src/app/api/proxy/[...path]/route.ts)
+       → reads honeydue-token httpOnly cookie
+       → attaches Authorization: Token <value>
+       → https://api.myhoneydue.com/api/tasks/123/ (server-side fetch)
+       → response flows back
+```
+
+**Consequences:**
+- Browser never makes cross-origin requests. No CORS entry needed on
+  the Go API for `app.myhoneydue.com`.
+- Auth tokens live in httpOnly cookies, not localStorage. XSS can't
+  exfiltrate them.
+- The web pod needs outbound HTTPS to `api.myhoneydue.com` — covered
+  in the `allow-egress-from-web` NetworkPolicy (Chapter 5).
+
+### Env vars
+
+Build-time (baked into the client bundle by the Dockerfile `ARG`):
+- `NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL` — only used as a fallback; baked for safety
+- `NEXT_PUBLIC_POSTHOG_KEY` — PostHog project API key
+- `NEXT_PUBLIC_POSTHOG_HOST` — `https://analytics.88oakapps.com`
+
+Runtime (ConfigMap):
+- `API_URL=https://api.myhoneydue.com/api` — consumed by the
+  server-side proxy handlers
+- `PORT=3000`, `HOSTNAME=0.0.0.0`
+
+### Deployment spec highlights
+
+- **3 replicas**, same as api — this is a production customer surface
+- `topologySpreadConstraints` across `kubernetes.io/hostname` —
+  evicting one node at most kills one pod
+- `readOnlyRootFilesystem: true`; `emptyDir`s at `/app/.next/cache`
+  (Next.js build cache) and `/tmp`
+- PDB `web-pdb` with `minAvailable: 2`
+- runAsUser/runAsGroup `1001` (matches the `nextjs` user created in
+  the Dockerfile)
+
+### Why same availability as api
+
+The web client is now the primary user-facing surface. Users hitting
+`app.myhoneydue.com/login` should never see a 502 because a single
+node went down. 3 replicas × `minAvailable: 2` guarantees at least
+two pods stay up through any voluntary disruption.
+
 ## Service 1 — api (Go REST API)
 
 ### What it does

docs/deployment/13-cloudflare.md

@@ -5,8 +5,9 @@
 Cloudflare sits in front of every public request. It provides DNS
 (authoritative nameservers for `myhoneydue.com`), TLS termination at
 the edge, DDoS mitigation, caching, and the round-robin fan-out across
-our three node IPs. We use the Free plan. TLS mode is "Flexible"
+our three node IPs. We use the Free plan. TLS mode is **Full (strict)**
-(HTTP between CF and origin). This chapter documents every Cloudflare
+— CF connects to origin over HTTPS and verifies the origin's cert
+against CF's own Origin CA. This chapter documents every Cloudflare
 setting that matters.
 
 ## DNS
@@ -72,53 +73,49 @@ when you want sub-second failover.
 
 ## TLS
 
-### Mode: Flexible
+### Mode: Full (strict)
 
-CF Dashboard → SSL/TLS → Overview → **Flexible**.
+CF Dashboard → SSL/TLS → Overview → **Full (strict)**.
 
 **What this means:**
-- User ↔ Cloudflare: **TLS** (HTTPS)
+- User ↔ Cloudflare: **TLS** (HTTPS) — CF serves its own Let's Encrypt cert
-- Cloudflare ↔ Origin: **plaintext HTTP** (port 80)
+- Cloudflare ↔ Origin: **TLS** (HTTPS :443) — origin serves our CF Origin CA cert; CF verifies it chains to CF's Origin CA root
 
-**Why we chose it:**
+**How it's wired:**
-- No origin cert required on the Hetzner nodes
+- k8s secret `cloudflare-origin-cert` (type `kubernetes.io/tls`) holds
-- Zero Traefik cert-management complexity
+  `tls.crt` + `tls.key`. The cert is valid for `*.myhoneydue.com` +
-- Fine for a site where CF terminates all user-facing TLS
+  `myhoneydue.com`, 15-year validity, issued by
+  `CloudFlare Origin CA SSL Certificate Authority`.
+- All three `Ingress` resources in `deploy-k3s/manifests/ingress/ingress-simple.yaml`
+  reference the secret via `spec.tls[].secretName`.
+- Traefik terminates TLS on :443 using the cert. Backend pods still
+  speak plain HTTP over the cluster network (Traefik → pod is an
+  intra-cluster hop, encrypted at the Flannel overlay layer).
 
-**Downsides:**
+**Why we chose Full (strict) over Flexible:**
-- An attacker with network access between CF and Hetzner could read
+- CF → origin traffic was plaintext on Flexible. Between Cloudflare's
-  traffic. Realistically: nobody between CF's POPs and Hetzner's
+  POPs and Hetzner Nuremberg is a lot of internet. Full (strict)
-  Nuremberg DC, but it's theoretically plaintext on the wire.
+  closes that gap.
-- MitM risk if DNS gets hijacked and traffic is routed through an
+- Origin cert is a CF-internal-only CA, so it's useless to anyone who
-  unintended origin.
+  isn't CF. Non-CF clients that somehow bypass the UFW CF-IP allowlist
+  can't impersonate the origin because their cert wouldn't chain to
+  CF's Origin CA root.
 
-### Future: Full (strict)
+**Maintenance:** the Origin CA cert is valid for 15 years (expires
+Apr 2041). No action needed until then. If rotation is ever required,
+regenerate in CF dashboard → SSL/TLS → Origin Server, re-run the
+`kubectl create secret tls cloudflare-origin-cert --dry-run=client -o yaml | kubectl apply -f -`
+command, Traefik picks it up on next secret reload (no pod restart).
 
-The next step up is **Full (strict)**: CF verifies origin's TLS cert
+### Regenerating the cert (for the record)
-and connects over HTTPS. Cloudflare provides free **Origin CA
-certificates** for this: they're issued by a CF-internal CA that only
-CF's own edge accepts. An attacker without a CF-signed cert can't
-impersonate our origin.
 
-Path to enable:
-1. Generate Origin CA cert in CF dashboard → SSL/TLS → Origin Server
-2. Download as PEM
-3. Create k8s Secret `cloudflare-origin-cert`:
 ```bash
-   kubectl create secret tls cloudflare-origin-cert -n honeydue \
+# After downloading cf-origin-cert.pem + cf-origin-key.pem from CF dashboard:
-     --cert=origin.crt --key=origin.key
+kubectl -n honeydue create secret tls cloudflare-origin-cert \
+  --cert=cf-origin-cert.pem \
+  --key=cf-origin-key.pem \
+  --dry-run=client -o yaml | kubectl apply -f -
 ```
-4. Add `tls:` block to our Ingress:
-   ```yaml
-   spec:
-     tls:
-       - hosts: [api.myhoneydue.com]
-         secretName: cloudflare-origin-cert
-   ```
-5. Switch CF SSL mode to Full (strict)
-
-Trad-off: the `cloudflare-origin-cert` expires (default 15 years), so
-low maintenance. **TODO** (Chapter 20).
 
 ### Edge certificate
 

docs/deployment/20-roadmap.md

@@ -19,69 +19,55 @@ minute, with Slack/email alerts on failure.
 **Effort**: ~30 min for Uptime Kuma deploy, ~10 min for Better Stack
 signup.
 
-### Cloudflare origin IP restriction
+### ~~Cloudflare origin IP restriction~~ ✓ DONE (2026-04-24)
 
-**Why**: UFW allows :80 from anywhere. If node IPs leak, direct-connect
+Both `:80` and `:443` `Anywhere` rules removed on all 3 nodes. Only
-attackers bypass CF's WAF/DDoS protection.
+CF's 15 IPv4 + 7 IPv6 ranges allowed on `:443`. Direct-connect attempts
+from non-CF IPs time out.
 
-**How**: Replace the anywhere-80 UFW rule with 15 IPv4 + 7 IPv6 CF
+**Still TODO**: monthly automated refresh of the CF IP list. Ranges
-ranges. See [Chapter 13 §CF IP ranges](./13-cloudflare.md#cloudflare-ip-ranges-used-in-traefik-trustedips).
+change rarely; manual re-run of `scripts/ufw-cf-refresh.sh` (not yet
+written) on cadence is acceptable for now.
 
-Automation: a small script that refreshes the CF IP list monthly and
+### ~~Enable network policies in k3s~~ ✓ DONE (2026-04-24)
-re-applies UFW rules.
 
-**Effort**: 1 hour.
+Applied with one scaffold correction: Traefik runs as a DaemonSet with
+`hostNetwork: true`, so traffic from it arrives with the **node IP** as
+source rather than a pod IP. The original scaffold used
+`namespaceSelector: kube-system` which doesn't match hostNetwork
+traffic. Fixed by using an `ipBlock` list of the three node IPs plus
+the cluster pod CIDR `10.42.0.0/16`.
 
-### Enable network policies in k3s
+Also added policies for `web` (missing from the original scaffold).
 
-**Why**: Currently pods can freely egress anywhere. A compromised pod
+### ~~Apply Traefik security middleware~~ ✓ DONE (2026-04-24)
-could exfiltrate data or attack lateral services.
 
-**How**: `kubectl apply -f deploy-k3s/manifests/network-policies.yaml`.
+`security-headers` + `rate-limit` attached to all three ingresses
-The scaffold defines default-deny + explicit allows for:
+(api, admin, web). `admin-auth` is defined but not attached (needs an
-- DNS egress for all pods
+`admin-basic-auth` secret we haven't created). `cloudflare-only` IP
-- Traefik → api (port 8000)
+allowlist exists but is redundant with the UFW-level CF restriction —
-- Traefik → admin (port 3000)
+keep for defense in depth if we ever expose another layer.
-- api/worker → Redis
-- api/worker → external services (Postgres, B2, Fastmail)
 
-Then test that nothing breaks (might need to adjust allow rules).
+One scaffold correction: the `Content-Security-Policy` header in
-
+`security-headers.customResponseHeaders` was stripped. The Go API sets
-**Effort**: 1-2 hours including testing.
+its own CSP in `internal/router/router.go`, and two CSP headers combine
-
+via intersection (most restrictive wins), which would break the Google
-### Apply Traefik security middleware
+Fonts on the marketing landing page. Next.js apps set their own via
-
+middleware.
-**Why**: Our current Ingress has no rate limiting or security headers
-beyond what Traefik adds by default.
-
-**How**: Apply `deploy-k3s/manifests/ingress/middleware.yaml`, annotate
-Ingresses to use them:
-
-```yaml
-metadata:
-  annotations:
-    traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.middlewares: honeydue-security-headers@kubernetescrd,honeydue-rate-limit@kubernetescrd
-```
-
-**Effort**: 15 min.
 
 ## Medium priority
 
-### Upgrade to CF Full (strict) SSL
+### ~~Upgrade to CF Full (strict) SSL~~ ✓ DONE (2026-04-24)
 
-**Why**: Currently CF↔origin is plain HTTP. An attacker between CF and
+Origin CA cert (`*.myhoneydue.com` + `myhoneydue.com`, 15-year
-Hetzner could read traffic. Full (strict) mode encrypts this leg with
+validity) stored as `cloudflare-origin-cert` TLS secret. All three
-a CF-issued origin cert.
+ingresses reference it via `tls:` blocks. CF mode flipped from
+Flexible to Full (strict). Verified by:
 
-**How**:
+- direct-connect to origin on `:443` serves the Origin cert (subject
-1. Generate Origin CA cert in CF dashboard → SSL/TLS → Origin Server
+  `CN=CloudFlare Origin Certificate`)
-2. Create `cloudflare-origin-cert` Secret in k8s
+- CF edge continues to serve its own Let's Encrypt cert to browsers
-3. Add `tls:` block to Ingresses
+- both layers now TLS-encrypted
-4. Switch CF SSL mode to Full (strict)
-
-**Effort**: 30 min.
-
-**Citations**: [Cloudflare Origin CA docs][cf-origin-ca]
 
 ### Migration Job for schema changes
 
@@ -312,7 +298,16 @@ k3s server on each node with the new backend.
 As items are done, mark them here. Think of this as a running changelog.
 
 - [x] k3s migration from Swarm (2026-04-24)
-- [x] Traefik DaemonSet + hostNetwork
+- [x] Traefik DaemonSet + hostNetwork (2026-04-24)
-- [x] Admin seed via ADMIN_EMAIL + ADMIN_PASSWORD
+- [x] Admin seed via ADMIN_EMAIL + ADMIN_PASSWORD (2026-04-24)
-- [x] Documentation book (this doc set)
+- [x] Documentation book (this doc set) (2026-04-24)
+- [x] Web client deployed at `app.myhoneydue.com` (2026-04-24) — Next.js 16 standalone, 3 replicas with PDB, proxy pattern to api, see Chapter 7.
+- [x] Admin URL-baking fix (2026-04-24) — Dockerfile `ARG NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL`, `.dockerignore` hardening for `admin/.env.*`.
+- [x] Auto-seed initial data on first API boot (2026-04-24) — `20260414_seed_initial_data` migration populates lookups, admin user, task templates. See commit `4ec4bbb`.
+- [x] APNs wired up (2026-04-24) — Key ID `5L5BVF5G48`, Team ID `X86BR9WTLD`, sandbox mode. Secret `honeydue-apns-key`, `FEATURE_PUSH_ENABLED=true`.
+- [x] Traefik middleware: `security-headers` + `rate-limit` attached to all three ingresses (2026-04-24). CSP is stripped from the middleware because the Go API sets its own.
+- [x] Admin liveness probe path fix (2026-04-24) — was hitting `/admin/` (404) and crashlooping every ~90s for 6 hours before the bug was caught. Fixed to `/`.
+- [x] Network policies applied (2026-04-24) — default-deny + explicit allows. Traefik hostNetwork is matched via node IP `ipBlock`s, not namespaceSelector. See Chapter 5.
+- [x] Cloudflare Full (strict) SSL (2026-04-24) — Origin CA cert installed as `cloudflare-origin-cert` secret, ingresses have `tls:` blocks, CF mode flipped from Flexible. Both user↔CF and CF↔origin now TLS.
+- [x] UFW CF-IP allowlist on all 3 nodes (2026-04-24) — 15 IPv4 + 7 IPv6 CF ranges allow `:443`; `Anywhere` rules for `:80` and `:443` deleted. Direct-connect from non-CF IPs times out.
 - [ ] All other items above

docs/deployment/appendices/c-file-locations.md

@@ -34,6 +34,14 @@ ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIBU9xTTBD78tYUqHijgyU9PDqtmS4NuM/6uy8XgDzva+
 | `~/.docker/config.json` | Docker CLI config. After `docker login` to Gitea, contains creds. **Log out after each deploy** to not leave PATs on disk. |
 | `~/Library/Containers/com.docker.docker/` | Docker Desktop state (macOS). |
 
+### Apple / Cloudflare credentials on disk
+
+| Path | Purpose |
+|---|---|
+| `~/Desktop/code/honeyDue/AuthKey_5L5BVF5G48.p8` | APNs auth key (Apple). Source file for the `honeydue-apns-key` k8s secret. Sensitive — treat as a credential. |
+| `~/Desktop/code/honeyDue/cf-origin-cert.pem` | Cloudflare Origin CA cert (PEM). Source file for the `cloudflare-origin-cert` k8s secret. `*.myhoneydue.com` + `myhoneydue.com`, expires 2041. |
+| `~/Desktop/code/honeyDue/cf-origin-key.pem` | Private key for the Origin cert. CF only shows this **once** at generation time. Sensitive — treat as a credential. |
+
 ## Git repo (`/Users/treyt/Desktop/code/honeyDue/honeyDueAPI-go/`)
 
 ### Top-level
@@ -90,19 +98,21 @@ ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIBU9xTTBD78tYUqHijgyU9PDqtmS4NuM/6uy8XgDzva+
 | `deploy-k3s/manifests/namespace.yaml` | Creates `honeydue` namespace. |
 | `deploy-k3s/manifests/rbac.yaml` | ServiceAccounts + `automountServiceAccountToken: false`. |
 | `deploy-k3s/manifests/pod-disruption-budgets.yaml` | PDBs for api (2/3) and worker (0/1). |
-| `deploy-k3s/manifests/network-policies.yaml` | Default-deny + allows. NOT currently applied. |
+| `deploy-k3s/manifests/network-policies.yaml` | Default-deny + allows. **Applied.** Includes web policies; Traefik hostNetwork handled via node IP `ipBlock`s rather than namespaceSelector. |
 | `deploy-k3s/manifests/api/deployment.yaml` | api Deployment. |
 | `deploy-k3s/manifests/api/service.yaml` | api ClusterIP Service. |
 | `deploy-k3s/manifests/api/hpa.yaml` | api HorizontalPodAutoscaler. NOT currently applied. |
 | `deploy-k3s/manifests/admin/deployment.yaml` | admin Deployment. |
 | `deploy-k3s/manifests/admin/service.yaml` | admin Service. |
+| `deploy-k3s/manifests/web/deployment.yaml` | web Deployment (3 replicas, customer-facing Next.js at app.myhoneydue.com). |
+| `deploy-k3s/manifests/web/service.yaml` | web ClusterIP Service. |
 | `deploy-k3s/manifests/worker/deployment.yaml` | worker Deployment. |
 | `deploy-k3s/manifests/redis/deployment.yaml` | Redis Deployment. |
 | `deploy-k3s/manifests/redis/service.yaml` | Redis Service. |
 | `deploy-k3s/manifests/redis/pvc.yaml` | Redis PersistentVolumeClaim. |
-| `deploy-k3s/manifests/ingress/ingress.yaml` | Full Ingress with TLS + middleware (scaffold; needs CF origin cert). |
+| `deploy-k3s/manifests/ingress/ingress.yaml` | Alternate full Ingress scaffold (unused; we apply ingress-simple.yaml). |
-| `deploy-k3s/manifests/ingress/ingress-simple.yaml` | Simple Ingress without TLS (what we actually apply). |
+| `deploy-k3s/manifests/ingress/ingress-simple.yaml` | **Primary Ingress**. TLS via CF Origin cert, `security-headers` + `rate-limit` middleware attached to all three rules (api/admin/web). |
-| `deploy-k3s/manifests/ingress/middleware.yaml` | Traefik middleware CRDs. Not currently applied. |
+| `deploy-k3s/manifests/ingress/middleware.yaml` | Traefik middleware CRDs (`rate-limit`, `security-headers`, `cloudflare-only`). Applied. `admin-auth` was defined but removed at runtime (needs an unset basic-auth secret). |
 | `deploy-k3s/manifests/traefik-helmchartconfig.yaml` | Our DaemonSet + hostNetwork override for Traefik. |
 | `deploy-k3s/manifests/secrets.yaml.example` | Template (never deployed). |
 | `deploy-k3s/scripts/01-provision-cluster.sh` | hetzner-k3s provisioning (we didn't use it; existing nodes). |